Operation Saluting October

Operation Saluting October
Part of Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
Map depicting FAPLA and South African/FALA troop movements during Operation Saluting October and Operation Moduler
Planned by	Pyotr Gusev[1] Ivan Ryabchenko[2]
Objective	Capture of Mavinga[3][4]
Date	July 12[5] - October 7, 1987[6]
Executed by	People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA)
Outcome	FAPLA objectives failed; offensive stalls at Lomba River[3] South Africa launches Operation Moduler to halt the offensive[4]

Operation Saluting October (Portuguese: Operação Saludando Octubre, alternatively translated as Operation Salute to October)[1] was an offensive carried out by the People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and its armed wing, the Armed Forces of the Liberation of Angola (FALA), during the Angolan Civil War. The preliminary phase of the operation commenced in July 1987.[2] The principal FAPLA objective was to advance two hundred kilometres from its bases at Cuito Cuanavale to seize the strategically vital FALA logistics centre at Mavinga.[3] In the meantime, a number of secondary movements towards the smaller FALA-held settlements of Cangamba and Cassamba were initiated to draw FALA troops away from Mavinga.[4] The capture of Mavinga was projected to cause the collapse of FALA's entire southeastern front, and pave the way for a second offensive on UNITA's political and military headquarters at Jamba.[3] "Saluting October" was a reference to the seventieth anniversary of the Russian October Revolution.[7]

Background

Operation Saluting October was planned by Lieutenant General Pyotr Gusev, commander of the Soviet military mission in Angola.[1] It was modeled after Operation Second Congress, a similar unsuccessful offensive towards Mavinga planned by Colonel General Konstantin Kurochkin in 1985.[1] Kurochkin was the former head of the Soviet mission and remained the primary liaison between Gusev and the Soviet Ministry of Defence.[1] He was greatly supportive of Gusev's plans and personally flew to Angola in June 1987 to endorse Saluting October before the Angolan government and the FAPLA general staff.[1] Kurochkin and others in the Soviet Ministry of Defence were also instrumental in persuading Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to approve extensive funding for Saluting October.[8] Gorbachev was then slashing defence spending, and looking to reduce the enormous open-ended commitment of Soviet military aid to Angola in particular.[9] However, he agreed to approve the funds and materiel to support FAPLA operations for one more year.[8] Thereafter, the Soviet Union transported approximately $1 billion USD worth of military hardware to Angola in a massive airlift carried out with Antonov An-24 cargo aircraft, with as many as twelve per day landing in Luanda just prior to Saluting October.[10] This equipment was then offloaded and picked up by Angolan Ilyushin Il-76s, which in turn flew them directly to FAPLA's staging areas.[10][5] The deliveries from the Soviet Union included large numbers of tanks and armoured personnel carriers recently withdrawn from its own military campaign in Afghanistan.[11] These were initially rotated out to Tashkent and from there flown directly to Luanda by the AN-24s.[11] American diplomat Chester Crocker described this movement of materiel as "Moscow's largest logistical effort to date in Angola", involving over a thousand Soviet military personnel.[12]

Orchestrating the capture of Mavinga had been the prime objective of the Soviet military mission since the early 1980s.[1] The town itself had been largely destroyed and abandoned during the early years of the civil war, but it was also the site of the largest airfield under FALA's control.[13] The airstrip at Mavinga was one of the few in the country that could accommodate heavy lift aircraft carrying supplies and weapons from UNITA's two major external allies, South Africa and the United States.[13] The Central Intelligence Agency routinely kept FALA resupplied this way, via covert flights out of Kamina in neighbouring Zaire.[14] If Mavinga fell, FALA would lose this vital logistics lifeline, and FAPLA would be able to rapidly airlift more troops and equipment into the region, in close proximity to the UNITA political and military headquarters at Jamba.[13]

