From the 1990s, right-wing populist parties became established in the legislatures of various democracies. Right-wing populism has remained the dominant political force in the Republican Party in the United States since the 2010s.[32] Although extreme right-wing movements in the United States (where they are normally referred to as the "radical right") are usually characterized as separate entities, some writers consider them to be a part of a broader, right-wing populist phenomenon.[33] American businessman and media personality Donald Trump won the 2016 and 2024 United States presidential elections after running on platforms founded on right-wing populist themes.[34]
Cas Mudde argues that what he calls the "populist radical right" starts with the idea of 'the nation'. He however rejects the use of nationalism as a core ideology of right-wing populism on the ground that there are also purely "civic" or "liberal" forms of nationalism, preferring instead the term nativism: a xenophobic form of nationalism asserting that "states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation'), and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state". Mudde further argues that "while nativism could include racist arguments, it can also be non-racist (including and excluding on the basis of culture or even religion)", and that the term nativism does not reduce the parties to mere single-issue parties, such as the term anti-immigrant does. In the maximum definition, to nativism is added authoritarianism—an attitude, not necessarily anti-democratic or autocratic, to prefer "law and order" and the submission to authority[b]—and populism—a "thin-centered ideology" that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the "general will of the people", regardless of human rights or constitutional guarantees.[c][36] Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser reiterated in 2017 that within European right-wing populism, there is a "marriage of convenience" of populism based on an "ethnic and chauvinistic definition of the people", authoritarianism, and nativism. This results in right-wing populism having a "xenophobic nature".[37]
Roger Eatwell, Emeritus Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Bath, writes that, "whilst populism and fascism differ notably ideologically, in practice the latter has borrowed aspects of populist discourse and style, and populism can degenerate into leader-oriented authoritarian and exclusionary politics."[9] For populism to transition into fascism or proto-fascism, it requires a "nihilistic culture and an intractable crisis".[10]
[P]opulism is like fascism in being a response to liberal and socialist explanations of the political. And also like fascism, populism does not recognize a legitimate political place for an opposition that it regards as acting against the desires of the people and that it also accuses of being tyrannical, conspiratorial, and antidemocratic. ... The opponents are turned into public enemies, but only rhetorically. If populism moves from rhetorical enmity to practices of enemy identification and persecution, we could be talking about its transformation into fascism or another form of dictatorial repression. This has happened in the past ... and without question it could happen in the future. This morphing of populism back into fascism is always a possibility, but it is very uncommon, and when it does happen, and populism becomes fully antidemocratic, it is no longer populism.[38]
Erik Berggren and Andres Neergard wrote in 2015 that, "[m]ost researchers agree [...] that xenophobia, anti-immigration sentiments, nativism, ethno-nationalism are, in different ways, central elements in the ideologies, politics, and practices of right-wing populism and Extreme Right Wing Parties."[39] Similarly, historian Rick Shenkman describes the ideology presented by right-wing populism as "a deadly mix of xenophobia, racism, and authoritarianism".[40] Tamir Bar-On also concluded in 2018 that the literature generally places "nativism" or "ethnic nationalism" as the core concept of the ideology, which "implicitly posits a politically dominant group, while minorities are conceived as threats to the nation". It is "generally, but not necessarily racist";[41] in the case of the Dutch PVV for instance, "a religious [minority, i.e. Muslims] instead of an ethnic minority constitutes the main 'enemy'".[42]
In regard to the authoritarian aspect of right-wing populism, political psychologist Shawn W. Rosenberg asserts that its "intellectual roots and underlying logic" are best seen as "a contemporary expression of the fascist ideologies of the early 20th century".
Guided by its roots in ideological fascism ... and its affinity to the fascist governments of 1930s Germany and Italy, [right-wing populism] tends to delegate unusual power to its leadership, more specifically its key leader. This leader embodies the will of the people, renders it clear for everyone else and executes accordingly. Thus distinctions between the leadership, the people as a whole and individuals are blurred as their will is joined in a single purpose. (p.5) ... In this political cultural conception, individuals have a secondary and somewhat derivative status. They are rendered meaningful and valued insofar as they are part of the collective, the people and the nation. Individuals are thus constituted as a mass who share a single common significant categorical quality – they are nationals, members of the nation. ... In this conception, the individual and the nation are inextricably intertwined, the line between them blurred. As suggested by philosophers of fascism ... the state is realized in the people and the people are realized in the state. It is a symbiotic relation. Individuals are realized in their manifestation of the national characteristics and by their participation in the national mission. In so doing, individuals are at once defined and valued, recognized and glorified. (p.12)[49]
According to Rosenberg, right-wing populism accepts the primacy of "the people", but rejects liberal democracy's protection of the rights of minorities, and favors ethno-nationalism over the legal concept of the nation as a polity, with the people as its members; in general, it rejects the rule of law. All of these attributes, as well as its favoring of strong political leadership, suggest right-wing populism's fascist leanings.[50] Historian Federico Finchelstein defines populism as a form of authoritarian democracy while fascism is an ultraviolent dictatorship.[51]
Motivations and methods
