Greek constitutional crisis of 1985

The Greek constitutional crisis of 1985 was the first constitutional dispute of the newly formed Third Hellenic Republic after the fall of the Greek Junta in 1974. The constitutional crisis was initiated as a political gamble of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou by suddenly declaring not to support Constantine Karamanlis for a second term as President of the Republic, and proposing constitutional amendments designed to further increase the power of his position by reducing the presidential powers acting as a guardrail against the powerful executive branch.

Papandreou instead backed Supreme Court justice Christos Sartzetakis, who was popular with left-leaning voting blocks for his investigation of the politically motivated murder of Grigoris Lambrakis in 1963. Sartzetakis was elected president by the Hellenic Parliament in a tense and confrontational atmosphere due to constitutionally questionable procedures by Papandreou. The opposition, led by Karamanlis' former party, New Democracy, considered the vote illegal, an issue that dominated and polarized the election campaigns. However, the choice of Sartzetakis as president helped Papandreou and his socialist PASOK party to secure the 1985 Greek parliamentary election despite his inability to handle the deterioration of the economy of Greece. After the elections, all political parties accepted Sartzetakis as president, and the constitutional amendments took effect in 1986.

The constitutional amendments transformed the liberal democracy of Greece based on the constitution of 1975 into a "populist democracy" with a majoritarian parliamentary system.

Brief history of Constitutional crises in Greece

Further information: Constitutional history of Greece and National Schism

General Dimitrios Kallergis on horseback approaching King Otto and his wife Amalia at the windows of the Old Royal Palace to demand for a Greek constitution.

Constantine I of Greece and Eleftherios Venizelos, their disagreement caused the National Schism that echoed over decades in the history of Greece.

Much of the history of modern Greece since its independence in 1821 from the Ottoman Empire has been turbulent. Upon the foundation of the First Hellenic Republic, the Greek political institutions and economy were underdeveloped and heavily indebted due to the liberation wars. The lack of political conscience among the Greeks led to friction between the local aristocratic families and the first Prime Minister Ioannis Kapodistrias, leading to his assassination.[1] The extensive borrowing made Greece subject to creditors, i.e., the European Great Powers, which imposed a foreign royal family as head of the Greek state, having absolute power. This created tension between the Greek people, who sought more inclusive political participation to improve their living conditions, and the elites led by the king, who sought to please the foreign creditors and preserve their positions by actively intervening in political life. The tension eventually led to the military to intervene in politics; this lasted in the next century when Greece had eight military coups since World War I.[2] In early military movements, the military succeeded in securing a constitution from the king and a wide range of reforms, as in the case of 3 September 1843 Revolution and the Goudi coup in 1909, respectively. From the Goudi coup, Eleftherios Venizelos became a prime minister with great popular appeal, modernized Greece, and greatly expanded the Greek territory in the Balkan Wars and World War I. However, his policies brought him into conflict with King Constantine I regarding the entry of Greece in World War I with the Allies.[3] The disagreement between the two men resulted in the National Schism, dividing in half the society and the military, and the eventual expulsion of the king. The creation of the Second Hellenic Republic based on the Constitution of 1927 was, however, short-lived (1924-1935), and the king returned. Later military movements tended to be in favor of the king, as happened with 4th of August Regime in 1936, led by General Ioannis Metaxas.[4]

The Axis occupation in World War II and immediate 1944-49 civil war between the Communist-led uprising against the establishment led by the King, inflicted economic devastation and deepened cleavages in society.[5] After the lifting of martial law (1947-1950), post-civil-war governments were politically weak and heavily depended on the external patronage of the United States (Marshall Plan) to contain communism amid Cold War. The political dialogue of the following two decades revolved around how power basis swifts from the Right (victors of the civil war) to the Center. However, they delayed due to division on how to approach the necessary social reconciliation with the vanquished in the civil war, many of whom were either captured or exiled.[6] Another thorny issue was the control of the military by the elected government, i.e., politicians, instead of the king.