Crocker observed that "it was the Soviets who pushed this offensive; they had the influence to prevail in allied decision-making since they paid the bills and provided the hardware. More precisely, it was the Soviet military and Communist Party hardliners who wanted the offensive," intent on ensuring a final decisive victory for their FAPLA ally.[12] In public exchanges with their Western counterparts, Soviet officials were supportive of a negotiated end to the Angolan conflict, but privately they urged the Angolan government of the need to secure a unilateral military solution as soon as possible.[12] Kenyan historian Gilbert Khadiagala wrote that both the Soviet and Angolan political leadership were seduced by the idea of a quick, definitive military solution, and by July 1987, had become increasingly unwilling to engage with an American initiative led by Crocker aimed at securing peace talks with UNITA.[15] Indeed, Moroccan political scientist Zaki Laidi pointed out that Soviet hardliners had always been opposed to American diplomatic initiatives in Angola, and their enormous contribution of military aid was partly to dissuade the Angolans from ruling out a battlefield solution in favour of a "regional settlement sponsored by the United States".[16] In his analysis of the Angolan government's decision to greenlight Saluting October, American journalist Karl Maier claimed that "the idea of wiping out UNITA had been an obsession ever since the [Angolan leadership] took control of Luanda at independence in November 1975, and the mirage of total victory had clouded the leaders' vision" to tactical realities on the ground.[17]

Previous FAPLA offensives towards Mavinga had been unsuccessful, which Soviet advisers blamed on shortages of equipment, improper reconnaissance, and failure to safeguard the rear of the units involved.[5] Consequently, Saluting October was to integrate more heavy armour and artillery with the FAPLA infantry, and the Soviets devoted more resources to training Angolan reconnaissance troops and combat engineers.[5] As a result, three new independent reconnaissance battalions were formed for the purposes of screening the advance.[5] FAPLA was also supplied with more sophisticated bridging equipment.[5]

The outlined offensive relied heavily on the logistical and technical support provided by Soviet advisers attached to FAPLA on the brigade level.[10][18] Pilots and air crews from the Soviet Air Forces would also provide support for the ground operations.[19][8] There were a number of East German military advisers attached to the units involved as well, fulfilling various non-combat roles.[20]

On the personal orders of Fidel Castro, Cuban combat forces - then present in large numbers in Angola to shore up FAPLA's counter-insurgency efforts - were explicitly forbidden from participating in Saluting October.[1] Cuban disagreements with the Soviet and FAPLA general staff in the past had resulted in much of the support roles during Soviet-directed FAPLA offensives being filled by East German advisers instead.[21] However, the East German National People's Army was uninterested in contributing regular ground troops to fully replace the role of Cuban combat formations, claiming that this would not make up for FAPLA's deficiencies.[22]

"Don't get into such wasting, costly, and finally pointless offensives," Castro vented to Gusev's staff. "And count us out if you do."[23] Castro and the Cuban general staff opposed Saluting October on the grounds that FAPLA was being forced to adopt tactics more applicable to Soviet conventional operations in central Europe than an offensive against an irregular fighting force on the broken African terrain.[24] Gusev and his chief of staff, Ivan Ryabchenko, had also planned Operation Saluting October based on their experiences moving similarly sized units in the Soviet Union, and had failed to take into account the logistical disadvantages and technical shortcomings of the FAPLA forces involved.[2][12] Castro's opposition to Saluting October increased as preparations continued throughout early 1987.[17] Once the Soviet and FAPLA preparations became public, Cuban diplomats took the unprecedented step of publicly criticising the planned offensive to the international press, and reiterating on several occasions that their military forces would not take part in it.[17]

To FAPLA, the experience of planning and executing an operation of such massive proportions was relatively new, but the Soviet military mission was convinced that a decade of exhaustive training on its part had created an army capable of undertaking a complex multi-divisional offensive.[3] The Angolan brigade commanders had repeatedly expressed reservations about splitting the force and fighting on two fronts, arguing that a single assault on Mavinga would be more linear and sufficient.[3]

Crocker notes that according to Western intelligence sources, the Soviet military mission favoured a large offensive because they had assigned undue relevance to static objectives on their maps that held little tactical significance.[12] In reality, Crocker wrote, "this was a low-intensity bush war spread across a vast country where high-value targets were scarce. The key military resources were reliable people and the capability for sustained and rapid maneuver. Soviet-led FAPLA offensives bore little relation to Angolan conditions."[12] The United States Department of Defense was reportedly baffled by the decision to launch such a complex offensive better suited for the European theatre, concluding that "the Soviets have developed no specific doctrine to deal with the insurgency in Angola," and had little recourse other than conventional military tactics.[25]

FAPLA buildup

Soviet advisers planning operations in southern Angola, 1980s.