According to Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, "National populists prioritize the culture and interests of the nation, and promise to give voice to a people who feel that they have been neglected, even held in contempt, by distant and often corrupt elites." They are part of a "growing revolt against mainstream politics and liberal values. This challenge is in general not anti-democratic. Rather, national populists are opposed to certain aspects of liberal democracy as it has evolved in the West. [...] [Their] 'direct' conception of democracy differs from the 'liberal' one that has flourished across the West following the defeat of fascism and which has gradually become more elitist in character." Furthermore, national populists question what they call the "erosion of the nation-state", "hyper ethnic change" and the "capacity to rapidly absorb [high] rates of immigration", the "highly unequal societies" of the West's current economic settlement. They are suspicious of "cosmopolitan and globalizing agendas".[3] Populist parties use crises in their domestic governments to enhance anti-globalist reactions; these include refrainment towards trade and anti-immigration policies. The support for these ideologies commonly comes from people whose employment might have low occupational mobility. This makes them more likely to develop an anti-immigrant and anti-globalization mentality that aligns with the ideals of the populist party.[52]
Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg see "national populism" as an attempt to combine the socio-economical values of the left and political values of the right and the support for a referendary republic that would bypass traditional political divisions and institutions as they aim for the unity of the political (the demos), ethnic (the ethnos) and social (the working class) interpretations of the "people", national populists claim to defend the "average citizen" and "common sense", against the "betrayal of inevitably corrupt elites".[53] As Front National ideologue François Duprat put in the 1970s, inspired by the Latin American right of that time, right-populism aims to constitute a "national, social, and popular" ideology. If both left and right parties share populism itself, their premises are indeed different in that right-wing populists perceive society as in a state of decadence, from which "only the healthy common people can free the nation by forming one national class from the different social classes and casting aside the corrupt elites".[54]
Methodologically, by co-opting concepts from the left – such as multiculturalism and ethnopluralism, which is espoused by the left as a means of preserving minority ethnic cultures within a pluralistic society – and then jettisoning their non-hierarchical essence, right-wing populists can, in the words of sociologist Jens Rydgren, "mobilize on xenophobic and racist public opinions without being stigmatized as racists".[55] Sociologist Hande Eslen-Ziya argues that right-wing populist movements rely on "troll science", namely "(distorted) scientific arguments moulded into populist discourse" that creates an alternative narrative.[56] In addition to rhetorical methods, right-wing populist movements have also flourished by using tools of digital media, including websites and newsletters, social media groups and pages, as well as Youtube channels and messaging chat groups.[57][58][59]
Cultural issues and immigration
While immigration is a common theme at the center of many national right-wing populist movements, the theme often crystallizes around cultural issues, such as religion, gender roles, and sexuality, as is the case with the transnational anti-gender theory movements.[59][60] A body of scholarship has also found populist movements to employ or be based around conspiracy theories, rumors, and falsehoods.[61][62][63] Some scholars argue that right-wing populism's association with conspiracy, rumor and falsehood may be more common in the digital era thanks to widely accessible means of content production and diffusion.[64] These media and communication developments in the context of specific historical shifts in immigration and cultural politics have led to the association of right-wing populism with post-truth politics.[59]
History
Germany and France (1870–1900)
German and French right-wing populism can be traced back to the period 1870–1900 in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, with the nascence of two different trends in Germany and France: the Völkisch movement and Boulangism.[65]Völkischen represented a romantic nationalist, racialist, and from the 1900s, antisemitic tendency in German society, as they idealized a bio-mystical "original nation" that still could be found in their views in the rural regions, a form of "primitive democracy freely subjected to their natural elites".[66][65] In France, the anti-parliamentarian Ligue des Patriotes, led by Boulanger, Déroulède, and Barrès, called for a "plebiscitary republic", with the president elected by universal suffrage, and the popular will expressed not through elected representatives (the "corrupted elites"), but rather via "legislative plebiscites", another name for referendums.[65] It also evolved to antisemitism after the Dreyfus affair (1894).[67]
Denmark and Norway (1970s)
Modern national populism—what Pierro Ignazi called "post-industrial parties"[68]—emerged in the 1970s, in a dynamic sustained by voters' rejection of the welfare state and of the tax system, both deemed "confiscatory"; the rise of xenophobia against the backdrop of immigration which, because originating from outside Europe, was considered to be of a new kind; and finally, the end of the prosperity that had reigned since the post–World War II era, symbolized by the oil crisis of 1973. Two precursor parties consequently appeared in the early 1970s: the Progress Party, the ancestor of the Danish People's Party, and Anders Lange's Party in Norway.[53]
Netherlands and France (2001)
A new wave of right-wing populism arose after the September 11 attacks. "Neo-populists" are nationalist and Islamophobic politicians who aspire "to be the champions of freedoms for minorities (gays, Jews, women) against the Arab-Muslim masses"; a trend first embodied by the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List and later followed by Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom and Jean Marie and his daughter Marine Le Pen's National Rally. According to Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, those parties are not a real syncretism of the left and right, as their ideology and voter base are interclassist.[d][69] Furthermore, neo-populist parties went from a critique of the welfare state to that of multiculturalism, and their priority demand remains the reduction of immigration.[70][71]
Hungary (early 2000s)
The roots of the right-wing populist movement in Hungary are deep, and over the past few decades it has significantly influenced politics in the country. Right-wing populism is growing in Hungary at present because its origins can be found in the post-communist era, particularly in the economic and political chaos of the 1990s.