The Constitution of 1952 was established with the king as head of state and the army but with stronger parliamentary powers since elements of the Constitution of 1927 were incorporated. However, the king maintained considerable powers, such as dissolving the government and parliament and calling new elections. Moreover, article 31[7] stated that the king hires and fires ministers (Greek: Ο βασιλεύς διορίζει και παύει τους υπουργούς αυτού). This created confusion as the prime minister was chosen by popular election, but the elected prime minister could not select the government's ministers without the king's approval. Two prime ministers in the 1950s had raised the question as to who governs the state, the king or the prime minister,[8] echoing the disagreements between Venizelos and Constantine I during the National Schism.

Andreas Papandeou in exile.

In the early 1960s, Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou made a faint attempt to gain control of the military, which alarmed many officers without weakening them.[9][10] The latter created friction with the King Constantine II, who wanted to be in command of the army and not the elected government.[11] In the meantime, the son of Georgios Papandreou, Andreas Papandreou, was campaigning by having fierce anti-monarchy and anti-American rhetoric, which made him a target of conspiratorial accusations from ultra-rightists who feared that following any new elections, which the nearly 80-year-old Georgios Papandreou would likely win, his son would be the actual focus of power in the senior Papandreou's Center Union party. These incidents caused a dispute between Georgios Papandreou and King Constantine II, leading to the resignation of the former.[12] For the next twenty-two months, there was no elected government, and hundreds of demonstrations took place, with many being injured and killed in clashes with the police.[13] The king, acting within his constitutional rights, tried to bring members of the Center Union party to his side and form a government, leading to Apostasia of 1965. He temporarily succeeded in getting 45 members, including Constantine Mitsotakis, to his side, who later were called 'apostates' by the side supporting Papandreous.[13][14] To end the political deadlock, Georgios Papandreou attempted a more moderate approach with the king, but Andreas Papandreou publicly rejected his father's effort and attacked the whole establishment, attracting the support of 41 members of the Center Union in an effort designed to gain the party's leadership and preventing any compromise.[15] The prolonged political instability between the politicians and the king in finding a solution led a group of Colonels to intervene and rule Greece for seven years. The junta regime expelled prominent political figures, including Andreas Papandreou, Constantine Mitsotakis, and the king. After the junta's fall due to its inability to handle the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the dominant political figure, Constantine Karamanlis, returned to restore democratic institutions in Greece.

Restoration of democracy and Constitution of 1975

Further information: Metapolitefsi

With the return of civilian rule under Karamanlis, the new government, acting under extraordinary circumstances, issued a "Constituting Act" which voided the junta's Constitution of 1973. Pending a referendum on a new constitution, the 1952 constitution was temporarily restored, "except for the articles dealing with the form of the State"; the last phrase referred to whether the monarchy would be restored. In the meantime, the functions of the king were to be discharged by the incumbent President Phaedon Gizikis, who was appointed by the junta's regime as a nominal figurehead.

In the 1974 Greek republic referendum, 76% of voters chose a parliamentary republic with a president as head of state instead of a king, effectively voiding 150 years of tradition of monarchical rule.[16] This led to the foundation of the Third Hellenic Republic with the new Constitution of 1975, which reinforced the executive branch's power, represented by the prime minister, while the president would act as the head of state with sufficient reserve powers, the right to call elections, appoint a government, dissolve Parliament, and call referendums on important national questions. Despite vocal resistance from the leftist parties, which wanted a purely parliamentary system with a ceremonial president, Karamanlis insisted that these powers would act as checks and balances to prevent an omnipotent prime minister who could accumulate executive and legislative powers without any restraint.[17] Parliament adopted the new constitution and it was promulgated on 11 June 1975. Andreas Papandreou, along with the communists, boycotted the promulgation of the constitution, and he publicly described it as "totalitarian", advocating instead for a "socialist" constitution without further elaborating on what he meant.[18]

