Fukuyama is hoogleraar aan de faculteit politieke wetenschappen van de universiteit van Stanford. Aldaar is hij sinds 2010 ook hoofdonderzoeker bij het Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, directeur van het Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law en onderwijsdirecteur van Ford Dorsey master's of International Policy.[1] Voordien was hij hoogleraar en directeur van het internationale ontwikkelingsprogramma aan de School of Advanced International Studies van de Johns Hopkins-universiteit. Voorheen was hij hoogleraar aan de School of Public Policy van de George Mason-universiteit.
En ik dacht dat dat het Amerika was, dat ik had zien ontstaan na het burgerrechtentijdperk in de Verenigde Staten. Ik herinner me dat mijn vader me altijd vertelde: 'Als iemand zei: 'Waar kom je vandaan?' - dan moet je zeggen: 'Ik ben een Amerikaan, want een Amerikaan zijn heeft geen raciale connotatie.' Of je voorouders uit Japan komen, maakt niet uit.' En, weet je, dat is het soort Amerika waar ik bewondering voor had toen ik opgroeide, en ik dacht dat we het echt voor elkaar hadden gekregen.
Ik werd afgeschrikt door hun nihilistische idee van wat literatuur was. Het had niets te maken met de wereld. Ik kreeg zo'n afkeer van die hele overintellectuele benadering dat ik me in plaats daarvan op kernwapens richtte.
Ik besloot dat het totale onzin was. Ze huldigden een soort Nietzscheaans relativisme dat zei dat er geen waarheid is, geen argument dat superieur is aan enig ander argument. Toch waren de meesten van hen toegewijd aan een marxistische agenda. Dat leek volledig tegenstrijdig. Als je echt een moreel relativist bent, is er geen reden waarom je het nationaalsocialisme of de raciale superioriteit van de Europeanen niet zou bevestigen, want niets is meer waar dan iets anders. Ik vond het een failliete manier van werken en besloot het roer om te gooien en politicologie te gaan studeren.
— 'What Follows the End of History? Identity Politics', The Chronicle of Higher Education, F. Fukuyama geïnterviewd door Evan Goldstein, 27 augustus 2018
"(...) heeft de regering Bush geconcludeerd dat Fukuyama's historisch tijdschema te laissez-faire is en bij lange na niet genoeg aandacht heeft voor de hefbomen van de historische verandering. De geschiedenis, zo heeft de regering Bush geconcludeerd, heeft doelbewuste organisatie, leiderschap en richting nodig. In deze ironie der ironieën heeft de identificatie door de regering-Bush van regimeverandering als cruciaal voor haar antiterreurbeleid en integraal onderdeel van haar verlangen naar een democratische, kapitalistische wereld geleid tot een actief "Leninistisch" buitenlands beleid in plaats van Fukuyama's passieve "Marxistische" sociale teleologie."
Hierover schreef hij in 2006 America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (Amerikaanse editie)/After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong (Britse editie). Hij heeft zich sinds de 21ste eeuw beziggehouden met ontwikkelingssamenwerking en schreef daar veel over, zoals zijn boeken State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004), Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (2006), Falling behind: explaining the development gap between Latin America and the United States (2008), The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (2011) en Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy (2014) en zijn artikels, o.a. Social capital, civil society and development[58] (2001), "Stateness" first[59] (2005), The Post-Washington Consensus Development After the Crisis[60] (2011) en Governance: What Do We Know, and How Do We Know It?[61] (2016).[62] Hij heeft zich ook met andere politieke onderwepen beziggehouden, o.a. islam in de 21ste eeuw,[63][64][65]immigratie[66][67] en verdedigingen van zijn 'einde van de geschiedenis'-these.[68][69][70][62]
Fukuyama zit in de adviesraad van verschillende instellingen, zoals NED en Freedom House[71] en leidt het ontwikkelingsprogramma Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law van zijn Stanford-universiteit.[72]
Huidige wereldbeschouwing
In een interview in 2018 voor het Engelse tijdschrift The New Statesman zei Francis Fukuyama over de terugkeer van het socialisme in de Verenigde Staten en Groot-Brittannië:
"It all depends on what you mean by socialism. Ownership of the means of production – except in areas where it’s clearly called for, like public utilities – I don’t think that’s going to work. If you mean redistributive programmes that try to redress this big imbalance in both incomes and wealth that has emerged then, yes, I think not only can it come back, it ought to come back. This extended period, which started with Reagan and Thatcher, in which a certain set of ideas about the benefits of unregulated markets took hold, in many ways it’s had a disastrous effect. At this juncture, it seems to me that certain things Karl Marx said are turning out to be true. He talked about the crisis of overproduction… that workers would be impoverished and there would be insufficient demand."
Vertaling: Het hangt er helemaal van af van wat je bedoelt met socialisme. [Staats]Eigendom van de productiemiddelen, ik denk niet dat dat gaat werken, behalve op terreinen waar het echt noodzakelijk is, zoals nutsbedrijven. [Maar] Als je herverdelingsprogramma's bedoelt waarmee de ontstane grote onbalans in inkomen en rijkdom wordt geprobeerd te herstellen, ja dan denk ik dat het niet alleen terug kan komen, het zou ook terug moeten komen. De lange periode, die begon met Reagan en Thatcher, waarin bepaalde ideeën over de voordelen van niet-gereguleerde markten ingang vonden, heeft in veel opzichten een rampzalig effect gehad. Op dit moment lijkt het me dat bepaalde dingen die Karl Marx heeft gezegd waar blijken te zijn. Hij sprak over de crisis van de overproductie... dat arbeiders zouden verarmen en er onvoldoende vraag zou zijn.
— Interview in The New Statesman, 17 oktober 2018[73]
Rusland stevent af op een regelrechte nederlaag in Oekraïne. De Russische planning was incompetent, gebaseerd op de onjuiste veronderstelling dat de Oekraïners Rusland gunstig gezind waren en dat hun leger onmiddellijk na een invasie zou instorten.