Preparations for Operation Saluting October commenced in April 1987.[7] The offensive was to involve two FAPLA divisions composed of eight brigades staged around Cuito Cuanavale, for a total of 10,000-11,000 troops, 150 T-54/55 and T-62 main battle tanks, 30 PT-76 light tanks, and several organic batteries of M-46 and D-30 towed howitzers.[7][5] In total, the force had around 500 armoured fighting vehicles.[26] These were essentially motorised infantry brigades transported by truck and BTR-60PB armoured personnel carriers, each with an attached tank company, an armoured reconnaissance company, and six batteries of towed artillery.[27]

The FAPLA 47, 16, 21, and 59 Brigades were to spearhead the offensive on Mavinga.[7] The FAPLA 8, 13, 25, and 66 Brigades provided security for the rear areas of the main offensive as it progressed, including guarding the lengthy supply lines needed to keep the front-line brigades in the field.[7][26] Gusev believed this would prevent the leading brigades from being encircled.[5] Previous offensives had also failed due to successful FALA attacks on FAPLA's extended supply lines, cutting the advancing units off from their logistics bases.[28] Using half the force to provide rear security was thus perceived as essential.[26]

Also deployed to the operational area was the FAPLA 52 Air Defence Brigade, equipped with six 9K33 Osa air defence systems.[5] Two of the 52 AD Brigade's 9K33 Osa batteries were deployed with the leading brigades, and another two with the rearmost brigades.[5] The remaining two were positioned around Cuito Cuanavale to protect the airfield and staging areas there.[5] While not actively deployed during the offensive, FAPLA's 24 Brigade was also held in reserve at Cuito Cuanavale.[26]

Aside from the FAPLA regular forces, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), was enlisted to provide security for supply convoys.[29] MK militants were also ordered to carry out small diversionary attacks on FALA forces north of Cuito Cuanavale to prevent them from shifting south to reinforce Mavinga.[29] Medical support for these operations was provided by the East German government, which frequently airlifted wounded MK personnel from Angola to its own hospitals for treatment.[29] South African historian Maren Saeboe wrote that "as a conventional military force MK was hardly a solid defence line. But the guarding of convoys and trains was crucial to keeping supply lines open both for civilians and military personnel."[29] About 900 MK militants were mustered to assist FAPLA with security duties,[7] although none played a major role in the offensive itself.[29]

Shortly after the FAPLA buildup became apparent, UNITA announced its renewed willingness to reach a negotiated settlement with the Angolan government.[28] As a precondition to peace talks, UNITA offered to reopen the section of the Benguela railway under its control, and allow the normal traffic of freight to resume.[28] In early June 1987, Angolan Foreign Minister Afonso Van-Dúnem agreed in principle to this proposal, but the government later reversed its decision.[15] While the Angolan leadership was dismayed by the disruption to trade, and was willing to consider an indirect agreement with UNITA to keep the Benguela line secure, it was not willing to accede to UNITA's demands for a nationwide ceasefire.[15] When it became clear that further bargaining was futile, UNITA requested more military aid from the United States to stave off the upcoming offensive.[28] "It is a question of life or death for UNITA," the movement's leader Jonas Savimbi commented in an interview with Western journalists. "On their side, it is a question of lose and start to negotiate. On our side, it is lose and disappear."[11]

The eight FAPLA brigades were assembled in their forward operating areas around Cuito Cuanavale by mid-July.[7] However, most of the month was spent clearing out local FALA resistance from the area.[7] Consequently, the 47, 16, 21, and 59 Brigades moved out of Cuito Cuanavale and began their advance towards Mavinga well behind schedule, on August 14.[7] The infantry advanced on foot and mounted in BTR-60PBs and Brazilian-sourced Engesa trucks, sweeping for FALA insurgents.[2] The tanks were located at the rear.[2] The four leading brigades advanced in dispersed box-like formations covering between five and eight square kilometres each, with the mechanised troops concentrated in the centre and dismounted infantry on the flanks.[5] 16 Brigade occupied the eastern flank of the offensive, 21 Brigade occupied the centre, and 47 and 59 Brigades underpinned the western flank.[5] Gusev's plan called for 47 and 59 Brigades to approach Mavinga from an easterly direction, while 16 and 21 Brigades advanced from the north, enveloping the FALA forces between Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga in a pincer movement.[27] According to the Soviet projections, the four brigades would be able to reach and capture Mavinga by the end of September.[30]

