随着苏加诺政权的瓦解,苏哈托在政变后开始掌握权力。印尼共产党的全国最高领导人被追捕和逮捕,许多领导人均被草率处决。10月初,印尼共产党主席迪帕·努桑塔拉·艾地逃往中爪哇,但在11月22日便被支持苏哈托的部队逮捕并处决。曾在苏加诺政府中担任高级顾问的印尼共产党领导人恩乔托(英语:Njoto)于11月6日左右被枪杀,印尼共产党第一副主席M.H.卢克曼(英语:M. H. Lukman)在次年四月被杀。
在一些地区,當地的印尼华人被杀害,他们的财产被抢劫和焚烧,这是反华种族主义的结果,借口是 D. N. 艾迪特让印尼共产党更接近中華人民共和國。印尼华裔历史学家伊塔·法蒂娅·纳迪亚 (Ita Fatia Nadia) 在《雅加达邮报》上表示,她的父亲是一名“帕图克青年”,也是一名印尼社会党党员。1965年10月,她七岁时,印尼陆军士兵来到她位于日惹的家进行检查,随后他便失踪了.她还记得,在上学的路上看到尸体,意识到失踪的家人和邻居都被杀了,后来她母亲告诉她不要管这件事[28]。
对印尼华人的歧视在苏门答腊和加里曼丹]的屠杀中扮演了重要角色,这些屠杀被称为种族灭绝。Charles A. Coppel 对这种说法提出了严厉批评,他认为西方媒体和学者不愿面对他们所支持的反共议程的后果[32] ,而是把印尼种族主义当成替罪羊,并夸大其词地声称有数十万或数百万印尼華人被杀[33] 。Charles A. Coppel 在一篇题为“从未发生过的种族灭绝:解释1965-1966年印尼反华大屠杀的神话”的文章中谈到了这种歪曲的报道。Coppel在1998年5月骚乱的报道中也看到了同样的偏见,当时人道主义志愿者团队指出,非华裔抢劫者占被杀人数的大多数[34] 。他的论点继续引发争论[35]。
据估计,约有2,000名印尼华人被杀害(反共大屠殺总死亡人数估计在50万至300万人之间),有记录显示,在望加锡、棉兰和龙目岛发生了屠杀[36]。Robert Cribb和Charles A. Coppel指出,在清洗期间,实际上只有“相对较少”的华人被杀害,而大多数死者都是印尼原住民[37] 。华人的死亡人数达数千人,而印尼原住民的死亡人数则达数十万。被屠杀的绝大多数人是巴厘人和爪哇人[33]。
^Robinson, Geoffrey B. The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66. Princeton University Press. 2018: 206–207 [2021-11-30]. ISBN 978-1-4008-8886-3. (原始内容存档于2018-08-20). In short, Western states were not innocent bystanders to unfolding domestic political events following the alleged coup, as so often claimed. On the contrary, starting almost immediately after October 1, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several of their allies set in motion a coordinated campaign to assist the Army in the political and physical destruction of the PKI and its affiliates, the removal of Sukarno and his closest associates from political power, their replacement by an Army elite led by Suharto, and the engineering of a seismic shift in Indonesia's foreign policy towards the West. They did this through backdoor political reassurances to Army leaders, a policy of official silence in the face of the mounting violence, a sophisticated international propaganda offensive, and the covert provision of material assistance to the Army and its allies. In all these ways, they helped to ensure that the campaign against the Left would continue unabated and its victims would ultimately number in the hundreds of thousands.
^Melvin, Jess. Telegrams confirm scale of US complicity in 1965 genocide. Indonesia at Melbourne. University of Melbourne. 20 October 2017 [21 October 2017]. (原始内容存档于2021-12-08). The new telegrams confirm the US actively encouraged and facilitated genocide in Indonesia to pursue its own political interests in the region, while propagating an explanation of the killings it knew to be untrue.
^Simpson, Bradley. Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968. Stanford University Press. 2010: 193 [2024-02-22]. ISBN 978-0-8047-7182-5. (原始内容存档于2018-06-25). Washington did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the Army-led massacre of alleged PKI members, and U.S. officials worried only that the killing of the party's unarmed supporters might not go far enough, permitting Sukarno to return to power and frustrate the [Johnson] Administration's emerging plans for a post-Sukarno Indonesia. This was efficacious terror, an essential building block of the neoliberal policies that the West would attempt to impose on Indonesia after Sukarno's ouster.
^Andrew, John Rotter. Light at the end of the tunnel. Rowman & Littlefield Publ. 2010: 273. ISBN 978-0-7425-6133-5.
^ 19.019.119.2Bevins, Vincent. The Jakarta method: Washington's anticommunist crusade & the mass murder program that shaped our world First Trade Paperback Edition. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. 2021. ISBN 978-1-5417-4240-6. 引文格式1维护:冗余文本 (link)
^Friend (2003), p. 111; Taylor (2003), p. 358; Vickers (2005), p. 159; Robinson (1995), p. ch. 11.
^John Braithwaite. Anomie and violence: non-truth and reconciliation in Indonesian peacebuilding. ANU E Press. 2010: 294 [15 December 2011]. ISBN 978-1-921666-22-3. In 1967, Dayaks had expelled Chinese from the interior of West Kalimantan. In this Chinese ethnic cleansing, Dayaks were co-opted by the military who wanted to remove those Chinese from the interior who they believed were supporting communists. The most certain way to accomplish this was to drive all Chinese out of the interior of West Kalimantan. Perhaps 2000–5000 people were massacred (Davidson 2002:158) and probably a greater number died from the conditions in overcrowded refugee camps, including 1500 Chinese children aged between one and eight who died of starvation in Pontianak camps (p. 173). The Chinese retreated permanently to the major towns...the Chinese in West Kalimantan rarely resisted (though they had in nineteenth-century conflict with the Dutch, and in 1914). Instead, they fled. One old Chinese man who fled to Pontianak in 1967 said that the Chinese did not even consider or discuss striking back at Dayaks as an option. This was because they were imbued with a philosophy of being a guest on other people's land to become a great trading diaspora.
^Eva-Lotta E. Hedman. Eva-Lotta E. Hedman , 编. Conflict, violence, and displacement in indonesia. SOSEA-45 Series illustrated. SEAP Publications. 2008: 63 [15 December 2011]. ISBN 978-0-87727-745-3. the role of indigenous Dayak leaders accounted for their "success." Regional officers and interested Dayak leaders helped to translate the virulent anti-community environment locally into an evident anti-Chinese sentiment. In the process, the rural Chinese were constructed as godless communists complicit with members of the local Indonesian Communist Party...In October 1967, the military, with the help of the former Dayak Governor Oevaang Oeray and his Lasykar Pangsuma (Pangsuma Militia) instigated and facilitated a Dayak-led slaughter of ethnic Chinese. Over the next three months, thousands were killed and roughly 75,000 more fled Sambas and northern Pontianak districts to coastal urban centers like Pontianak City and Singkawang to be sheltered in refugee and "detainment" camps. By expelling the "community" Chinese, Oeray and his gang... intended to ingratiate themselves with Suharto's new regime.