De ineenstorting van hun positie zou plotseling en catastrofaal kunnen zijn, in plaats van langzaam te gebeuren via een uitputtingsslag.
Er is geen diplomatieke oplossing voor de oorlog mogelijk voordat dit gebeurt. Er is geen denkbaar compromis dat voor zowel Rusland als Oekraïne aanvaardbaar zou zijn, gezien de verliezen die zij op dit moment hebben geleden.
Poetin zal de nederlaag van zijn leger niet overleven. Hij krijgt steun omdat hij wordt gezien als een sterke man; wat heeft hij te bieden zodra hij incompetent blijkt en zijn dwangmatige macht wordt ontnomen?
Turkse drones zullen steeds belangrijker worden op het slagveld.
Een Russische nederlaag zal een "nieuwe geboorte van de vrijheid" mogelijk maken, en ons uit de put halen over de achteruitgang van de mondiale democratie. De geest van 1989 zal voortleven, dankzij een stel dappere Oekraïners.
In 2022 heeft Aleksandr Doegin nog een antwoord geformuleerd op ieder van Fukuyama's punten.[81]
Het liberalisme, met zijn universalistische pretenties, staat misschien moeilijk naast een schijnbaar parochiaal nationalisme, maar de twee kunnen met elkaar worden verzoend. De doelstellingen van het liberalisme zijn volledig verenigbaar met een wereld verdeeld in natiestaten. . . . Liberale rechten zijn zinloos als ze niet door een staat kunnen worden afgedwongen ... De territoriale bevoegdheid van een staat komt noodzakelijkerwijs overeen met het gebied dat wordt bezet door de groep individuen die het sociaal contract hebben ondertekend. Mensen die buiten die jurisdictie wonen, moeten hun rechten door die staat laten respecteren, maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs afdwingen. . . . De noodzaak van internationale samenwerking bij de aanpak van problemen zoals de klimaatopwarming en pandemieën is nog nooit zo duidelijk geweest. Maar één bepaalde vorm van macht, het vermogen om regels af te dwingen door te dreigen met of daadwerkelijk gebruik te maken van geweld, blijft onder controle van natiestaten. . . . De uiteindelijke macht, met andere woorden, blijft de bevoegdheid van natiestaten, wat betekent dat de controle van de macht op dit niveau van cruciaal belang blijft. . . . . Er is dus geen noodzakelijke tegenstelling tussen liberaal universalisme en de noodzaak van natiestaten. De normatieve waarde van mensenrechten mag dan universeel zijn, handhavingsbevoegdheid is dat niet; het is een schaars goed dat noodzakelijkerwijs op een territoriaal afgebakende manier wordt toegepast.
— A Country of Their Own:
Liberalism Needs the Nation, Francis Fukuyama
Het werk bestaat uit twee delen: een 'empirisch' en een 'normatief' deel. Fukuyama beweert dat "de overwinning van het liberalisme vooral heeft plaatsgevonden in het rijk van de ideeën of het bewustzijn en nog onvolledig is in de echte of materiële wereld. Maar er zijn krachtige redenen om te geloven dat het het ideaal is dat op de lange termijn de materiële wereld zal regeren."[89] Daarmee zegt hij dat 'het einde van de geschiedenis' eerder een normatieve dan empirische vaststelling is. "Het normatieve oordeel is kritisch afhankelijk van empirisch bewijs met betrekking tot, bijvoorbeeld, de werkbaarheid van kapitalistische en socialistischeeconomische systemen, maar berust uiteindelijk op supra-empirische gronden."[90] In het eerste deel poogt Francis Fukuyama aan te tonen dat een hegeliaans concept van 'geschiedenis' "als een coherente, gerichte evolutie van menselijke samenlevingen als geheel" bestaat door te wijzen op economische ontwikkeling op basis van natuurwetenschappelijke vooruitgang.[90] Volgens Fukuyama is dat echter onvoldoende om de verspreiding van liberale democratieën en vrije markten te verwachten, aangezien het "niet meer doet dan ons hoop geven dat de wereldgeschiedenis een progressief karakter heeft, en niet het normatieve geval bewijst."[90] Daarvoor is, volgens hem, het platoonse concept van thymos nodig, het deel van de ziel dat volgens de Oudgrieksefilosoof mensen aanzette om waarde toe te kennen aan anderen en zichzelf. Fukuyama verbindt dit met Hegels concept van een "strijd voor erkenning" en beweert dat dit de basis is voor het succes van de liberaal-democratische ideologie. "We kunnen de totaliteit van het revolutionaire fenomeen [i.e. de val van het communisme] niet begrijpen als we de werking van de thymotische woede en de vraag naar erkenning die gepaard ging met de economische crisis van het communisme, niet op waarde schatten."[91]
Daarnaast probeert hij de verschillende vormen van kritiek te weerleggen die filosofen als Nietzsche,Marx en Rousseau hebben geuit op de liberale vrije-markt-democratie. Volgens Fukuyama hebben Nietzsche en Heidegger de "normatieve basis van de moderne liberale democratie inderdaad in gevaar gebracht door de filosofische 'crisis van de moderniteit'" en heeft postmoderne filosofie een bijzonder negatieve invloed gehad op de verdediging van het maatschappijmodel.[90] Hij zegt daarbij dat deze "aporie, het meest serieus besproken in het Strauss-Kojève-debat, de centrale intellectuele kwestie van onze tijd is."[90] Fukuyama baseert zich namelijk op de ideeën van de filosoof Alexandre Kojève. Opvallend is dat Kojève een heel andere visie op het werk van Hegel heeft dan Karl Popper.[92] Karl Popper noemt in zijn werk The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) Hegel samen met Marx en Plato als een vijand van de open samenleving. Alexandre Kojève ziet Hegel juist als een voorstander van de liberale(open) samenleving.