From 1975 until 1980, Karamanlis and his close associate Konstantinos Tsatsos governed Greece as prime minister and president of Greece, respectively. In the meantime, Papandreou and his newly formed political party (PASOK) rose in popularity due to the rising pressure from the 1973 and 1979 oil crisis on the Greek economy and Papandreou's radical rhetoric, mostly anti-American and anti-EEC. In 1980, after Karamanlis secured the entry of Greece into European Economic Community, he became president handing over the premiership to Georgios Rallis, which created a power vacuum that contributed to Andreas Papandreou winning the 1981 Greek parliamentary election and becoming prime minister. In the eyes of Greece's allies, Karamanlis, as President, would act as a restraining factor on radical departures in foreign and domestic affairs if Papandreou realized his campaign promises.[19][20] Nevertheless, the cohabitation of the two men in the 1981–1985 period was successful since Papandreou followed a more pragmatic approach by reversing many of his campaign promises.

Constitutional crisis

Further information: Greek constitutional amendment of 1986

Presidents of the Hellenic Republic, Konstantinos Karamanlis (left) and Christos Sartzetakis (right).

First stage

On 6 March 1985, New Democracy announced that they would support Karamanlis' second Presidency term, while on the same day, the Communist Party (KKE) declared that they would put forward their own candidate. The press anticipated that Papandreou would also support Karamanlis,[21] since he had assured Karamanlis his support in person.[22] However, Papandreou changed his mind at the last moment, siding with the left wing of PASOK, which did not want Karamanlis, and instead backed Christos Sartzetakis (a Supreme Court of Greece judge known for his principled handling of the 1963 murder of left-wing deputy Grigoris Lambrakis and viewed favorably by the left, and a protagonist in the 1969 movie "Z"). This move surprised some of Papanderou's ministers, much of the rank-and-file of his party, and even Sartzetakis himself, who was not consulted in advance.[21][22] Later on, it was revealed that the supposedly spontaneous change of mind was to camouflage Papandreou's long-held constitutional designs since Sartzetakis not only knew about it well in advance but also that there had been two other judicial figures who rejected Papandreou's offer.[23] At the same time, Papandreou announced plans for a constitutional reform, which rekindled the debate about the form of the republic and further polarized the political environment by damaging the consensus between the two dominant political parties, PASOK and New Democracy, that existed between 1981 and 1985.[24]

Papandreou also argued that it would be illogical for Karamanlis to preside over any constitutional reform since much of the constitution of 1974 was heavily influenced by Karamanlis himself.[18] Papandreou informed Karamanlis of his decision via his deputy, Antonios Livanis, as he could not bring himself to do so in person.[25] In response, Karamanlis resigned from the Presidency on 10 March 1985, two weeks before the termination of his term, and was replaced by PASOK's Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Ioannis Alevras, as acting president.[18] Constitutional scholars were subsequently divided on whether Alevras, as the acting President, could participate in the parliamentary vote for his successor; in the end, the PASOK-dominated parliament decided to allow it, with New Democracy deputies leaving the chamber.[26]

Parliamentary votes for president

According to the Constitution of 1975, up to three rounds of a parliamentary vote were permitted for presidential candidates; the first two rounds required more than 200 votes out of 300 members of parliament, and in the third round, 180 votes out of 300.[27] If all three rounds failed, then new elections would be held. Papandreou could only rely upon approximately 164 MPs (he had expelled six PASOK MPs for criticizing him since 1981), 13 MPs from the KKE, and five independent MPs (about 182).[28] The first two rounds failed to elect Sartzetakis as president. The election was carried out in conditions of high political tension; at one point, a New Democracy MP momentarily grabbed the ballot box. New Democracy chairman Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of violating constitutional protocol, which required a secret ballot, by forcing his deputies to cast their vote with colored ballots, but Mitsotakis' concern was dismissed.[28] Mitsotakis and Papandreou ended up having a verbal confrontation, with Mitsotakis claiming Papandreou had no respect for parliament, and Papandreou responding, with Mitsotakis' role in the Apostasia in mind, that the latter was the last person entitled to speak about respect.[i][28]

In the third round on 29 March, despite vigorous protests from the opposition, PASOK members used colored ballots under strict surveillance.[29] Sartzetakis was voted president with a decisive vote from Alevras since Papandreou's party suffered the defection of two MPs, who Papandreou accused of taking bribes from Mitsotakis' party.[29] Mitsotakis considered the vote illegal and claimed that if New Democracy won the elections, Sartzetakis would not be president by bringing the legality of the process to Council of State, further deepening the constitutional crisis.[30]