In the early 2000s, the Jobbik Party, formally known as the Movement for a Better Hungary, emerged and rapidly became the country's most successful far-right political party. Jobbik, which was founded in 2003, exploited anti-Semitic and anti-Roma feelings to rally support, as well as strong nationalist rhetoric and hostility to capitalism and liberalism. The party's successful use of internet channels to attract and mobilize young people resulted in tremendous popularity and influence.[72]
Viktor Orbán's Fidesz Party is also a prominent factor in Hungarian right-wing populism. Since taking office in 2010, Orbán has changed Fidesz from a center-right party to a right-wing populist organization. Under Orbán's leadership, the party has stressed national sovereignty, anti-immigrant policies, and conservative social values, frequently battling with the EU on a variety of topics. Orbán's administration has centralized authority, controlled media, and altered legal frameworks to keep power.[73][72]
President Yoweri Museveni and his party, National Resistance Movement, are usually considered right-wing populist,[82][83]anti-LGBT,[84][85] and Ugandannationalist. According to Corina Lacatus, "Museveni came to power in 1986 as a populist figure who adopted an authoritarian leadership style and converted over the years in an authoritarian leader. Over the years, he has continued to rely on a tried-and-tested populist discourse that granted him political success in the first place, to continue the advancement of his regime and to promote his election campaigns."[86]
Javier Milei, the incumbent president of Argentina, is known for his flamboyant personality, distinctive personal style, and strong media presence. Milei's views distinguish him in the Argentine political landscape and have garnered him significant public attention and polarizing reactions. He has been described politically as a right-wing libertarian and right-wing populist, that supports laissez-faire economics, aligning specifically with minarchist and anarcho-capitalist principles. Milei has proposed a comprehensive overhaul of the country's fiscal and structural policies. He supports freedom of choice on drug policy, firearms, prostitution, same-sex marriage, sexual preference, and gender identity, while opposing abortion and euthanasia. In foreign policy, he advocates closer relations with the United States, supporting Ukraine in response to the Russian invasion of the country. He is also distancing Argentina from geopolitical ties with China.[87] He has been variously described as far right,[88][89][90] far-right populist,[91][92][93] right-wing libertarian,[94][95][96]ultraconservative,[97][98][99] and ultra-liberal.[100][101][102] A philosophical anarcho-capitalist who is for practical purposes a minarchist, Milei advocates minimal government, focusing on justice and security,[103] with a philosophy rooted in life, liberty, and property, and free market principles. He criticizes socialism and communism,[104] advocating economic liberalization and the restructuring of government ministries.[105] He opposes the Central Bank of Argentina and current taxation policies.[106][107]
Economically, Milei is influenced by the Austrian school of economics and admires former president Carlos Menem's policies.[108] He supports capitalism, viewing socialism as embodying envy and coercion.[104] Milei proposes reducing government ministries and addressing economic challenges through spending cuts and fiscal reforms, criticizing previous administrations for excessive spending.[109][110] He has praised the economic policies of former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and called her "a great leader".[111][112][113]
In Brazil, right-wing populism began to rise roughly around the time Dilma Rousseff won the 2014 presidential election.[114] In the Brazilian general election of 2014, Levy Fidelix, from the Brazilian Labour Renewal Party,[115] presented himself with a conservative speech and, according to him, the only right-wing candidate. He spoke for traditional family values and opposed abortion, legalization of marijuana, and same-sex marriage and proposed that homosexual individuals be treated far away from the good citizens' and workers' families.[116] In the first round of the general election, Fidelix received 446,878 votes, representing 0.43% of the popular vote.[117] Fidelix ranked 7th out of 11 candidates. In the second round, Fidelix supported candidate Aécio Neves.[118]
In addition, according to the political analyst of the Inter-Union Department of Parliamentary Advice, Antônio Augusto de Queiroz, the National Congresselected in 2014 may be considered the most conservative since the "re-democratization" movement, noting an increase in the number of parliamentarians linked to more conservative segments, such as ruralists, the military, the police, and the religious right. The subsequent economic crisis of 2015 and investigations of corruption scandals led to a right-wing movement that sought to rescue fiscally and socially conservative ideas in opposition to the left-wing policies of the Workers' Party. At the same time, right-libertarians, such as those that make up the Free Brazil Movement, emerged among many others. For Manheim (1952), within a single real generation, there may be several generations which he called "differentiated and antagonistic". For him, it is not the common birth date that marks a generation, although it matters, but rather the historical moment in which they live in common. In this case, the historical moment was the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. They can be called the "post-Dilma generation".[119]
Centrist interim President Michel Temer took office following the impeachment of President Rousseff. Temer held 3% approval ratings in October 2017,[120] facing a corruption scandal after accusations of obstructing justice and racketeering against him.[121] He managed to avoid trial thanks to the support of the right-wing parties in the National Congress of Brazil.[120][121] On the other hand, President of the Senate Renan Calheiros, acknowledged as one of the key figures behind Rousseff's destitution and a member of the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement, was removed from office after facing embezzlement charges.[122]
Canada has a history of right-wing populist protest parties and politicians, most notably in Western Canada, partly due to the idea of Western alienation. The highly successful Social Credit Party of Canada consistently won seats in British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan but fell into obscurity by the 1970s.
In the late 1980s, the Reform Party of Canada, led by Preston Manning, became another right-wing populist movement formed due to the policies of the center-right Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, which alienated many Blue Tories and led to a feeling of neglect in the West of Canada. Initially motivated by a single-issue desire to give a voice to Western Canada, the Reform Party expanded its platform to include a blend of socially conservative and right-wing populist policies. It grew from a fringe party into a major political force in the 1990s and became the official opposition party before reforming itself as the Canadian Alliance. The Alliance ultimately merged with the Progressive Conservative Party to form the modern-day Conservative Party of Canada, after which the Alliance faction dropped some of its populist and socially conservative ideas.
In August 2018, Conservative MP Maxime Bernier left the party, and the following month he founded the People's Party of Canada, which has self-described as "smart populism" and been described as a "right of centre, populist" movement.[137] Bernier lost his seat in the 2019 Canadian federal elections, and the People's Party scored just above 1% of the vote; however, in the 2021 election, it saw improved performance and climbed to nearly 5% of the popular vote.[138]
Moore (1996) argues that "populist opposition to the growing power of political, economic, and cultural elites" helped shape "conservative and right-wing movements" since the 1920s.[158] Historical right-wing populist figures in both major parties in the United States have included Thomas E. Watson (D-GA), Strom Thurmond,[e]Joseph McCarthy (R-WI), Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), George Wallace (D-AL), and Pat Buchanan (R-VA).[155]
Several of the prominent members of the Populist Party of the 1890s and 1900s, while economically liberal, supported social aspects of right-wing populism.[154] Watson, the Vice-Presidential nominee of the Populist Party in 1896 and presidential nominee in 1900, eventually embraced white supremacy and anti-Semitism.[159] William Jennings Bryan, the 1896 Populist presidential nominee, was socially and theologically conservative, supporting creationism, Prohibition and other aspects of Christian fundamentalism. Bradley J. Longfield posits Bryan was a "theologically conservative Social Gospeler".[154][160] An article by National Public Radio's Ron Elving likens the populism of Bryan to the later right-wing populism of Trump.[154]
In 2010, Rasmussen and Schoen characterized the Tea Party movement as "a right-wing anti-systemic populist movement". They added, "Today our country is in the midst of a...new populist revolt that has emerged overwhelmingly from the right – manifesting itself as the Tea Party movement."[161] In 2010, David Barstow wrote in The New York Times: "The Tea Party movement has become a platform for conservative populist discontent."[162] Some political figures closely associated with the Tea Party, such as U.S. Senator Ted Cruz and former U.S. Representative Ron Paul, have been described as appealing to right-wing populism.[163][164][165] In the U.S. House of Representatives, the Freedom Caucus, associated with the Tea Party movement, has been described as right-wing populist.[166][167]
Furthermore, the main center-right party the Coalition has certain members belonging to the right-wing populist faction known as National Right including the current opposition leader Peter Dutton.[177]
Right-wing politics in India primarily centers around nationalism, cultural conservatism, and economic reform aimed at self-reliance and growth. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is the leading right-wing party, closely associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist organization. The BJP and the RSS promote the idea of Hindutva, or "Hinduness", which emphasizes India's Hindu cultural heritage. This ideology is often contrasted with secularism and is sometimes seen as favoring policies that strengthen Hindu identity in the nation’s cultural and political fabric.