De oorsprong van onze politiek 1: Van de prehistorie tot de Verlichting
Professor Fukuyama draagt het boek op aan zijn overleden oudprofessor Samuel Huntington. In het voorwoord geeft Fukuyama aan dat hij De oorsprong van onze politiek schreef om verder te bouwen op Huntingtons werk Political Order in Changing Societies uit 1968 en fundamentele nieuwe inzichten te integreren. Daarnaast heeft Fukuyama belangstelling voor de problemen van failed states, waar de internationale gemeenschap veel moeilijkheden heeft ondervonden om daar modernenatiestaten te ontwikkelen.[93]
De antwoorden op veel van deze vragen zijn niet te vinden in Political Order in Changing Societies; en een nieuwe blik op Huntingtons thematiek vraagt om een uitgebreide verheldering van deze onderwerpen.
Vandaar dit boek, over de historische achtergronden van instellingen, maar ook over het proces van politiek verval.[94]
Deel 2: Staatsvorming - In dit onderdeel schetst Fukuyama de vroege staatsvorming en het gevaar van herpatrimonialisering. Daarvoor kijkt hij in de eerste plaats naar het Oude China, dat zich in 221 v.C. verenigde onder keizer Huangdi van de Qin-dynastie. Door intense militaireterritorialecompetitie tussen de verscheidene Chinese politiekeentiteiten vanaf de 8ste eeuw v.C. trad er staatsvorming op - met een dalend aantal staten en uiteindelijk één grootschalige staat tot gevolg - en bestuurlijke professionalisering, zoals Charles Tilly ook vaststelde in vroegmodern Europa. Deze Chinese staatsvorming contrasteert met de ontwikkeling in het premoderne India, waar slechts weinig centralisering en eenmaking was en waar politieke heersers meer sociale oppositie ondervonden; Fukuyama stelt dat de positie van het hindoeïsme, dat de maatschappij verdeelt in een sociaal-hiërarchischkastenstelsel waar de religieuzekaste - brahmanen - boven de politiek-militairekaste staat - ook wel de kshatriya's. Het hindoeïsme en het Indische kastenstelsel introduceerde eerst een rechtsorde vooraleer een staat zich kon ontwikkelen. Dit verklaart, volgens Fukuyama, mede waarom het moderne India een democratie met een sterk rechtssysteem is, maar met vaak weinig effectief bestuur; terwijl het moderne China vaak doortastende bestuursmaatregelen kan treffen, maar evenzeer tyranniek kan optreden. Vervolgens wendt Fukuyama zich tot de islamwereld en vooral de Ottomanen, die een professioneel leger en bestuur trachtten te organiseren rond de institutie van de devshirme, waarbij christelijke kinderen uit de Balkan als slaven geronseld afgezonderd werden van hun familie om al vanaf jonge leeftijd opgeleid te worden binnen de Ottomaanse staat. Een groot deel van de Ottomaanse elite was zo afkomstig uit het devshirmesysteem. De devshirme-gangers - waaronder de janitsaren, de militairen uit het systeem - behoorden op deze manier volledig loyaal te zijn aan de Ottomaanse sultan, aangezien zij geen familiale belangen konden verdedigen en oorspronkelijk hun titel niet konden doorgeven aan nakomelingen. Zodra in de 16de en 17de eeuw de janitsaren steeds meer rechten voor hun nakomelingen verworven, raakte het systeem meer in diskrediet, en begin 18de eeuw werd het afgeschaft. Militaire en bestuurlijke slavernij had een beperkt succes op lange termijn. In een laatste hoofdstuk bekijkt Fukuyama hoe de Katholieke Kerk in de middeleeuwen voorschriften invoerde die de positie van grote verwantschapsstructuren ondermijnden bij de Germaanse stammen die het voormalige West-Romeinse rijk overnamen en middeleeuwse West-Europeanen. In de vroege middeleeuwen legde de Katholieke Kerk verboden op op bepaalde huwelijkspraktijken, zoals huwelijken tussen neven en nichten. Zulke huwelijkspraktijken hadden de bedoeling onroerend bezit binnen de familie te behouden; als de Kerk dit tegenhield, kon ze dus zelf meer schenkingen verwerven van bijvoorbeeld kinderloze weduwen die niet binnen dezelfde familiegroep konden hertrouwen. Cruciaal was ook het wettelijke recht van vrouwen om onroerend goed te bezitten en van de hand te doen. Al dit zorgde ervoor dat het vermogen van een patrilineair-georganiseerde familie - i.e. een familie die haar afkomst langs mannelijke lijn traceert - om goederen te beheren ondermijnd werd en daarmee het sociale systeem van sterke verwantschapsstructuren onderuit werd gehaald. West-Europese christenen, en vooral Engelsen, waren op deze manier al sinds de middeleeuwen individualistischer ingesteld dan andere wereldregio's waar verwantschap een belangrijkere rol bleef/blijft spelen. Omwille hiervan stelt Fukuyama dat "sociale ontwikkeling [in Europa] vooraf[ging] aan politieke ontwikkeling."[95]
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995)
The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (1999)
Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2002)
State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004)
America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (Amerikaanse editie); After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong (Britse editie) (2006)
Graduaatsonderzoeker, National Security Program, Center for International Affairs, Harvard-university (1979)
Graduaatsonderzoeker, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard-university (1978-1979)
Publicaties
Boeken en monografieën
Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World, 1986.
The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades, redacteur samen met Andrzej Korbonski, 1987.
Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission,1987.
Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World, 1989.
The End of History and the Last Man, 1992.
The US-Japan Security Relationship Aftern the Cold War, samen met Kongdan Oh, 1993.
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, 1995.
The Virtual Corporation and Army Organization, samen met Abram Shulsky, 1997.
The End of Order, 1997.
The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order, 1999.
Information and Biological Revolutions: Global Governance Challenges— Summary of a Study Group, redacteur samen met Caroline S. Wagner, 1999.
Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, 2002.
State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 2004.
Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, redacteur, 2006.
America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, 2006.
Beyond Bioethics: A Proposal for Modernizing the Regulation of Human Biotechnologies, 2006.