The FAPLA offensive

See also: Operation Moduler

The FAPLA offensive was initially successful but also proceeded at an extremely slow pace.[31] The tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles in particular were slowed by the ruggedness of the terrain, and the challenge of navigating through extremely dense foliage.[5] To complicate matters, this resulted in the armour consuming excessive quantities of fuel to cover short distances; Gusev and Ryabchenko had failed to take this possibility into account and had severely underestimated the amount of fuel needed for the offensive.[5] Meanwhile, FAPLA's Engesa trucks experienced problems with their clutches slipping as they fought for traction in the sandy soil, causing frequent breakdowns.[5] The infantry involved in the offensive also advanced cautiously, covering just under 4 kilometres a day, and ceased all other activity in the late afternoon to construct elaborate defensive works.[31] This would prove to be a fatal error, as it allowed FALA and its South African allies to compile detailed intelligence on their movements and make preparations for its own build-up to counter the offensive.[4] Ronnie Kasrils, MK's intelligence chief, warned the Soviet staff that if Saluting October proceeded a South African counteroffensive was imminent.[3] Gusev overruled the MK concerns, and the offensive continued without contingency plans for a South African intervention.[3][7]

FALA had seven battalions dispersed between FAPLA and Mavinga, three of which were equipped with conventional heavy weapons.[11] These units frequently harassed the advancing FAPLA formations with hit and run attacks.[5] Platoon or company-sized groups of insurgents would open fire with small arms, then disperse when the lead FAPLA elements counterattacked.[5] Simultaneously, FALA spotters nearby would direct fire on the formation from mortars and Type 63 multiple rocket launchers.[5] 16 Brigade bore the brunt of these attacks, and by August 25 it had suffered 220 casualties.[5] FALA inflicted enough damage on 16 Brigade that it remained well behind the other brigades as they continued towards Mavinga, leaving FAPLA's eastern flank exposed.[5]

South Africa took advantage of FAPLA's numerous delays to assemble an expeditionary force strong enough to stop the FAPLA drive on Mavinga, an initiative known as Operation Moduler.[32] The first 700 South African troops were deployed to Mavinga on August 4.[33] On August 19, the 47 and 59 Brigades came under heavy bombardment from South African Valkiri multiple rocket launchers, which further slowed their advance.[7] Simultaneously, a South African special forces team demolished the primary bridge over the Cuito River.[7] However, the bridge was quickly rebuilt by Cuban engineers.[7]

Signal bell used by 47 Brigade at the Lomba River.

By the last week of August 1987, the South African forces near Mavinga had built up to include 32 Battalion, elements of 101 Battalion, and its elite 61 Mechanised Battalion Group.[32] This composite formation, now numbering around 3,000, was also bolstered by a single battery of G5 howitzers.[33] The South African units were concentrated around the Lomba River, which was the last of three major rivers the four leading FAPLA brigades needed to cross before reaching Mavinga.[34] The FAPLA general staff had minimal intelligence about FALA activity south of the Lomba, and was completely ignorant of the South African buildup.[5] In the fourth volume of their work War of Intervention in Angola, historians Adrien Fontanellaz, Tom Cooper, and José Augusto Matos noted:

the Angolan and Soviet commanders were all but blind: not only had their intelligence entirely failed to detect the South African presence, they made no use of at least two MiG-21R reconnaissance fighters...and the capability of Angolan Su-22s to carry KKR-1 reconnaissance pods. Furthermore, they never thought to let at least the helicopter gunships conduct visual reconnaissance, and conducted no ground reconnaissance south of the Lomba, and thus had next to no idea about FALA dispositions.[5]

47 and 59 Brigades reached the Lomba River on August 28.[7] At this phase, 47 Brigade began to advance westwards around the source of the river to establish a bridgehead on its southern banks.[7] Meanwhile, 59 Brigade and 21 Brigade were to join forces in the FAPLA centre and establish their own crossing site.[33] 59 Brigade began moving eastwards to link up with 21 Brigade accordingly.[33] 16 Brigade advanced further eastwards and did not attempt a river crossing.[33] Its objective may have been to keep FALA occupied in the east and prevent it from interfering with the river crossings.[27] These series of movements around the Lomba left the four brigades isolated and at high risk of being individually engaged and destroyed by the (otherwise severely outnumbered) South African blocking force.[7] Their inability to reinforce each other on short notice was further aggravated by the topography around the Lomba, which consisted of tributaries and largely impassable swampy terrain.[33]