Constitutional proposals & debate

With Sartzetakis as president, Papandreou could formally submit the proposals for constitutional amendments by adding to the previous one the removal of a secret ballot for president.[31] Papandreou's proposals were designed to ease future changes to the constitution and reduce the powers of the President. While the former proposal was eventually abandoned, Papandreou was determined to eliminate the presidential powers. His argument was the hypothetical case of an activist president, mimicking the tendency of kings of Greece to intervene in the political life since the creation of the modern Greek state.[32] PASOK minister Anastasios Peponis introduced the constitutional amendment package to the Parliament with the following argument:

Invoking the lack of use of some provisions, their lack of implementation is by no means an argument to keep them in the current constitution. The question is what is our guiding principle? When provisions directly or indirectly contradict the principle of popular sovereignty, we object to them. [...] We support that the president is neither directly appointed by nor elected by the people. We are not a presidential, we are a parliamentary democracy. It is not the president who resorts to the people, so that the people deliver a verdict by majority voting. It is the legitimate government. It is the political parties. If the president resorts to the people, then he inevitably either sides with one party against others or attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution. Nevertheless, as soon as he attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution, then he embarks upon the formation of his own decisions of governmental nature. Then the government, directly or indirectly, fully or partially, is abolished.[33]

Scholars considered such constitutional changes "unnecessary" since no president had utilized these powers in the course of the Third Hellenic Republic until the time Papandreou raised the issue.[34][32] Moreover, Anna Benaki-Psarouda, New Democracy's rapporteur, presented in the parliament the following argument against the proposed reforms:

And this is the achievement of the 1975 Constitution: A miraculous balance between the Parliament, the Government and the President of the Republic, namely these state organs which express popular sovereignty and always pose the risk of de facto usurping it. [...] It is also interesting to see where these competencies of the President of the Republic are transferred. They are removed from him, but where do they go? To popular sovereignty and the Parliament, as the parliamentary majority claims? Dear colleagues, all of them go to the government, either directly or indirectly through the parliamentary majority controlled by it. Because the parliament is now subjugated to the parliamentary majority through party discipline. [...] Dear colleagues, the conclusion from the amendments suggested by the government or the parliamentary majority is the following: Power is transferred completely to the government. Hence, we have every reason to be afraid and suspect and mistrust about the future of Greece. [...] I want to stress the following, so that we, the Greek people, understand well: that with the suggested amendments you turn government and government majority into superpowers.[35]

Psarouda-Benaki effectively argued that this type of majoritarianism would damage the quality of Greek democracy.[35] Scholars also noted that the proposed changes would make the prime minister the most powerful ("autocratic") position in the Greek state since there would not be any constitutional restraints.[36] The constitutional amendments passed along party lines.

Election campaign of 1985

The logo of PASOK displaying a rising sun. Papandreou implied in his election campaign in 1985 that PASOK represented the "forces of light" while the opposition the "forces of darkness."

Both parties continued their confrontations in the campaigns for the June 1985 parliamentary election, where the political polarization reached new heights. Mitsotakis declared, "In voting, the Greek people will also be voting for a president"[31] and also warned that there is a danger of sliding towards an authoritarian one-party state.[37] From PASOK, Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas described what was at stake not as "oranges and tomatoes but the confrontation between two worlds." [38] Papandreou followed this by characterizing the upcoming elections as a fight between light and darkness in his rallies, implying that PASOK represented the "forces of light" since its logo was a rising sun.[38] The Economist magazine described Greece as a "country divided," tearing itself apart and opening the wounds of civil war.[39] Just before the elections, Karamanlis broke his silence and urged the Greeks to be cautious with their vote (without explicitly advising who to vote), commenting that PASOK had brought "confusion and uncertainty."[40] However, Karamanlis' statement was not broadcast on TV and radio, which were controlled by the state and governing party, i.e., PASOK.[40]

In the event, Papandreou was re-elected with 45.82% of the vote.[38] Papandreou's gamble worked to his benefit because he gained more from far-left voting blocks than the centrist voters lost.[41][23]

Aftermath

After the election results, Mitsotakis accepted Sartzetakis as president and the head of the state.[42] Papandreou's constitutional proposals took effect in 1986.