Key figures in right-wing Indian politics include Narendra Modi, known for his policies on economic reform, digital infrastructure, and a strong stance on national security, and Amit Shah, the BJP’s chief strategist. The party’s policies often prioritize military modernization, anti-corruption measures, and regional development projects.
The Bharatiya Janata Party has successfully gained support through welfare programs aimed at the rural population, as well as through appeals to traditional values and the narrative of a strong, unified India. This approach has reshaped Indian politics by shifting the focus toward nationalist and development-oriented policies, making the BJP a dominant force in recent decades.
Right-wing populism is thought to have emerged in New Zealand with Robert Muldoon, the New Zealand National Party prime minister from 1975 to 1984. A economic nationalist and social conservative, Muldoon has been cited as having appealed to the masses through his animosity towards the media and leftists and his own abrasive and colourful public persona.[181] He also often made rude or unusually frank comments about foreign leaders, including American president Jimmy Carter and Australian prime minister Malcolm Fraser,[181] whom he ridiculed and even bullied.[182]
Pakistan
In Pakistan, Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf (PTI) has recently been described as centrist-populist while sharing some characteristics with right-wing populists.[183] Its leader Imran Khan has furiously attacked traditional politicians and made people believe that only he has the solutions.[183] British journalist Ben Judah, in an interview, compared Imran Khan with Donald Trump on his populist rhetoric.[184]
Taiwan's right-wing populists tend to deny the independent identity of their country's 'Taiwan' and emphasize their identity as a 'Republic of China'. Taiwan's left-wingTaiwanese nationalists have strong pro-American tendencies, so Taiwan's major and minor conservatives are critical of this.[191] In particular, Taiwan's right-wing populists demand that economic growth and right-wing Chinese nationalist issues be more important than liberal democracy and that they become closer to the People's Republic of China. Some of Taiwan's leading right-wing populists include Terry Gou, Han Kuo-yu, and Chang Ya-chung.[192][193][194]
In May 2019, Foreign Policy magazine described Ireland, Malta and Portugal as the only three European Union countries without far-right populist parties in their parliament.[195] Portugal subsequently elected the Chega party to its parliament in October 2019.[196] The French-speaking Belgian region of Wallonia is also described as a rare place in Europe without a significant right-wing populism presence, in part due to a media cordon sanitaire which prohibits far-right candidates from live media appearances.[197][198]
In 2016, Senior European Union diplomats cited growing anxiety in Europe about Russian financial support for far-right and populist movements and told the Financial Times that the intelligence agencies of "several" countries had scrutinized possible links with Moscow.[199] Also in 2016, the Czech Republic warned that Russia was trying to "divide and conquer" the European Union by supporting right-wing populist politicians across the bloc.[200] However, as there in the United States of America, there seems to be an underlying problem that is not massively discussed in the media. That underlying problem is that of housing. A 2019 study shows an immense correlation between the price of housing and voting for populist parties.[201] In that study, it was revealed that the French citizens that saw the price of their houses stagnate or drop were much more likely to vote for Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential election. Those who saw the price of their house rise were much more likely to vote for Emmanuel Macron. The same pattern emerged in the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, in which those that saw the price of their house rise voted to Remain. Whereas those that saw it flatline or drop voted to Leave.
From 1980, the Freedom Party adopted a more moderate stance. Upon the 1983 federal election, it entered a coalition government with the Socialist Party, whereby party chairman Norbert Steger served as Vice-Chancellor of Austria. The liberal interlude, however, ended when Jörg Haider was elected chairman in 1986. Haider re-integrated the party's nationalist base voters through his down-to-earth manners and patriotic attitude. Nevertheless, he also obtained votes from large sections of the population disenchanted with politics by publicly denouncing the corruption and nepotism of the Austrian Proporz system. The electoral success was boosted by Austria's accession to the European Union in 1995.
Upon the 1999 federal election, the Freedom Party (FPÖ), with 26.9% of the votes cast, became the second strongest party in the National Council parliament. Having entered a coalition government with the People's Party, Haider had to face the disability of several FPÖ ministers and the impossibility of agitation against members of his cabinet. In 2005, he finally countered the FPÖ's loss of reputation with the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) relaunch to carry on his government. The remaining FPÖ members elected Heinz-Christian Strache chairman, but since the 2006 federal election, both right-wing parties have run separately. After Haider was killed in a car accident in 2008, the BZÖ lost a measurable amount of support.
Vlaams Blok, established in 1978, operated on a platform of law and order, anti-immigration (with a particular focus on Islamic immigration), and secession of the Flanders region of the country. The secession was originally planned to end in the annexation of Flanders by the culturally and linguistically similar Netherlands until the plan was abandoned due to the multiculturalism in that country. In the elections to the Flemish Parliament in June 2004, the party received 24.2% of the vote, within less than 2% of being the largest party.[202] However, in November of the same year, the party was ruled illegal under the country's anti-racism law for, among other things, advocating segregated schools for citizens and immigrants.[203]
In less than a week, the party was re-established under the name Vlaams Belang, initially with a near-identical ideology before moderating parts of its statute. It advocates the adoption of the Flemish culture and language by immigrants who wish to stay in the country. It also calls for a zero-tolerance stance on illegal immigration and the reinstatement of border controls.[204] Despite some accusations of antisemitism from Belgium's Jewish population, the party has demonstrated a staunch pro-Israel stance as part of its opposition to Islam.[205] In Antwerp, sections of the city's significant Jewish population have begun to support the party.[206] With 23 of 124 seats, Vlaams Belang leads the opposition in the Flemish Parliament.[207] It also holds 11 out of the 150 seats in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives.[208]
The Flemish nationalist and conservative liberalNew Flemish Alliance party has been described as populist or containing right-wing populist elements by foreign media such as the German Die Zeit magazine. However, the party has rebutted the term and does not label itself as such.[209]
In the French-speaking Wallonia, Mischaël Modrikamen, an associate of Steve Bannon, was chairman of the Parti Populaire (PP), which contested elections in Wallonia. Political analysts have generally observed that right-wing populist parties tend to perform better with the Flemish electorate over French-speaking Belgian voters, on the whole, owing to the Flemish vote moving to the right in recent decades and Flemish parties intertwining Flemish nationalism with other issues.[123]
As of the 2019 federal, regional, and European elections, Vlaams Belang has surged from 248,843 votes in 2014 to 783,977 on 26 May 2019.[210]
Following the 2021 Bulgarian general election, another right-wing populist party, Revival, entered Parliament, while VMRO, Conservative Bulgaria, Attack, and the Volya Movement failed to win any seats.