Voorwoord in Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 2006.
Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics, redacteur, 2007.
East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, redacteur samen met Kent E. Calder, 2008.
Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap between the United States and Latin America, redacteur, 2008.
New Ideas in Development After the Financial Crisis, redacteur samen met Nancy Birdsall, 2011.
The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 2011.
Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy, redacteur samen met Larry Diamond en Marc Plattner, 2012.
Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, 2014.
Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, 2018.
Report of the Working Group on Platform Scale, Stanford University Program on Democracy and the Internet, 2020.
Liberalism and Its Discontents, 2022.
Bijdrages in redactiebundels
"Pakistan Since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan", in U.S. Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia, 1982.
“New Directions for Soviet Middle East Policy: Implications for the Atlantic Alliance”, in The Middle East and the Western Alliance, 1982.
“Escalation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf”, in Hawks, Doves, and Owls, 1985.
“The New Marxist Leninist States and Internal Conflict in the Third World”, in Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and U.S. Policy, 1985.
“Soviet Experience with Cooperative Forces”, in Developing Cooperative Forces in the Third World,1986.
“U.S.-Soviet Interactions in the Third World”, in U.S.- Soviet Relations: The Next Phase,1986.
“Military Aspects of the U.S.-Soviet Competition in the Third World”, in East-West Tensions in the Third World, 1986.
“A Systematic Soviet Strategy for the Third World?”, in The Red Orchestra, 1986.
“Soviet Military Power in the Middle East; or, Whatever Became of Power Projection?”, in The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East, 1987.
“The Political Character of the Overseas Empire", in The Future of the Soviet Empire, 1987.
"Soviet Strategy in the Third World", in The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades, 1987.
“Discord or Cooperation in the Third World?” in Coping with Gorbachev's Soviet Union, 1988.
“Reflections on 'The End of History' Five Years Later", in After History: Francis Fukuyama and His Critics, 1994.
“Immigration", in The New Promise of American Life, 1995.
“On the Possibility of Writing a Universal History", in History and the Idea of Progress, 1995.
“The Politics of Women", in Predictions: 30 Great Minds on the Future, 1999.
“Military Organization in the Information Age: Lessons from the World of Business”, samen met A. N. Shulsky, in The Changing Role of Information Warfare, 1999.
“Asian Values, Korean Values, and Democratic Consolidation", in Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea, 2000.
“Der unprogrammierte Unmensch”, in Die Gegenwart der Zukunft, 2000.
“Social Capital”, in Culture Matters, 2000.
“The Limits of Liberal Democracy”, in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, 2001.
“Culture and Economic Development”, in InternationalEncyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2001.
“Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Dimensions of Development”, samen met Sanjay Marwah, in Emerging Market Democracies: East Asia and Latin America, 2002.
“Does ‘the West’ Still Exist?” in Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership, 2004.
“Economic, Political, and Cultural Consequences of Changes in Generational Relations”, in Intergenerational Solidarity, Welfare and Human Ecology, 2005.
“Fighting the War on Terrorism”, in Uniting America: Restoring the Vital Center to American Democracy, 2005.
“Still Disenchanted? The Modernity of Postindustrial Capitalism”, in The Economic Sociology of Capitalism, 2005.
"Introduction", in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, 2006.
"Nation-building and the failure of institutional memory", in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, 2006.
"Conclusion: Guidelines for Future Nation-Builders", in Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, 2006.
“Development and the Limits of Institutional Design”, in Political Institutions and Development: Failed Expectations and Renewed Hopes, 2007.
“Soft Talk, Big Stick”, in To Lead the World: American Strategy After the Bush Doctrine, 2008.
“Challenges to World Order after September 11”, in Imbalance of Power: US Hegemony and International Order, 2009.
"International Institutional Transfer", in The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy, 2009.
“Reconceptualizing Democracies and Empowering Them to Deliver”, in Democracy in U.S. Security Strategy: From Promotion to Support, 2009.
“National Identity, American and Otherwise”, in Narrating Peoplehood amidst Diversity: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives, 2011.
“Agency or Inevitability: Will Human Beings Control Their Technological Future?”, in The Posthuman Condition, 2012.
"Democracy: Should All Nations Be Encouraged to Promote Democratization: Yes", samen met Michael McFaul, in Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations, 2012.
"The Patterns of History", in Democracy in East Asia: A New Century, 2013.
"Nation-Building and State Building", in Building the Nation: N.F.S. Grundtvig and Danish National Identity, 2015.
“What is Corruption?”, in Against Corruption, met voorwoord van David Cameron, 2016.
“Civil Society and Political Society”, in Jean Bethke Elshtain: Politics, Ethics, and Society, 2018.
“Beyond Measurement: What is Needed for Effective Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms”, samen met Francesca Recanatini, in Governance Indicators: Approaches, Progress, Promise, 2018.
"The Intrinsic Functions of Government", in Public Service and Good Governance for the 21st Century, 2020.
"Comparative Media Regulation in the United States and Europe", samen met Andy Grotto, in Social Media and Democracy: The State of the Field and Prospects for Reform, 2020.
“Why National Identity Matters", in National Identity and Social Cohesion, 2021.
“Corruption, Elites, and Power: An Overview of International Policy Efforts to Improve the Quality of Government”, samen met Francesca Recanatini, in The Oxford Handbook of The Quality of Government, 2021.
Onderzoeksartikels
“Egypt and Israel After Camp David”, samen met Steven J. Rosen, Current History, 1979.
"The Soviet Threat to the Persian Gulf", RAND Corporation P-6596,1981.
“A New Soviet Strategy”, Commentary, 1979.
“Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention Threats in the Middle East", Orbis, 1981.
"The Soviet Union and Iraq Since 1968", RAND Corporation N-1524-AF, 1980.
"The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan: A Trip Report", RAND Corporation N-1579-RC, 1980.
"The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report", RAND Corporation N-1584-RC, 1980.