The 61 Mechanised Battalion Group subsequently outmanoeuvred and defeated the FAPLA brigades in a series of piecemeal actions throughout September 1987.[34] On September 9, 61 Mechanised repelled an initial crossing attempt by 21 Brigade.[33] On September 13, it thwarted 47 Brigade's attempts to establish a bridgehead on the Lomba's southern bank, destroying all its bridging equipment.[33] On September 16, a second crossing attempt by 21 Brigade ended in failure when its exposed troops came under heavy fire from the South African G5s.[33] Having belatedly realised the disadvantage of conducting separate crossings, the FAPLA general staff ordered 47 Brigade to abandon its initial objective and link up with 59 Brigade.[33] The brigade's officers initially protested that they lacked sufficient fuel and supplies to continue advancing, but were overruled by the general staff.[27] By October 2, 47 Brigade and 59 Brigade were close to linking up, having successfully bridged the Lomba between their positions with two wooden pontoon bridges and a Soviet-supplied TMM folding bridge.[27] However, 61 Mechanised destroyed 47 Brigade with a decisive counterattack on October 3, killing 600 FAPLA troops and destroying or capturing 127 vehicles.[33] The brigade lost nearly all its attached tanks, artillery, and air defence equipment.[27] The following day, the South African positions on the south bank of the Lomba were further reinforced by the arrival of 4 South African Infantry Battalion, making the likelihood of another crossing attempt increasingly remote.[33] On October 5, the FAPLA general staff ordered 16, 21, and 59 Brigades to cease crossing attempts and begin a general withdrawal from the Lomba River.[27] According to one South African military report, "with one of its four offensive brigades totally destroyed and two of the remaining three badly mauled...[FAPLA] was left with no option but to begin withdrawing in the direction of Cuito Cuanavale."[27]

Operation Saluting October was formally terminated by the FAPLA general staff on October 7, 1987, having failed well short of its objective due to the South African intervention.[6] The brigades involved were ordered to withdraw towards Cuito Cuanavale.[3] Upon receiving this news, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos summoned Gusev and the senior Cuban general officer, Gustavo Fleitas Ramirez, for an urgent conference to discuss the worsening military situation and the failure of Operation Saluting October.[1] Ramirez reminded dos Santos that Cuba had been opposed to the offensive from the beginning.[1] Gusev lamented in his memoirs that "I informed [chief of the Soviet general staff] Akhromeyev about the result of the operation, but the most difficult task, in moral terms, was to inform the president of Angola, whom I had assured that the operation would succeed and that Savimbi would be crushed".[1]

Aftermath

Reflecting on the aftermath of Saluting October, Fidel Castro stated that the operation had been doomed by logistical woes from the beginning.[15] He criticised Gusev's decision to launch the offensive from areas "at the extreme end of the strategic line being defended by Cuba...a remote place where supplies and logistics were made very difficult."[15] Soviet Minister of Defence Dmitry Yazov maintained that if Cuba had agreed to support the offensive with its regular ground forces, Saluting October would have been successful.[1]

The involvement of South African troops was not made public until November 13, when the South African Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, disclosed that military forces had been committed to halt Saluting October and save FALA from annihilation.[17] Previously, Savimbi had denied direct South African involvement and claimed that FALA had stopped the FAPLA offensive on its own.[17]

Historian William Minter found that Western and Cuban accounts both "fault Soviet strategic advice for significant errors" during Operation Saluting October.[14] Minter wrote that Western and Cuban assessments agreed that FAPLA had overstretched its logistical capabilities to mount a conventional offensive of this scale.[14] Another historian, Jonathan House, asserted that Saluting October failed due for the same reasons as Operation Second Congress: "the combination of fragile logistics, inexperienced leaders, and [South African] spoiling actions wrecked the Soviet plans."[35]

In his work Tank Battles of the Cold War, Anthony Tucker-Jones wrote that the Soviets' "rigid doctrine and poor command and control structure of the Angolan army" were the main causes for the offensive's failure.[25] Tucker-Jones claimed that the Soviet military mission had ignored their own counter-insurgency experiences in Afghanistan, and committed a serious blunder by assuming they could rely solely on "overwhelming numbers of armour and infantry" to crush FALA.[25]

FALA's grip on the Benguela Railway was seriously weakened as it diverted forces south to resist the FAPLA offensive.[36] Consequently, local FAPLA units were able to retake several towns along the rail line while Saluting October was underway.[36] The understrength FALA forces tasked with defending these settlements were forced to withdraw eastwards towards the Zambian border.[36] Some of the insurgents actually retreated across the border and were detained by the Zambian security forces.[36] UNITA offered to release two captured MK cadres in exchange for its troops in Zambian captivity, but was rebuffed.[29]