In the early 1970s, the home of the strongest right-wing populist party in Europe was in Denmark, the Progress Party.[212] In the 1973 election, it received almost 16% of the vote.[213] In the following years, its support dwindled, but the Danish People's Party replaced it in the 1990s, becoming an important support party for the governing coalition in the 2000s.[214] At the height of its popularity, it won 21% of the vote (corresponding to 37 seats) in the 2015 Danish general election,[215] becoming the second-largest party in the Folketing and serving once again as support party for two minority governments 2015–2019 before being reduced to 16 seats in the 2019 Danish general election and 5 seats (2.6% of the vote) in 2022.[216] In 2015 the New Right party was founded,[217] which gained six seats (3.7% of the vote) at the 2022 election.[216] In 2022 the Denmark Democrats were founded as the most recent right-wing populist party in the Folketing, gaining 8% of the vote and 14 seats at the 2022 general election.[218]
France's National Front (NF) – renamed in 2018 as the "National Rally" – has been cited as the "prototypical populist radical right-wing party".[37] The party was founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen as the unification of several French nationalist movements of the time; he developed it into a well-organized party.[37] After struggling for a decade, the party reached its first peak in 1984. By 2002, Le Pen received more votes than the Socialist candidate in the first round of voting for the French presidency, becoming the first NF candidate to qualify for a presidential runoff election. After Le Pen's daughter, Marine Le Pen, took over as the head of the party in 2011, the National Front established itself as one of the main political parties in France. Marine Le Pen's policy of "de-demonizing" or normalizing the party resulted in her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, being first suspended and then ejected from the party in 2015. Marine Le Pen finished second in the 2017 election and lost in the second round of voting versus Emmanuel Macron, which was held on 7 May 2017. However, polls published in 2018 showed that a majority of the French population considers the party to be a threat to democracy.[225]
Right-wing populism in France has also congealed around cultural issues such as the anti-gay marriage and anti-gender theory movements exemplified by La Manif pour tous.[59]
The AfD has grown in popularity, particularly in eastern Germany, where it has benefited from economic dissatisfaction and immigration fears. According to studies, the AfD will be the second most popular party in Germany by 2023, with rising influence at both the national and provincial levels.Their stance has gotten more radical, advocating for Germany's exit from the EU and NATO and opposing climate protection measures.[227] The party's popularity might be attributed to internal disputes and policy debates inside Germany's ruling coalition, which have eroded public trust in traditional parties.[228]
In 2024, the AfD won the state election in Thuringia and finished a close second in Saxony and Brandenburg.
The Neo-NaziGolden Dawn has grown significantly in Greece during the economic downturn, gaining 7% of the vote and 18 out of 300 seats in the Hellenic Parliament. The party's ideology includes annexing territory in Albania and Turkey, including the Turkish cities of Istanbul and İzmir.[232] Controversial measures by the party included a poor people's kitchen in Athens, which only supplied Greek citizens and was shut down by the police.[233]
In Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi served four separate term between 1994 and 2011, and is considered the first prominent populist politician in modern Europe, fueling anti-immigrant sentiments, denying the results of the 2006 general election,[236] and often making offensive comments towards the judiciary and political opponents,[237] although his Forza Italia party is considered to be more moderate.[238][239] Instead, the most prominent right-wing populist party in the last twenty years was Lega, formerly Lega Nord (Northern League),[240] whose leaders reject the right-wing label,[241][242][243] although not the "populist" one.[244] The League is a federalist, regionalist, and sometimes secessionist party, founded in 1991 as a federation of several regional parties of northern and central Italy, most of which had arisen and expanded during the 1980s. LN's program advocates the transformation of Italy into a federal state, fiscal federalism, and greater regional autonomy, especially for the northern regions. At times, the party has advocated for the secession of the north, which it calls Padania. The party generally takes an anti-southern Italian stance as members are known for opposing southern Italian emigration to northern Italian cities, stereotyping southern Italians as welfare abusers and detrimental to Italian society, and attributing Italy's economic troubles and the disparity of the north–south divide in the Italian economy to supposed inherent negative characteristics of the southern Italians, such as laziness, lack of education, or criminality.[245][246][247][248] Certain LN members have been known to publicly deploy the offensive slur terrone, a common pejorative term for southern Italians evocative of negative southern Italian stereotypes.[245][246][249] As a federalist, regionalist, populist party of the north, LN is also highly critical of the centralized power and political importance of Rome, sometimes adopting to a lesser extent an anti-Roman stance in addition to an anti-southern stance.
With the rise of immigration into Italy since the late 1990s, LN has increasingly turned its attention to criticizing mass immigration to Italy. The LN, which opposes illegal immigration, is critical of Islam and proposes Italy's exit from the Eurozone and is considered a Eurosceptic movement and, as such, is a part of the Identity and Democracy (ID) group in the European Parliament. LN was or is part of the national government in 1994, 2001–2006, 2008–2011, and 2018–2019. Most recently, the party, including among its members the presidents of Lombardy and Veneto, won 17.4% of the vote in the 2018 general election, becoming the third-largest party in Italy (largest within the centre-right coalition). In the 2014 European election, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, it took 6.2% of votes. Under Salvini, the party has, to some extent, embraced Italian nationalism and emphasized Euroscepticism, opposition to immigration, and other "populist" policies while allying with right-wing populist parties in Europe.[250][251][252]
Between the late 2010s and the early 2020s, another right-wing populist movement emerged within the centre-right coalition. The nationalist and national-conservative Brothers of Italy (FdI), led by Giorgia Meloni, gained 4.4% of votes in the 2018 election and, four years later, it became the most voted party in the 2022 general election, gaining 26% of votes. Meloni was appointed prime minister on 22 October, at the head of what it was considered as the most right-wing Italian government since 1945.[253][254]
Additionally, in the German-speaking South Tyrol, the local second-largest party, Die Freiheitlichen, is often described as a right-wing populist party.