“The USSR and the Middle East", samen met A.S. Becker, Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1981.
“The Rise and Fall of the Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party", Survey, 1985.
“Gorbachev and the Third World", Foreign Affairs, 1986.
“Asia in a Global War", Comparative Strategy, 1987.
“The Cycles of Soviet Third World Policy”, Problems of Communism, 1987.
“The End of History?”, The National Interest, 1989.
“A Reply to My Critics”, The National Interest, 1989.
“The Next South Africa”, The National Interest, 1991.
“Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon”, Political Science, 1991.
“Democratization and International Security”, Adelphi Papers, 1991.
“Capitalism and Democracy: The Missing Link", Journal of Democracy, 1992.
“The Beginning of Foreign Policy", The New Republic, 1992.
“Neyasnost' Natsional'nogo Interessa ("Dubbelzinnigheid van nationaal belang")", Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moskou), 1992.
“The Modernizing Imperative", The National Interest, 1993.
“Immigrants and Family Values", Commentary, 1993.
“Great Planes", The New Republic, 1993.
“Against the New Pessimism", Commentary, 1994.
“Die Zukunft des Krieges” (“De toekomst van oorlog”)", Frankfurter Allgemeine Magazin, 1994.
“The Primacy of Culture", Journal of Democracy, 1995.
“Confucianism and Democracy", Journal of Democracy, 1995.
“Virtue and Prosperity", National Interest, 1995.
“Social Capital and the Global Economy", Foreign Affairs, 1995.
“Trust Still Counts in a Virtual World", Forbes ASAP, 1996.
“The Illusion of Exceptionalism", Journal of Democracy, 1997.
"Is It All In the Genes?", Commentary, 1997.
“Asian Values and the Asian Crisis", Commentary, 1998.
"Falling Tide: Global Trends and US Civil Society", Harvard International Review, 1997.
"Response to Sebastian Mallaby", The National Interest, 1998.
“Women and the Evolution of World Politics", Foreign Affairs, 1998.
“The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order", The Atlantic Monthly, 1999.
“Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle", The National Interest, 1999.
“Asian Values and the Current Crisis", Development Outreach, 1999.
“How to Remoralize America", The Wilson Quarterly, 1999.
“Asian Values in the Wake of the Asian Crisis", The Review of Korean Studies, 1999.
“The March of Equality", Journal of Democracy, 2000.
“Social Capital and Civil Society", IMF Working Paper WP/00/74, 2000.
“Don’t Do It, Britannia", Prospect, 2000.
“Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Dimensions of Development”, samen met Sanjay Marwah, Journal of Democracy, October 2000.
"Social Capital, Civil Society, and Development", Third World Quarterly, 2001.
“Natural Rights and Human History", The National Interest, 2001.
“Differing Disciplinary Perspectives on the Origins of Trust", Boston University Law Review, 2001.
“How to Regulate Science", The Public Interest, 2002.
“Life, but Not as We Know It", New Scientist, 2002.
"Gene Regime", Foreign Policy, 2002.
“The Ground and Nature of Human Rights”, samen met William Schulz and Robin Fox, The National Interest, 2002.
"In Defense of Nature, Human and Non-Human", World Watch Magazine, 2002: 30-32.
“Holes in Our Gene Policy", Bloomberg Personal Finance, 2002.
"Can Any Good Come of Radical Islam?", samen met Nadav Samin, Commentary, 2002.
"Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda", SAIS Review, 2002.
“Has History Restarted Since September 11?”, Centre for Independent Studies, 2002.
“Nation-Building 101", The Atlantic Monthly, 2004.
"The Imperative of State-Building", Journal of Democracy, 2004.
“The Neoconservative Moment", The National Interest, 2004.
“Transhumanism", Foreign Policy, 2004.
“Why There is No Science of Public Administration", Journal of International Affairs, 2004.
“Re-Envisioning Asia", Foreign Affairs, 2005.
“‘Stateness’ First", Journal of Democracy, 2005.
“Facing the Perils of Presidentialism?”, samen met Björn Dressel and Boo-Seung Chang, Journal of Democracy, 2005.
“Human Biomedicine and the Problem of Governance", Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 2005.
“Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 2006.
“Liberalism versus State-Building", Journal of Democracy, 2007.
“A Proposal for Modernizing the Regulation of Human Biotechnologies”, samen met Franco Furger, Hastings Center Report, 2007.
“Identity and Migration", Prospect, 2007.
"A Quiet Revolution", recensieartikel over Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul (2007), Foreign Affairs, 2007.
"Should Democracy be Promoted or Demoted?", samen met Michael McFaul, Washington Quarterly, 2007.
"The New Nationalism and the Strategic Architecture of Northeast Asia", Asia Policy, 2007.
"The Latin American Experience", Journal of Democracy, 2008.
“State-Building in Solomon Islands", Pacific Economic Bulletin, 2008.
“What Were They Thinking", samen met Seth Colby, The American Interest, 2009.
“Transitions to the Rule of Law", Journal of Democracy, 2010.
“Development Strategies: Integrating Governance and Growth", samen met Brian Levy, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5196, 2010.
"Left Out", The American Interest, 2011.
“The Post-Washington Consensus", samen met Nancy Birdsall, Foreign Affairs, 2011.
"Political Order in Egypt", The American Interest, 2011: 6-13.
“Dealing with Inequality", Journal of Democracy, 2011.
"American Political Dysfunction", The American Interest, 2011.
"Is There a Proper Sequence in Democratic Transitions?", Current History, 2011.
"The Future of History", Foreign Affairs, 2012.
"The Patterns of History", Journal of Democracy, 2012.
"What Is Governance?" Governance, 2013.
“Democracy and the Quality of the State", Journal of Democracy, 2013.
“America in Decay: The Sources of Political Dysfunction", Foreign Affairs, 2014.
“Building Better Governments", The American Interest, 2014.
"States and Democracy", Democratization, 2014.
“Why Is Democracy Performing So Poorly?”, Journal of Democracy, 2015.
