國際法院對強行法的態度並不明確。一方面,國際法院承認有些義務有普世性或對世效(erga omnes),換言之即便國家沒有簽約,也需對所有國家負擔,如禁止使用武力與禁止種族屠殺。[17]但另一方面,國際法院不只曾拒絕解釋強行法的內容,[18]亦明確表示一國違反強行法這一行為本身並不會給予國際法院管轄權:管轄權終究是基於雙方合意(jurisdiction always depends on the consent of the parties)。[19]
此外,附屬聯合國的国际法委员会(英语:International Law Commission)也未曾對強行法表示意見。由1969年維也納條約法公約的締約過程(travaux préparatoires)看,當時的起草人亦拒絕為之下過度明確的定義。聯合國相關機構對強行法的曖昧態度,目的可能在防止強行法的僵化(crystallization)
而阻礙其續造。[20]
^Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933,頁64: [completeness of international law] “is an a priori assumption of every system of law, not a prescription of positive law.”
^Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 1952, 頁322-323。
^ Jean Combacau et Serge Sur, Droit international public (L.G.D.J., 2016), 頁52:「自吹自擂與胡亂唸咒不能創造法律(ni l'affirmation ni l'incatation ne peuvent constituter des regles de droit)」
^D. Carreau et F. Marrella, Droit international, Pedone, 11è éd., 2012, 頁116。
^參見Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to
International Law (7th edn, Routledge 1997), 頁57: "the rule is now said to limit the liberty of states to create local custom, as well as their liberty to make treaties; the rule thus acts as a check on the tendency of international law to disintegrate into different regional systems."
^D. Carreau et F. Marrella, Droit international, Pedone, 11è éd., 2012, 頁117。
^ L'affaire Nicaragua contre Etats-Unis, 1986 C.I.J. 14, para. 263
^ Legality of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 83: “the question whether a norm is part of the jus cogens relates to the legal character of the norm”。
^Armed Activities case, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 2006 p 6, 32;亦見50-51。
^D. Carreau et F. Marrella, Droit international, Pedone, 11è éd., 2012, 頁119。