The Sethi model was developed by Suresh P. Sethi and describes the process of how sales evolve over time in response to advertising.[1][2] The model assumes that the rate of change in sales depend on three effects: response to advertising that acts positively on the unsold portion of the market, the loss due to forgetting or possibly due to competitive factors that act negatively on the sold portion of the market, and a random effect that can go either way.
The Sethi advertising model or simply the Sethi model provides a sales-advertising dynamics in the form of the following stochastic differential equation:
.
Where:
is the market share at time
is the rate of advertising at time
is the coefficient of the effectiveness of advertising
The rate of change in sales depend on three effects: response to advertising that acts positively on the unsold portion of the market via , the loss due to forgetting or possibly due to competitive factors that act negatively on the sold portion of the market via , and a random effect using a diffusion or White noise term that can go either way.
The coefficient is the coefficient of the effectiveness of advertising innovation.
The coefficient is the decay constant.
The square-root term brings in the so-called word-of-mouth effect at least at low sales levels.[1][5]
The diffusion term brings in the random effect.
Example of an optimal advertising problem
Subject to the Sethi model above with the initial market share , consider the following objective function:
where denotes the sales revenue corresponding to the total market, i.e., when , and denotes the discount rate.
The function is known as the value function for this problem, and it is shown to be[2]
^ abcSethi, S. P. (1983). "Deterministic and Stochastic Optimization of a Dynamic Advertising Model". Optimal Control Applications and Methods. 4 (2): 179–184. doi:10.1002/oca.4660040207. S2CID123673289.
^ abVidale, M. L.; Wolfe, H. B. (1957). "An Operations-Research Study of Sales Response to Advertising". Operations Research. 5 (3): 370–381. doi:10.1287/opre.5.3.370.
^ abcSorger, G. (1989). "Competitive Dynamic Advertising: A Modification of the Case Game". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 13 (1): 55–80. doi:10.1016/0165-1889(89)90011-0.
^ abcChintagunta, P. K.; Vilcassim, N. J. (1992). "An Empirical Investigation of Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly". Management Science. 38 (9): 1230–1244. doi:10.1287/mnsc.38.9.1230. S2CID153538282.
^ abcChintagunta, P. K.; Jain, D. C. (1995). "Empirical Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition". Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 4 (1): 109–131. doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00109.x.
^ abPrasad, A.; Sethi, S. P. (2004). "Competitive Advertising under Uncertainty: Stochastic Differential Game Approach". Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 123 (1): 163–185. doi:10.1023/B:JOTA.0000043996.62867.20. S2CID121005830.
^ abBass, F. M.; Krishamoorthy, A.; Prasad, A.; Sethi, S. P. (2005). "Generic and Brand Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly". Marketing Science. 24 (4): 556–568. doi:10.1287/mksc.1050.0119. S2CID17054876.
^ abErickson, G. M. (2009). "An Oligopoly Model of Dynamic Advertising Competition". European Journal of Operational Research. 197: 374–388. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.06.023.
^Prasad, A.; Sethi, S. P. (2009). "Integrated Marketing Communications in Markets with Uncertainty and Competition". Automatica. 45 (3): 601–610. doi:10.1016/j.automatica.2008.09.018. S2CID8385913.
^ abcdErickson, G. M. (2009). "Advertising Competition in a Dynamic Oligopoly with Multiple Brands". Operations Research. 57 (5): 1106–1113. doi:10.1287/opre.1080.0663.
^ abRong, Zhang; Qingzhong, Ren (May 2013). "Equivalence between Sethi advertising model and a scalar LQ differential game". 2013 25th Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC). pp. 1244–1247. doi:10.1109/ccdc.2013.6561115. ISBN978-1-4673-5534-6. S2CID26614539.
^ abHe, X.; Prasad, A.; Sethi, S.P. (2009). "Cooperative Advertising and Pricing in a Stochastic Supply Chain: Feedback Stackelberg Strategies". Production and Operations Management. 18 (1): 78–94. doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01006.x. S2CID15522449. SSRN1069063.
^ abHe, X.; Prasad, A.; Sethi, S.P.; Gutierrez, G. (2007). "A Survey of Stackelberg Differential Game Models in Supply and Marketing Channels". Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering. 16 (4): 385–413. doi:10.1007/s11518-007-5058-2. S2CID11443159. SSRN1069162.
^ abSethi, S.P.; Prasad, A.; He, X. (2008). "Optimal Advertising and Pricing in a New-Product Adoption Model". Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 139 (2): 351–360. doi:10.1007/s10957-008-9472-5. S2CID16181059.
^ abcKrishnamoorthy, A., Prasad, A., Sethi, S.P. (2009). Optimal Pricing and Advertising in a Durable-Good Duopoly. European Journal of Operational Research.
^ abcdChutani A. and Sethi, S.P., "A Feedback Stackelberg Game of Cooperative Advertising in a Durable Goods Oligopoly," Dynamic Games in Economics, 13, J.L. Haunschmied, V. Veliov, and S. Wrzaczek (Eds.), Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014, 89-114.
^ abPrasad, A., Sethi, S.P., and Naik, P., "Understanding the Impact of Churn in Dynamic Oligopoly Markets," Automatica, 48, 2012, 2882-2887.
^ abcHe, X., Krishnamoorthy, A., Prasad, A., Sethi, S.P., "Co-Op Advertising in Dynamic Retail Oligopolies," Decision Sciences, 43(1), 2012, 73-105. SSRN 1521239.
^ abChutani, A. and Sethi, S.P., "Optimal Advertising and Pricing in a Dynamic Durable Goods Supply Chain," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 154(2), 2012, 615-643.SSRN 1898309.
^ abcKrishnamoorthy, A., Prasad, A., and Sethi, S.P., "Optimal Pricing and Advertising in a Durable-Good Duopoly," European Journal of Operations Research, 200(2), 2010, 486-497. SSRN 1114989.
^ abPrasad, A., Sethi, S.P., and Naik, P., "Optimal Control of an Oligopoly Model of Advertising," Proceedings of the 13th IFAC Symposium on Information Control Problems in Manufacturing (INCOM '09), Moscow, Russia, June 3–5, 2009. SSRN 1376394.
^ abBass, F.M., Krishnamoorthy, A., Prasad, A., and Sethi, S.P., "Advertising Competition with Market Expansion for Finite Horizon Firms," Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 1(1), February 2005, 1-19 SSRN 1088489
^Rong, Z., & Qingzhong, R. (2013). Equivalence between sethi advertising model and a scalar LQ differential game. 2013 25th Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC). https://doi.org/10.1109/ccdc.2013.6561115