"Comment on Jørgen Møller: The Importance of Equality", Journal of Democracy, 2015.
“Fuss Budgeting", The American Interest, 2015.
“Our Peculiar Reform Challenge”, samen met Bruce Cain, The American Interest, 2015.
“A More Systematic Approach to Biological Risk", samen met Megan Palmer and David Relman, Science, 2015.
“Reflections on Chinese Governance", Journal of Chinese Governance, 2016.
"Governance: What Do We Know, and How Do We Know It?”, Annual Review of Political Science, 2016: 89-105.
“Macro Theory and the Study of Political Development", Scandinavian Political Studies, 2016.
“Too Much Law and Too Little Infrastructure", The American Interest, 2016.
“American Political Decay or Renewal? The Meaning of the 2016 Election", Foreign Affairs, 58-68.
“The Last English Civil War", Daedalus, 2018: 15:24.
"The Populist Surge", The American Interest, 2018: 16-18.
“Why National Identity Matters", Journal of Democracy, 2018: 5-15.
"30 Years of World Politics: What Has Changed?" Journal of Democracy, 2020: 11-21.
“What Would a Second Trump Term Do to the Federal Bureaucracy?”, Washington Monthly, 2020.
“The Wages of American Political Decay", The American Interest, 2020.
“What Kind of Regime Does China Have?”, The American Interest, 2020.
“The Pandemic and Political Order", Foreign Affairs, 2020.
"Responding to COVID-19 Through Surveys of Public Servants", samen met Christian Schuster, Lauren Weitzman, Kim Sass Mikkelsen, Jan Meyer-Sehling, Katherine Bersch, Dinsha Mistree, Patricia Paskov, Daniel Rogger, en Kerenssa Kay, Public Administration Review, 2020: 792-796.
“Liberalism and Its Discontents", American Purpose, 2020.
“The Stakes in the Coming Election", American Purpose, 2020.
“How to Save Democracy from Technology: Ending Big Tech’s Information Monopoly", samen met Barak Richman en Ashish Goel, Foreign Affairs, 2021.
"Rotten to the Core? How America's Political Decay Accelerated During the Trump Era", Foreign Affairs, 2021.
“Making the Internet Safe for Democracy", Journal of Democracy, 2021.
“The Future of Platform Power: Solving for a Moving Target", Journal of Democracy 32, 2021.
“A Country of Their Own: Liberalism Needs the Nation", Foreign Affairs, 2022.
“The Obsolescing Bargain Crosses the Belt and Road Initiative: Renegotiations on BRI Projects", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2022.
“Response to the Polity Collection", Polity, 2022.
“The Global Survey of Public Servants: Evidence from 1,300,000 Public Servants in 1,300 Government Institutions in 23 Countries", samen met Christian Schuster, Kim Sass Mikkelsen, Daniel Rogger, Zahid Hasnain, Dinsha Mistree, Jan Meyer-Sehling, Katherine Bersch, en Kerenssa Kay, Public Administration Review, 2023.
“Russia Is Winning in Georgia: America Needs to Get Tough on Tbilisi”, samen met Nino Evgenidze, Foreign Affairs, 2023.
“Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy”, samen met Katherine Bersch, Annual Review of Political Science, 2023.
“China’s Road to Ruin: The Real Toll of Beijing’s Belt and Road”, samen met Michael Bennon, Foreign Affairs, 2023.
“In Defense of the Deep State", Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 2023.
“Response to the Global Perspectives Reviews of Liberalism and Its Discontents", Global Perspectives, 2023.
Bronnen, noten en/of referenties
↑ ab(en) Stanford University, Francis Fukuyama. cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu. Gearchiveerd op 2 maart 2021. Geraadpleegd op 23 februari 2021.
↑ abc(en) Stephen Moss (23 mei 2011). Francis Fukuyama: 'Americans are not very good at nation-building'. The Guardian. Gearchiveerd op 24 september 2022 "Fukuyama, who is 58, was born in Chicago but grew up in New York. His father is a second-generation Japanese-American whose own father fled the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 and started a shop on the west coast before being interned in the second world war (that distant family experience has made Fukuyama a critic of Islamophobia). His mother, who comes from an academic family in Japan, met her husband when she came to study in the US. Some Japanese was spoken at home, but Fukuyama, an only child, never learned to speak it – "it just wasn't fashionable to be ethnic when I was growing up" – though he says his three children have embraced their dual identity and his eldest son is learning Japanese."
↑(en) James Atlas, What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?. New York Times Magazine (22 oktober 1989). Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama grew up in Manhattan's Stuyvesant Town, a middle-class housing development on the Lower East Side. His father was a Congregational minister who later became a professor of religion, and Fukuyama's own direction in the beginning was toward an academic career. As a freshman at Cornell in 1970, he was a resident of Telluride House, a sort of commune for philosophy students; Allan Bloom was the resident Socrates. They shared meals and talked philosophy until all hours, living the good life Bloom would later evoke in "The Closing of the American Mind," the professor and his disciples sitting around the cafeteria discussing the Great Books.”
↑ abc(en) James Atlas, What is Fukuyama saying? And to whom is he saying it?. New York Times Magazine (22 oktober 1989). Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama majored in classics, then did graduate work in comparative literature at Yale, where he studied with the deconstructionist Paul de Man (who would achieve posthumous notoriety when it was discovered that he'd published pro-Nazi articles in the Belgian press at the height of World War II). "It was kind of an intellectual side journey," Fukuyama says.
After Yale, he spent six months in Paris, sitting in on classes with Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, whose abstruse and fashionable discours would become required reading for a generation of American graduate students. Fukuyama was less than impressed. "I was turned off by their nihilistic idea of what literature was all about," he recalls. "It had nothing to do with the world. I developed such an aversion to that whole over-intellectual approach that I turned to nuclear weapons instead." He enrolled in Harvard's government department, where he studied Middle Eastern and Soviet politics. Three years later he got a Ph.D. in political science, writing his thesis on Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East.”