In the Netherlands, right-wing populism was represented in the 150-seat House of Representatives in 1982 when the Centre Party won a single seat. During the 1990s, a splinter party, the Centre Democrats, was slightly more successful, although its significance was still marginal. Not before 2002 did a right-wing populist party break through in the Netherlands, when the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) won 26 seats and subsequently formed a coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Fortuyn, who had strong views against immigration, particularly by Muslims, was assassinated in May 2002, two weeks before the election. Ideologically, the LPF differed somewhat from other European right-wing populist movements by holding more liberal stances on certain social issues such as abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia (Fortuyn himself was openly gay) while maintaining an uncompromising stance on immigration, law and order, and the European Union. Fortuyn was also credited with shifting the Dutch political landscape by bringing the topics of multiculturalism, immigration, and the integration of immigrants into the political mainstream.[255] However, the coalition had broken up by 2003, and the LPF went into steep decline until it was dissolved.
Since 2006, the Party for Freedom (PVV) has been represented in the House of Representatives and described as inheriting the mantle of the Pim Fortuyn List. Following the 2010 general election, it has been in a pact with the right-wing minority government of CDA and VVD after it won 24 seats in the House of Representatives. The party is Eurosceptic and plays a leading role in the changing stance of the Dutch government towards European integration as they came second in the 2009 European Parliament election, winning 4 out of 25 seats. The party's main program revolves around strong criticism of Islam, restrictions on migration from new European Union countries and Islamic countries, pushing for cultural assimilation of migrants into Dutch society, opposing the accession of Turkey to the European Union, advocating for the Netherlands to withdraw from the European Union and advocating for a return to the guilder and abandoning the euro.[256]
From 2017 onwards, the Forum for Democracy (FvD) emerged as another right-wing populist force in the Netherlands. The FvD also advocates a stricter immigration policy and a referendum on Dutch membership of the EU.[257][258]
The Polish Congress of the New Right, headed by Michał Marusik, aggressively promotes fiscally conservative concepts, such as radical tax reductions preceded by the abolishment of social security, universal public healthcare, state-sponsored education, and Communist Polish 1944 agricultural reform as a way to dynamical economic and welfare growth.[264][265] The party is considered populist both by right-wing and left-wing publicists.[266][267]
In Spain, the appearance of right-wing populism began to gain strength after the December 2018 election for the Parliament of Andalusia, in which the right-wing populist party VOX managed to obtain 12 seats[270] and agreed to support a coalition government of the parties of the right People's Party and Citizens, although the Socialist Party won the elections.[271] VOX, which has been frequently described as far-right, both by the left parties and by Spanish or international press,[272][273] promotes characteristic policies of the populist right,[274] such as the expulsion of all illegal immigrants from the country—even of legal immigrants who commit crimes—a generalized criminal tightening, combined with traditional claims of right-wing conservatives, such as the centralization of the State and the suppression of the Autonomous Communities, and has harshly criticized the laws against gender violence, approved by the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, but later maintained by the PP executive of Mariano Rajoy, accusing the people and institutions that defend them of applying "gender totalitarianism".[275]
Party official Javier Ortega Smith is being investigated for alleged hate speech after Spanish prosecutors admitted a complaint by an Islamic association in connection with a rally that talked about "the Islamist invasion".[276] The party election manifesto that was finally published merged classic far-right-inspired policies with right-libertarianism in tax and social security matters.
After months of political uncertainty and protests against the party in Andalusia[277] and other regions,[278] in the 2019 Spanish general election, VOX managed to obtain 24 deputies in the Congress of Deputies, with 10.26% of the vote, falling short of expectations[279] after an intense electoral campaign in which VOX gathered big crowds of people at their events. Although the People's Party and Citizens leaders, Pablo Casado and Albert Rivera, had admitted repeatedly during the campaign that they would again agree with VOX to reach the government,[280] the sum of all their seats finally left them far from any possibility, giving the government to the social democrat Pedro Sánchez.[281]
Madrilenian president Isabel Díaz Ayuso, despite being a member of the centre-right People's Party, has been sustained in government by VOX and adopted many policies championed by the party.[282] She has embraced populist rhetoric,[283] defended Spanish imperialism,[284] dismissed climate change,[285] and opposed Covid-19 lockdowns.[286] She has been to compared to Donald Trump by several of her critics.[287][288]
Sweden
In Sweden, the first openly populist movement to be represented in the Riksdag (Swedish parliament), New Democracy was founded in 1994 by businessman Bert Karlsson and aristocrat Ian Wachtmeister. Although New Democracy promoted economic issues as its foremost concern, it also advocated restrictions on immigration and welfare chauvinism. The party saw a sharp rise in support in 1994 before declining soon after.[289][290]
In 2010, the Sweden Democrats entered parliament for the first time. The Sweden Democrats originally had connections to white nationalism during its early days but later began expelling hardline members and moderated its platform to transform itself into a more mainstream movement. The party calls for more robust immigration and asylum policies, compulsory measures to assimilate immigrants into Swedish society, and stricter law and order policies. The Sweden Democrats are currently the second largest party in Sweden, with 20.5% of the popular vote in the 2022 Swedish general election, and the second most seats in the Swedish parliament with 72 seats.[212][291]
In Switzerland, radical right populist parties held close to 10% of the popular vote in 1971, were reduced to below 2% by 1979, and grew to more than 10% in 1991. Since 1991, these parties (the Swiss Democrats and the Swiss Freedom Party) have been absorbed by the SVP. During the 1990s, the SVP grew from the fourth largest party to the largest and gained a second seat in the Swiss Federal Council in 2003 with the prominent politician and businessman Christoph Blocher. In 2015, the SVP received 29.4% of the vote, the highest vote ever recorded for a single party throughout Swiss parliamentary history.[298][299][300][301]
The role of UKIP in the UK underwent a rapid transformation post-Brexit, with Nigel Farage leading the initiative to establish the Brexit Party, which was subsequently rebranded as Reform UK. These entities have consistently been identified as extensions of UKIP,[312] sharing common populist ideological elements.[313]
^On the whole, the "right-wing populism" in Europe and the United States are almost identical to "right-wing nationalism", but in Asia and other non-Western regions, "right-wing populism" and "right-wing nationalism" do not necessarily coincide. Japan's former prime minister, the late Shinzo Abe, was described by experts as a right-wing 'nationalist', but at the same time as not a (right-wing) 'populist'.[4]Myanmar's right-wing nationalist military regime is cracking down on the activities of the largest populist political party supporting democratization. Some right-wing populist movements in Islamic world are based on Islamic fundamentalism, some of which reject Western ideologies, including nationalism.