Papandreou began his second administration with a comfortable majority in parliament and increased powers based on the amended constitution. However, his premiership was soon mired in numerous financial and corruption scandals, including the Koskotas scandal. The Greek economy rapidly deteriorated as Papandreou, shaken by PASOK's waning popularity, reversed the austerity measures imposed by the European Economic Community for a loan to save the Greek economy from bankruptcy.[43][44][45] Moreover, choices made in the early 1980s on anti-terrorism legislation and controversial foreign policy decisions led to a significant rise in terrorist incidents in Greece.[46]

Despite the rising public frustration with the state of affairs, Papandreou abused his position to remain in power since there were no constitutional restraints. Notable actions include but are not limited to the following:

• Papandreou changed the electoral law shortly before the June 1989 general elections, a move designed to prevent New Democracy from scoring an absolute majority.[47][48][49]
• Bestowing public appointments to about 90,000 people to gain additional votes six months before the 1989 elections.[50] Papandreou's blatant patronage reached the point of giving in one of his rallies a public command to the Minister of Finance Dimitris Tsovolas to "give it all [to them]" (Greek: Τσοβόλα δώσ'τα όλα) and "Tsovolas, empty the coffers [of the state]," and the crowd chanted these back.[51][44]
• During the judicial inquiries of the Koskotas scandal, it was revealed that Papandreou continued to use the Junta's surveillance infrastructure (filing and wiretapping) against any Greek citizen who was not loyal to him.[45][52][53]
• Judicial independence was damaged when Papandreou passed a law via emergency procedures despite massive backlash from lawyers, judges, and clerks, to prevent the judicial investigation of the Koskotas scandal from advancing to Athens Appeals Court.[54]

Two Greek communist and two conservative politicians (L-R: Leonidas Kyrkos, Charilaos Florakis, Constantine Mitsotakis, Konstantinos Stephanopoulos) discuss a time after the Papandreou indictment for the Koskotas scandal. Papandreou called them the "gang of four".

Papandreou lost the June 1989 election, mainly due to the Koskotas scandal.[55] Mitsotakis' party got 43%, but it was insufficient to form a government; Papandreou's last-minute change of the electoral vote law required a party to win 50% of the vote to govern alone. Papandreou hoped that while PASOK might come second in electoral votes, it could form a government with the support of the other leftist parties, but he was rejected.[56] Instead, the right-wing New Democracy collaborated with the radical left Synaspismos party, led by Charilaos Florakis, to form a government. The two parties, while belonging to opposite ideological camps (as well as having battled one another in the Greek Civil War), both sought a "catharsis," i.e., an investigation and trial of PASOK's corruption.[57][50][58] The new government not only indicted Papandreou but also dismantled some of the junta's surveillance infrastructure[59] and granted the first private television broadcast licenses to publishers who were critical to PASOK as a counterbalance to state media,[60] to avoid future political exploitation from any future all-powerful prime minister.

Since then, Greek constitutional reformers commonly include in their proposals the return of some prerogatives taken back to the president to reduce majoritarian politics, i.e., 'winner takes all,' while avoiding conflicts between the president and prime minister in the executive branch.[61]

Notes

1. While Andreas Papandreou and Constantine Mitsotakis started from the same political party, and both competed for the leadership of the Center Union,[62] Andreas had vilified Mitsotakis for Apostasia of 1965 (siding with the king and in the view of Andreas betraying his father) as a "traitor" and a "nightmare" effectively stigmatizing the life-long career of Mitsotakis in Greek politics.[63][64] In 1984, Mitsotakis became the New Democracy party leader because he was the only active politician (Karamanlis was President at the time) who could rival Andreas Papandreou.[63] From 1984 until 1990, the political conflict between Papandreou and Mitsotakis was both personal and polarized.[62] After winning the elections of 1990, Mitsotakis lacked the political capital and sufficient majority to implement his policies despite his long-term ministerial experience, resulting in Mitsotakis's tenure being short.[65]