↑(en) Francis Fukuyama, Huntington’s Legacy. The American Interest (27 augustus 2018). Gearchiveerd op 20 september 2022. Geraadpleegd op 20 september 2022.
↑ abc(en) Our Posthuman Future: The Perils and Promise of Biotechnology 2002. C-SPAN. YouTube (2002). Gearchiveerd op 26 september 2022. “He was a member of the political science department of the RAND Corporation from
'79 to '80, then again from '83 to '89 and from '95 to '96. He has also served as a member of the policy planning staff of the U.S. Department of State - first as a regular member specializing in Middle East affairs and then as Deputy Director for European political-military affairs.”
↑ abWhat Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?. Gearchiveerd op 28 juni 2023. “Fukuyama's first job out of the academic world was at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Then, in 1981, Paul D. Wolfowitz, director of policy planning in the Reagan Administration (and also a former student of Bloom's), invited him to join his staff. Fukuyama worked in Washington for two years, then returned to Rand. For the next six years, he wrote papers for Rand on Soviet foreign policy, speculating on such weighty matters as "Pakistan Since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan" and "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission." In "Gorbachev and the Third World" (published in the spring 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs), Fukuyama claimed that Soviet foreign policy was still expansionist, and that despite efforts to economize at home and act conciliatory abroad, Gorbachev was quietly "trying to stake out a more combative position" in client nations like Angola and Afghanistan, Libya and Nicaragua. The message of these heavily footnoted articles was clear: The cold war is still on. Last February, shortly before he returned to Washington to become deputy to Dennis Ross, the new director of policy planning, Fukuyama gave a lecture at the University of Chicago in which he surveyed the international political scene. It was sponsored by his former professor, Allan Bloom. "My whole life has been spent in organizations that prize technical expertise," says Fukuyama. "I was anxious to deal with larger and more important issues" - what Bloom calls "the big questions." As it happened, Owen Harries, co-editor of The National Interest, was looking around for a think piece on the current situation - a piece, as Harries explains it, that would "link history with the great traditions of political thought." Harries got hold of Fukuyama's lecture and instantly recognized that it was "a provocative, stimulating essay, just what the times needed."”
↑(en) Francis, Fukuyama, "End of History?", zomer 1989.
↑(en) JANUARY 17, 1992 Mr. Fukuyama discussed his book, The End of History and the Last Man, in which he contends that the shaping forces of history tend toward liberal democracy.. C-SPAN. YouTube (17 januari 1992). Gearchiveerd op 6 januari 2023. “Fukuyama: "... and then I returned in 1989 and I was a deputy director in that same policy planning staff. But my second State Department career was cut a little bit short by the publication of the original article of the End of History, which led me to write the book." Interviewer: "Was it cut short by your decision or by the decision the State Department?" Fukyama: "No, the State Department had nothing to do with it - it was a completely voluntary decision. I simply thought that, you know, writing the book
would be an opportunity in a certain sense, that would be very hard to pass up; whereas, you know, you can be a bureaucrat anytime you want."”
↑ abFukuyama, Francis (zomer 1989). End of History?. National Interest 1989 "Francis Fukuyama is deputy director of the State Department's policy planning staff and former analyst at the RAND Corporation. This article is based on a lecture presented at the University of Chicago's John M. Olin Center and to Nathan Tarcov and Allan Bloom for their support in this and many earlier endeavors."
↑ abc(en) Our Posthuman Future. C-SPAN. YouTube (2002). Gearchiveerd op 26 september 2022. “One of the reasons that we ended up with liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism, was that technology in the late 20th century was actually quite friendly to these kinds of institutions. The information technology revolution democratized life - instead of centralizing political control, it tended to spread it out. It gave ordinary people access to information and therefore sponsored the kinds of political values that led to what were, in my view, fairly decent political institutions. But technology is not necessarily friendly to good political values and it could be that we were on the cusp of a very major wave of technological innovation that might have different political consequences. (...) I started thinking about whether it might be the case that a different form of technology - that is to say biotechnology - would have a very different kind of political impact. In a certain sense, the reason why I think we've ended up with liberal democracy in the 20th century was that you had a couple hundred years of social and political experiments by utopian revolutionary movements that sought to remake human societies on a perfectly just basis by completely restructuring the nature of society. In my view, all of them failed: beginning with the French Revolution, but going through the Bolshevik and Chinese and Cambodian revolutions. All of these revolutions failed for one essential reason: because they ran into this brick wall called 'human nature'; that all of the revolutionaries began with a model of human nature or human behavior that was not realistic. (...) and they tried through various very crude technologies like agate prop and labor camps and re-education to get the square peg of human nature pounded into this particular round hole and at the end of the 20th century it had all failed and people had largely given up. Now, supposing that you have a technology that is much better than that that is based on a scientific understanding, for example, of the human brain; on a modern cognitive neuroscience that has its disposals much more powerful tools than labor camps and re-education. Wouldn't that lead to different possibilities for social engineering and social control? So this was the starting point where I began this, and this is why I began thinking about biotechnology and what potential political consequences it may have. (...) Let me say at the outset that I am not at all against biotechnology: it has tremendous therapeutic promise, with the discovery of stem cells, you have the possibility for the first time of regenerative medicine where you can actually recreate tissues including neurons in the brain that we had one point thought simply could not be recreated after early childhood. You have the possibility of curing many of the major diseases - cancers and heart disease and a number of other scourges of mankind - and I think I would be the last to deny the promise of this. However I think that one of the problems with this technology, is that there are some bad things or questionable things that are all wrapped up in the good things that biotechnology brings; (...) With biotechnology, I think the problems are much more subtle and they're all mixed up with the good things that it is going to bring and that's why it is much more problematic.”
↑(en) Francis Fukuyama, The Neoconservative Moment. The National Interest (1 juni 2004). Gearchiveerd op 18 augustus 2022. Geraadpleegd op 22 september 2022.