^Mudde: authoritarianism "is the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely. In this interpretation, [it] includes law and order and "punitive conventional moralism". It does not necessarily mean an anti-democratic attitude, but neither does it preclude one. In addition, the authoritarian's submission to authority, established or not, is "not absolute, automatic, nor blind". In other words, while authoritarians will be more inclined to accept (established) authority than non-authoritarians, they can and will rebel under certain circumstances."
^"Maximal" right-wing populists here give a preference for the état légal—which gives primacy to the law as expressed by the general will via election or referendum; against the Rechtsstaat—which limits the power of the democratic state (the majority) to protect the rights of minorities.
^Neo-populists, contrary to the Marxist worldview, do not oppose the "working class" to the "bourgeoisie" and capitalists, but rather the "people" to the "elites" and immigrants.
^Thurmond was a segregationist from South Carolina and began as member of the Democratic Party, but in 1964 switched to becoming a member of the Republican Party until his death in 2003.
^Norris, Pippa; Inglehart, Ronald (2018). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and the rise of authoritarian-populism. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. p. 14. ISBN978-1-108-42607-7.
^ abEatwell, Roger (2017) "Populism and Fascism" in Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira; Taggart, Paul; Espejo, Paulina Ochoa; and Ostiguy, Pierre eds. The Oxford Handbook of Populism. "whilst populism and fascism differ notably ideologically, in practice the latter has borrowed aspects of populist discourse and style, and populism can degenerate into leader-oriented authoritarian and exclusionary politics."
^Judis, John B. (5 October 2016). The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics. Columbia Global Reports. ISBN978-0-9971264-4-0.
^Lowe, Josh; Matthews, Owen; AM, Matt McAllester On 11/23/16 at 9:02 (23 November 2016). "Why Europe's populist revolt is spreading". Newsweek. Retrieved 24 March 2017.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
^AKGEMCİ, Esra (2022). "Authoritarian Populism as a Response to Crisis: The Case of Brazil". Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations. 19 (74). Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi İktisadi İşletmesi: 37–51. doi:10.33458/uidergisi.1113367. ISSN1304-7310. JSTOR27130875. Retrieved 24 October 2024. One could argue that authoritarian populism can also be combined with left-wing social policy. Still, I assert that the phenomenon was born to address specific conditions in which far-right leaders appealed to the "people" with populist attitudes to promote authoritarian measures. A leftist leader can also be both authoritarian and populist, but the term authoritarian populism, which Stuart Hall coined, can be applied as a distinctive version of far-right populism.
^Corrales, Javier (19 August 2024). "Why Populism is the Sugar, Salt, and Fat of Our Politics. . . with Variations: A Reflection". American Behavioral Scientist. 68 (13). SAGE Publications: 1804–1814. doi:10.1177/00027642241268275. ISSN0002-7642. For comparable arguments for left-wing authoritarian populism, see Corrales (2011, 2018),. Carrión (2021), Cleary and Öztürk (2022).
^Rosenberg cites Gentile, G. (1928) The philosophic basis of fascism. Foreign Affairs, v.6, n.2 pp.290–304
^Finchelstein, Federico (2019). From Fascism to populism in history: with a new preface (First ed.). Oakland, California: University of California Press. p. 6. ISBN978-0-520-30935-7. Populism is a form of authoritarian democracy, while Fascism is an ultraviolet dictatorship.
^Bisbee, James; Mosley, Layna; Pepinsky, Thomas B.; Rosendorff, B. Peter (2 July 2020). "Decompensating domestically: the political economy of anti-globalism". Journal of European Public Policy. 27 (7): 1090–1102. doi:10.1080/13501763.2019.1678662. S2CID211341396.
^Viriglio, Veronique (16 August 2023). "Il 'Trump argentino' che sfida Kirchner" [The "Argentine Trump" who challenges Kirchner] (in Italian). AGI. Archived from the original on 18 August 2023. Retrieved 18 August 2023.
^"NP View: The unstoppable Pierre Poilievre". National Post. 5 August 2022. Trying to demonize Poilievre as a "populist" or as Canada's Trump, or implying that he is a white supremacist or opposed to women's rights is unlikely to succeed. He is pro-choice, pro-immigration and has forcefully denounced white replacement theory and all of "that kind of thinking."
^Forrest, Maura (12 September 2022). "The quick take on Canada's new Conservative leader". Politico. He has been compared to former President Donald Trump for his populist overtures, but in terms of substance, he has largely confined himself to pocketbook issues. He is pro-immigration — his wife is a Venezuelan immigrant — and now calls himself pro-choice.
^McConkey, David (23 October 2022). "Pierre Poilievre, populist politician?". The Brandon Sun. In several ways, Poilievre does not fit the mould of a new populist. For one, Poilievre is not new. He was a cabinet minister in the Stephen Harper government and he has been a member of Parliament for almost 20 years. For another, he is not your stereotypical reactionary. He is at ease with the non-traditional family, he is pro-choice, he is pro-immigration.