Footnotes

1. Clogg 2013, pp. 267–268.
2. Liakos & Doumanis 2023, p. 259.
3. Curtis 1995, pp. 44–54.
4. Clogg 2013, p. 115.
5. Clogg 2013, p. 142.
6. Clogg 2013, pp. 142–144.
7. Greek Constitution 1952, p. 6.
8. Dervitsiotis 2019, p. 240.
9. Tsarouhas 2005, p. 9.
10. Mouzelis 1978, p. 126.
11. Curtis 1995, p. 70.
12. Clogg 2013, pp. 158–159.
13. Close 2014, p. 108.
14. Hatzivassiliou 2006, pp. 129–130.
15. Close 2014, p. 109.
16. Kaloudis 2000, p. 48.
17. Grigoriadis 2017, pp. 20–21.
18. Clogg 1985, p. 106.
19. Nafpliotis 2018, p. 517.
20. Larrabee 1981, p. 164.
21. Clogg 1985, p. 105.
22. Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2015, p. 86.
23. McDonald 1985, p. 134.
24. Grigoriadis 2017, p. 43.
25. Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2015, p. 114.
26. Clogg 1985, pp. 108–109.
27. Greek Constitution 1975, p. 631.
28. Clogg 1985, p. 109.
29. Clogg 1985, pp. 109–110.
30. Clogg 1985, pp. 110–111.
31. Clogg 1985, p. 110.
32. Clogg 1993, p. 66.
33. Grigoriadis 2017, pp. 43–44.
34. Featherstone & Katsoudas 1987, pp. 27–28.
35. Grigoriadis 2017, p. 44.
36. Featherstone & Katsoudas 1987, p. 28.
37. Clogg 2013, p. 194.
38. Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, p. 166.
39. Carabott & Sfikas 2004, p. 267.
40. Clogg 1985, p. 111.
41. Clogg 1985, pp. 111–112.
42. Clogg 1985, p. 112.
43. Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, p. 167.
44. Siani-Davies 2017, p. 35.
45. Close 2014, p. 158.
46. Stergiou 2021, pp. 166–169.
47. Magone 2003, p. 172.
48. Gallant 2016, p. 293.
49. Clogg 2013, p. 196.
50. Close 2014, p. 159.
51. Pappas 2019, p. 247.
52. Garrard & Newell 2006, p. 131.
53. Samatas 1993, pp. 44–47.
54. Gunther, Diamandouros & Sotiropoulos 2006, p. 185.
55. Dobratz & Whitfield 1992, pp. 167–180.
56. Clive 1990, pp. 115–116.
57. Koliopoulos & Veremis 2009, p. 170.
58. Clogg 2013, p. 197.
59. Samatas 1993, p. 47.
60. Papathanassopoulos 1990, p. 394.
61. Featherstone & Sotiropoulos 2020, pp. 112–113.
62. Clogg 2013, p. 190.
63. Curtis 1995, p. 232.
64. Washington Post & Mar. 1985.
65. Liakos & Doumanis 2023, p. 345.

Sources

Constitutions of Greece

• "Greek Constitution of 1952". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 1/1952 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
• "Greek Constitution of 1975". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 111/1975 (in Greek). National Printing Office.
• "Greek Constitution of 1986". Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 23/1986 (in Greek). National Printing Office.