Casualties

By October 5, two days before Saluting October was cancelled, FAPLA had suffered 1,059 dead and 2,118 wounded in its failed offensive.[11] The majority of these casualties were sustained as a result of the South African air and artillery strikes launched under the auspices of Operation Moduler, particularly during the initial approach to the Lomba River.[37] FAPLA had lost 61 T-54/T-55 tanks, 53 BTR-60s, 7 BMP-1s, and at least 43 other vehicles.[11] At least 20 of the 61 tanks lost were captured intact by FALA.[10] FAPLA also lost a complete 9K33 Osa air defence system, which was abandoned near the Lomba River and removed by the South Africans for inspection.[13] The captured system was later sent to the United States to be evaluated by intelligence officials there.[34]

Four members of the Soviet military mission were killed during Saluting October.[37] One was killed by a FALA land mine during the initial staging process in July.[2] The others died during the South African counteroffensives in September.[38] Four other Soviets were wounded, including an interpreter who later died of his injuries.[2]

FALA had suffered 155 dead and 662 wounded at the time of the FAPLA withdrawal.[36] At least 4 insurgents were taken prisoner.[2]

South African losses acknowledged for the entirety of Operation Moduler, which did not conclude until November 30, were 17 dead and 41 wounded.[11] The South Africans also lost 3 Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, 2 Casspir armoured personnel carriers, and an Aermacchi AM.3 (Bosbok) spotter aircraft.[11]

Allegations of war crimes

According to Soviet Lieutenant Colonel Igor Anatoliyevich Zhdarkin, FAPLA executed nearly all the prisoners taken during the early phases of Saluting October.[2] These included wounded FALA insurgents, who were beaten to death with entrenching tools.[2] Zhdarkin wrote that "several times our Soviet specialists managed to save prisoners by literally wresting them from the grasp of enraged Angolans."[2] Per Zhdarkin's account, the Soviets began taking custody of the prisoners and transporting them to the rear in their own vehicles to prevent illegal executions by FAPLA enlisted troops.[2]