^Campbell, Clark (16 September 2022). "The making of Pierre Poilievre, conservative proselytizer". The Globe and Mail. But he is no Donald Trump in tenets or temperament. He doesn't echo the anti-immigrant rhetoric, and abhors Mr. Trump's gargantuan deficits. He is so calculated that he could never be the erratic bundle of impulses that rambles at a Trump rally.
^Moore, Samuel (4 November 2022). "Pierre Poilievre: Canada's next Prime Minister?". Cherwell. Moreover, in a way that distinguishes him from Trump and other right-wing populists, Poilievre's social policies are progressive. He is pro-choice and pro-LGBT rights and has actually criticised the Trudeau ministry for not being pro-immigration enough, belittling the inefficiencies of the current immigration system as yet another example of big government "gatekeeping".
^Leonard J. Moore, "Good Old-Fashioned New Social History and the Twentieth-Century American Right," Reviews in American History vol 24#4 (1996) pp. 555–73, quote at p. 561
^Pierannunzi, Carol (23 January 2004). "Thomas E. Watson". New Georgia Encyclopedia. Retrieved 29 April 2019.
^ ab"Taiwan's 2020 Presidential Elections". The Diplomat. 12 December 2019. Retrieved 12 February 2021. These supporters, called "Han maniacs," elevated Han to presidential nominee. Ultimately, though, they were a minority, possibly some twenty percent of the overall electorate, and Han's political position, friendly to Beijing and inclined to right-wing populism, started to erode his support.
^Katsourides, Yiannos (December 2013). "Determinants of extreme right reappearance in Cyprus: The National Popular Front (ELAM), Golden Dawn's sister party". South European Society and Politics. 18 (4): 567–589. doi:10.1080/13608746.2013.798893. S2CID153418352.
^ abJens Rydgren. "Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark" West European Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3, May 2004, pp. 474–502."
^Skenderovic 2009, p. 124: "... and prefers to use terms such as national-conservative or conservative-right in defining the SVP. In particular, national-conservative has gained prominence among the definitions used in Swiss research on the SVP".
^H-G Betz, 'Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in Western Europe', L. Panitch & C. Leys (eds.), Socialist Register 2003 – Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-nationalism, London: Merlin Press, 2002, p. 198
^Kenny, Sue; Ife, Jim; Westoby, Peter, eds. (2014). Populism, Democracy and Community Development. Policy Press. ISBN978-1-4473-5387-4. The most recognised right-wing UK populist politician of recent time was Margaret Thatcher, who became leader of the Conservative Party in 1975, and in 1979 the first British woman prime minister.
^Tournier-Sol, Karine (5 January 2021). "From UKIP to Brexit: The Right-Wing Populist Surge in the UK". The Faces of Contemporary Populism in Western Europe and the US. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp. 1–22. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-53889-7_1. ISBN978-3-030-53889-7. S2CID234301640 – via Springer Link. Thatcher's "right-wing populism" was thus instrumental in marginalizing the extreme right.
^Wood, Brennon (1998). "Stuart Hall's Cultural Studies and the Problem of Hegemony". The British Journal of Sociology. 49 (3): 399–414. doi:10.2307/591390. ISSN0007-1315. JSTOR591390.
^Collins, Harry; Evans, Robert; Durant, Darrin; Weinel, Martin (2020), Collins, Harry; Evans, Robert; Durant, Darrin; Weinel, Martin (eds.), "What is Populism?", Experts and the Will of the People: Society, Populism and Science, Cham: Springer International, pp. 35–46, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-26983-8_4, ISBN978-3-030-26983-8, S2CID211313997
^Narayanan Ganesan, ed. (2015). Bilateral Legacies in East and Southeast Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. p. 67.
^Hofmann, Reto (22 June 2018). "Why Steve Bannon Admires Japan". The Diplomat. Retrieved 22 March 2021. In Japan, populist and extreme right-wing nationalism has found a home within the political establishment.
^Henceroth, Nathan (2019). "Open Society Foundations". In Ainsworth, Scott H.; Harward, Brian M. (eds.). Political Groups, Parties, and Organizations that Shaped America. ABC-CLIO. p. 739.
^Gunes, Cengiz, ed. (2013). The Kurdish Question in Turkey. Routledge. p. 270.
^Abadan-Unat, Nermin (2011). Turks in Europe: From Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen. New York: Berghahn Books. p. 19. ISBN978-1-84545-425-8. ...the fascist Nationalist Movement Party...
^Kuzio, Taras (November–December 2010), "Populism in Ukraine in a Comparative European Context"(PDF), Problems of Post-Communism, 57 (6): 3–18, doi:10.2753/ppc1075-8216570601, S2CID154825950, retrieved 16 October 2012, Anti-Semitism only permeates Ukraine's far-right parties, such as Svoboda… Ukraine's economic nationalists are to be found in the extreme right (Svoboda) and centrist parties that propagate economic nationalism and economic protectionism.
^Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Macedonia, Dimitar Bechev, Scarecrow Press, 2009, ISBN0-8108-6295-6, p. 104.
^Smilova, Ruzha; Smilov, Daniel; Ganev, Georgi (2012). "Democracy and the Media in Bulgaria: Who Represents the People?". Understanding Media Policies: A European Perspective. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 48–49.
^Nathan Kerrigan; Philomena de Lima (2023). "Introduction". In Nathan Kerrigan; Philomena de Lima (eds.). The Rural-Migration Nexus: Global Problems, Rural Issues. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 11. ISBN9783031180422.
^Golder, M. (2003). "Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe". Comparative Political Studies. 36 (4): 432. doi:10.1177/0010414003251176. S2CID55841713.
^Alexander Häusler (Hrsg.): Rechtspopulismus als "Bürgerbewegung". Kampagnen gegen Islam und Moscheebau und kommunale Gegenstrategien. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN978-3-531-15919-5.
^Wingfield-Hayes, Rupert (15 December 2012). "Japan loses faith in traditional politics". BBC News. Retrieved 6 November 2012. There is growing support here for non-traditional parties, particularly right-wing populists who promise strong leadership and bold answers. The most prominent is the Japan Restoration Party led by two political mavericks – Toru Hashimoto, the Mayor of Osaka, and 80-year-old Shintaro Ishihara, the former governor of Tokyo.
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