Books

• Carabott, Philip; Sfikas, Thanassis D., eds. (2004). The Greek Civil War: essays on a conflict of exceptionalism and silences. Surrey: Ashgate. ISBN 9780754641322.
• Clogg, Richard, ed. (1993). Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781349230563.
• —————— (2013). A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107656444.
• Close, David H. (2014). Greece since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781317880011.
• Dervitsiotis, Alkis (2019). Η έννοια της Κυβέρνησης (in Greek). Athens: P.N. Sakkoulas SA. ISBN 9789604208005.
• Curtis, Glenn E. (1995). Greece, A Country Study. Maryland: Library of Congress. ISBN 1490436235.
• Featherstone, Kevin; Katsoudas, Dimitrios K., eds. (1987). Political change in Greece: Before and after the colonels. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781000992144.
• ——————; Papadimitriou, Dimitris (2015). Prime Ministers in Greece, The Paradox of Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198717171.
• ——————; Sotiropoulos, Dimitri A. (2020). The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0198825104.
• Gallant, Thomas W. (2016). Modern Greece: From the war of independence to the present. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 9781350014510.
• Garrard, James; Newell, John, eds. (2006). Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 9780719065514.
• Grigoriadis, Ioannis N., ed. (2017). Democratic transition and the rise of Populist Majoritarianism: Constitutional Reform in Greece and Turkey. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783319575551.
• Gunther, Richard; Diamandouros, Nikiforos; Sotiropoulos, Dimitri, eds. (2006). Democracy and the state in the new southern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780191513961.
• Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis [in Greek] (2006). Greece and the Cold War Front Line State, 1952-1967. London & New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9781134154883.
• Koliopoulos, John S.; Veremis, Thanos M. [in Greek] (2009). Modern Greece A History Since 1821. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 9781444314830.
• Liakos, Antonis [in Greek]; Doumanis, Nicholas (2023). The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 20th and Early 21st Centuries: Global Perspectives. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-1474410847.
• Magone, José (2003). The Politics of Southern Europe Integration Into the European Union. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9780313051678.
• Mouzelis, Nicos P. (1978). Modern Greece: facets of underdevelopment. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. ISBN 978-0333226155.
• Pappas, Takis S. (2019). Populism and liberal democracy: A comparative and theoretical analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780192574893.
• Siani-Davies, Peter (2017). Crisis in Greece. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190911539.
• Stergiou, Andreas (2021). Greece's Ostpolitik Dealing With the 'Devil'. Cham: Springer International Publishing. ISBN 9783030611293.

Journal

• Clive, Nigel (1990). "The Dilemmas of Democracy in Greece". Government and Opposition. 25 (1): 115–122. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.1990.tb00750.x. JSTOR 44482490.
• Clogg, Richard (1985). "The 1985 Constitutional Crisis in Greece". The Journal of Modern Hellenism. 2 (1): 103–112.
• Dobratz, Betty A.; Whitfield, Stefanie (1992). "Does Scandal Influence Voters' Party Preference? The Case of Greece during the Papandreou Era". European Sociological Review. 8 (2): 167–180. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a036630. JSTOR 522295.
• Kaloudis, George (2000). "Transitional democratic politics in Greece". International Journal on World Peace. 17 (1): 35–39. JSTOR 20753241.
• Larrabee, F. Stephen (1981). "Dateline Athens: Greece for the Greeks". Foreign Policy. 45 (45): 158–174. doi:10.2307/1148318. JSTOR 1148318.
• McDonald, Robert (1985). "Greece after PASOK's Victory". The World Today. 41 (7): 133–136. JSTOR 40395748.
• Nafpliotis, Alexandros (2018). "From radicalism to pragmatism via Europe: PASOK's stance vis-à-vis the EEC, 1977-1981". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 18 (4): 509–528. doi:10.1080/14683857.2018.1519686.
• Papathanassopoulos, Stylianos (1990). "Broadcasting, politics and the state in Socialist Greece". Media, Culture & Society. 12 (3): 387–397. doi:10.1177/016344390012003007.
• Samatas, Minas (1993). "The Populist Phase of an Underdeveloped Surveillance Society: Political Surveillance in Post-Dictatorial Greece". Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora. 19 (1): 31–70.
• Tsarouhas, Dimitris (2005). "Explaining an activist military: Greece until 1975" (PDF). Southeast European Politics. 6 (1): 1–13.

Newspapers & magazines

• Steven V. Roberts (24 January 1977). "Greece Is Facing an Uphill Fight For Admission to Common Market". The New York Times.
• Jonathan C. Randal (13 March 1985). "Greek Opposition Leader Gladdened by Papandreou's Shift". Washington Post.