↑ ab(en) Francis Fukuyama. America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy [2006], ix "The subject of this book is American foreign policy since the al-Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001. This is a personal subject for me. Having long regarded myself as a neoconservative, I thought I shared a common worldview with other neoconservatives-including friends and acquaintances who served in the administration of George W. Bush."
↑(en) Will immigration change the American way? — with Francis Fukuyama (1994) | THINK TANK. American Enterprise Institute. YouTube (22 april 1994). Gearchiveerd op 22 september 2022. “And so, to my mind, the issue is really much less immigration per se as what happens to the immigrants once they get there and whether, you know, we still believe in assimilation as the ultimate goal. And the only thing that troubles me about the current immigration compared to that that occurred at the turn of the century is that our belief in assimilation is — really we don’t believe in it in the way that we once did. (...) I mean, I am not nearly as confident as you in this American assimilation machine. I mean, I think we really do have something to worry about because the multicultural ideology, I think, is very strong today. And it’s something we’re doing to ourselves. It does not necessarily have to be. And I think that that’s really [a problem].”
↑(en) Francis Fukuyama, U.S. vs. Them. The Washington Post (11 september 2002). “Between these two views of the sources of legitimacy, the Europeans are theoretically right but wrong in practice. It is impossible to assert as a matter of principle that legitimately constituted liberal democracies can't make grave mistakes or indeed commit crimes against humanity. But the European idea that legitimacy is handed downward from a disembodied international community rather than handed upward from existing democratic institutions reflecting the public will on a nation-state level invites abuse on the part of elites, who are then free to interpret the will of the international community to suit their own preferences. This is the problem with the International Criminal Court. Instead of strengthening democracy on an international level, it tends to undermine democracy where it concretely lives, in nation-states.
(...)
This conflict does not lend itself to "moral clarity"; both sides believe what they believe by dint of their histories and experiences. Americans are right to insist that there is no such thing as an "international community" in the abstract, and that nation-states must ultimately look out for themselves when it comes to critical matters of security. But they should also understand that they are dependent on international institutions and cooperation to manage this thing called the global economy, from which they benefit enormously.”
↑ ab(en) Project for the New American Century - Statement of Principles. Project for the New American Century (3 juni 1997). Gearchiveerd op 12 januari 2013. Geraadpleegd op 22 september 2022. “June 3, 1997 "American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks. But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America's role in the world. They have not set forth guiding principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century. We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership. As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests? We are in danger of squandering the opportunity and failing the challenge. We are living off the capital -- both the military investments and the foreign policy achievements -- built up by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world. And the promise of short-term commercial benefits threatens to override strategic considerations. As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead. We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities. Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership. Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today. Here are four consequences:
we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global
responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.
Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next. Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Ikle, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad I., Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Dan Quayle, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Henry S. Rowen, Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weigel, Paul Wolfowitz”
↑(en) Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Gearchiveerd op 22 september 2022. “The members of the initiative group thanked Francis Fukuyama for his consistent and unequivocal support for Ukraine during the Russian-Ukrainian war, for his publications, which tremendously helped the world gain a better understanding of Ukraine’s position.”
↑ ab(en) Why red and blue America can’t hear each other anymore. The Washington Post (24 januari 2020). Gearchiveerd op 24 september 2021. “Democrats will not win back swing voters by writing off their opponents as simple racists and xenophobes; they need to show empathy for the legitimate concerns of a working class that is in serious trouble. Identity is an inherently flexible concept that can be deliberately shaped in broader or narrower ways. Liberals around the world have lost ground to populists by ignoring the broad moral appeal of national identity, which in a diverse contemporary society needs to be built around liberal and democratic values. Klein dismisses complaints about political correctness and identity politics on the left, but a politics built on the grievances of ever narrower identity groups breeds similar thinking on the right, and it cannot be the basis for a broader democratic, civic identity that is the ultimate answer to polarization.”
↑(en) Democracy and Its Discontents - Esquire (2018). Gearchiveerd op 30 december 2022. “"As a citizen, I am horrified," Fukuyama said of Trump. "As a political scientist, I am delighted." The rise of such a figure is "a kind of natural experiment where we get to see how theories like checks and balances work in practice and where we can gauge how strong American institutions are. It’s all just theoretical until these concepts are challenged."”
↑ abF. Fukuyama (2019). Identiteit: Waardigheid, ressentiment en identiteitspolitiek. Atlas Contact. ISBN 9789045037806.
↑1. Overigens waren titel en inhoud van dit boek lang niet zo oorspronkelijk en vernieuwend als Fukuyama het deed voorkomen. Zie bijvoorbeeld het boek van Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: The Free Press, 1960, vijfde, herziene druk Harvard University Press, 2000), aangehaald door de Nederlandse historicus en hoogleraar Rob Kroes in zijn 'Naschrift. Gebeurtenissen en ontwikkelingen sinds 1965', in: Jacques Presser, Amerika. Van kolonie tot wereldmacht. Vierde, herziene druk. Amsterdam/Brussel: Elsevier, 1976, pp. 511-537, aldaar 512: "Aan het eind der jaren vijftig vond de stelling ingang dat men in westerse samenlevingen the end of ideology beleefde - de grote strijd der ideologieën van het eind der vorige [negentiende] en de eerste helft van deze [twintigste] eeuw was achterhaald door de vestiging van de verzorgingsstaat met zijn subtiel apparaat van beleidsinstrumenten en van de gemengde economie, toegankelijker voor die instrumenten dan een vrije markteconomie." Hierbij kan opgemerkt worden dat juist aan die 'verzorgingsstaat' en 'gemengde economie' weer grotendeels een einde werd gemaakt vanaf ongeveer het midden van de jaren 1980 - versneld door het einde van het communisme na 1990 - door het bijna ongeremd doorschieten van het zogenoemde neoliberalisme (marktfundamentalisme, deregulering), wat op zijn beurt weer tot de financiële, economische en politieke crisis van 2008 en latere jaren leidde.
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