References

1. Gleijeses, Piero (2013). Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. pp. 393–425. ISBN 978-1-4696-0968-3.
2. Tokarev, Andrei; Shubin, Gennady, eds. (2011). Bush War: The Road to Cuito Cuanavale: Soviet Soldiers' Accounts of the Angolan War. Auckland Park: Jacana Media (Pty) Ltd. pp. 93, 128–148. ISBN 978-1-4314-0185-7.
3. Stapleton, Timothy (2010). A Military History of South Africa: From the Dutch-Khoi Wars to the End of Apartheid. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International. pp. 169–185. ISBN 978-0313365898.
4. Peter, Abbott; Helmoed-Romer Heitman; Paul Hannon (1991). Modern African Wars (3): South-West Africa. Osprey Publishing. pp. 5–13. ISBN 978-1-85532-122-9.
5. Fontanellaz, Adrien; Matos, Jose Augustus; Cooper, Tom (2021). War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4: Angolan and Cuban Air Forces, 1987-1992. Warwick: Helion & Company. pp. 47–55. ISBN 978-1804510964.
6. Fontanellaz, Adrien; Matos, Jose Augustus; Cooper, Tom (2023). War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 5: Angolan and Cuban Air Forces, 1987-1992. Warwick: Helion & Company. pp. 4–19. ISBN 978-1804514153.
7. George, Edward (2005). The Cuban intervention in Angola. New York: Frank Cass Publishers. pp. 236–246. ISBN 978-0-415-64710-6.
8. Chan, Stephen (2012). Southern Africa: Old Treacheries and New Deceits. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. pp. 42–46. ISBN 978-0-300-18428-0.
9. Fauriol, Georges Alfred; Loser, Eva (1990). Cuba: The International Dimension. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 173–184. ISBN 978-0-88738-324-3.
10. Vanneman, Peter (1990). Soviet Strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev's Pragmatic Approach. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. pp. 41–57. ISBN 978-0-8179-8902-6.
11. Scholtz, Leopold (2013). The SADF in the Border War 1966–1989. Cape Town: Tafelberg. pp. 252–253, 260, 277. ISBN 978-0-624-05410-8.
12. Crocker, Chester (1992). High Noon in Southern Africa: Making peace in a rough neighborhood. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp. 356–363. ISBN 0-393-03432-1.
13. Hamann, Hilton (2007) [2003]. Days of the Generals. Cape Town: Struik Publishers. pp. 87–89, 93. ISBN 978-1-86872-340-9.
14. Minter, William (1994). Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press. pp. 190, 238. ISBN 978-1-4392-1618-7.
15. Khadiagala, Gilbert (1994). Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975-1993. Athens: Ohio University Press. pp. 153–155. ISBN 0-8214-1097-0.
16. Laidi, Zaki (1990). The Super-Powers and Africa: The Constraints of a Rivalry, 1960-1990. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 322–342. ISBN 0-226-46781-3.
17. Maeir, Karl (2007). Angola: Promises and Lies. London: Serif. p. 25. ISBN 978-1-897959-52-7.
18. Mitchell, Thomas G. (2013). Israel/Palestine and the Politics of a Two-State Solution. Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc. pp. 94–99. ISBN 978-0-7864-7597-1.
19. Vanneman, Peter; Kahn, Owen Ellison (1991). Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 53–55. ISBN 978-1412821797.
20. Polack, Peter (13 December 2013). The Last Hot Battle of the Cold War: South Africa vs. Cuba in the Angolan Civil War (illustrated ed.). Casemate Publishers. pp. 66–83. ISBN 9781612001951. Retrieved 25 February 2015.
21. "Angola, Unredacted" (PDF). Langley: Central Intelligence Agency. 20 November 1978. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 January 2017. Retrieved 14 May 2024.
22. Nation, R. Craig; Kauppi, Mark (1984). The Soviet Impact in Africa. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books. pp. 78–79. ISBN 0-669-08353-4.
23. Castro, Fidel; Ramonet, Ignacio (2006). My Life: A Spoken Autobiography. New York: Scribner. pp. 326–334. ISBN 978-1-4165-5328-1.
24. Hughes, Geraint (2014). My Enemy's Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. pp. 73–86. ISBN 978-1-84519-627-1.
25. Tucker-Jones, Anthony (2021). Tank Battles of the Cold War, 1948–1991. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Press. pp. 90–94. ISBN 978-1526778048.
26. Nortje, Piet (2003). 32 Battalion: The Inside Story of South Africa's Elite Fighting Unit. New York: Zebra Press. pp. 234–235. ISBN 1-868729-141.
27. Scholtz, Leopold (December 2017). "The Battle of the Lomba, 3 October 1987: A Tactical and Operational Analysis". Journal for Contemporary History. 42 (2): 48–73.
28. Dorsey, James; Morrison, James (14 April 1987). "Angola masses troops for new offensive" (PDF). The Washington Times. Washington DC. Archived from the original (PDF) on 28 January 2025. Retrieved 28 January 2025.
29. Saeboe, Maren (2002). "A State of Exile: The ANC and Umkhonto we Sizwe in Angola, 1976-1989" (Document). Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal. pp. 118, 153, 178–184.
30. Stiff, Peter (1989). Nine Days of War. Alberton: Lemur Books (Pty) Ltd. p. 23. ISBN 978-0-620-14260-1.
31. Herbst, Jeffrey (1989). Diaz-Briquets, Sergio (ed.). Cuban Internationalism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. ISBN 978-0820702018.
32. Alao, Abiodun (1994). Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa. London: British Academi Press. pp. 30–38. ISBN 978-1-85043-816-8.
33. Stapleton, Timothy J. (2013). A Military History of Africa. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. pp. 258–260. ISBN 978-031-339-570-3.
34. Mannall, David (19 November 2014). Battle on the Lomba 1987: The Day a South African Armoured Battalion shattered Angola's Last Mechanized Offensive (2014 ed.). Helion and Company. pp. 140–157, 219. ISBN 978-1-909982-02-4.
35. House, Jonathan (2020). A Military History of the Cold War, 1962–1991. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. pp. 55–56. ISBN 978-0806167787.
36. James III, W. Martin (2011) [1992]. A Political History of the Civil War in Angola: 1974–1990. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 174–176. ISBN 978-1-4128-1506-2.
37. Weigert, Stephen L. (25 October 2011). Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961–2002. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 85–153. ISBN 978-0-230-33783-1.
38. "Clash of Armour II". Key Publishing. September 3, 2021. Archived from the original on July 21, 2022. Retrieved September 22, 2022.