Anti-Erdoğanism

Anti-Erdoğanism is a political movement in opposition to Erdoğanism, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Erdoğanists. Anti-Erdoğanism has a presence in every Turkish political faction, ranging from the far-left to the far-right, as well as from liberals and socialists to conservatives, nationalists, and Islamists.

History

Some Anti-Erdoganists accused Erdoğan and his AKP of being Neo-Ottomanists.[1][2]

Despite many criticising Erdoğan due to the perception of him being an Islamist, most Islamists criticise Erdoğan and his rule, as well as Erdoğanists due to them being an extreme cult of personality.[3] The Felicity Party is among the fiercest Anti-Erdoganist parties in Turkey, which claims that Erdoğan is only an opportunist who uses religious rhetoric to maintain popular support.[4][5]

Erdoğanism had been likened to Putinism.[6]

Critics of Erdoğanism accuse it of being a fascist ideology, especially after 2015.[7] The accusations of fascism increased throughout the years.[8]

Although Erdoğan had initially helped the Kurds in Turkey,[9] he began to lose more and more Kurdish support starting in 2015 because of his alliance with the MHP. Erdoğan often baselessly accuses Kurds who criticise his policies of being PKK supporters, which further disillusions the ones who do not support the PKK.[10] Even conservative Kurds, of whom many were once staunch Erdoğan supporters, had ceased their support due to his increasing nationalism.[11] During the 2023 elections, when Erdoğan pushed a very strong nationalist rhetoric, the majority of Kurds did not vote for him, and many conservative Kurds were repulsed by his nationalism to the point they viewed the opposition as a better alternative.[12][13] Many Kurds denied that Erdoğan was an Islamist, and claimed that he was a mere "Green Kemalist".[14]

Abdullah Gül and Ahmet Davutoğlu became Anti-Erdoğanists due to the increasing nationalism of Erdoğan.[15]

The National Path Party was founded in 2021 by BBP politicians and Alperen Hearths who were repulsed by Erdoğan.[16][17][18] The party has no major ideological difference with the BBP except for the dispute about Erdoğan.[19] Remzi Çayır had also claimed that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and Alparslan Türkeş would have been very disappointed seeing Idealists who support Erdoğan.[20]

The Islamic State rebuffs Erdoğan as a "taghut", and his supporters as "kuffar". In the 4th edition of Rumiyah, the Islamic State called on people to "ask Allah for help and attack Turkey" and to "stab those who support the AKP".[21][22]

Alparslan Kuytul, a Salafi cleric, is a staunch critic of Erdoğan. Kuytul advocated for a Sharia system and also believed that Erdoğan is a taghut. Kuytul refers to the AKP as ZKP (Oppressive Development Party).[23]

References

1. "Turkey: AKP's Hidden Agenda or a Different Vision of Secularism?". Nouvelle Europe. 7 April 2011. Retrieved 7 June 2015."The "Hidden" That Never Was". Reflections Turkey. 28 May 2012. Retrieved 7 June 2015.^[permanent dead link‍]
   "Support for Muslim Brotherhood isolates Turkey". Die Weld. Retrieved 7 June 2015.Ömer Taşpınar (1 April 2012). "Islamist Politics in Turkey: The New Model?". The Brookings Institution. Retrieved 7 June 2015.
2. Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi (1 October 2016). "Turkey's Diyanet under AKP rule: from protector to imposer of state ideology?" (PDF). Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (4): 619–635. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1233663. ISSN 1468-3857. S2CID 151448076.
3. "Is 'Erdoganism' a Threat to Turkey's Islamism?". US News. 2015-03-31. Retrieved 2016-07-30.
4. Mustafa Akyol (30 March 2015). "Is 'Erdoganism' threat to Turkey's Islamism?". Al-monitor.com. Archived from the original on 1 April 2015. Retrieved 30 July 2016.
5. Yavuz, M. Hakan; Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi (18 February 2019). "Turkish secularism and Islam under the reign of Erdoğan". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 19: 1–9. doi:10.1080/14683857.2019.1580828. ISSN 1468-3857.
6. Akyol, Mustafa (2016-06-21). "Erdoganism". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2016-07-30.
7. "The Decline and Fall of Turkish Democracy". The Atlantic. 13 April 2017.
8. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/06/25/erdogan/
9. "The Blackballers' Club". The Economist. December 16–22, 2006. pp. 10–11. Archived from the originalon February 24, 2021.
10. Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove; Fernandes, Desmond (2008). "Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan: A Comparison of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation". Genocide Studies and Prevention. 3 (1): 45–46. doi:10.3138/gsp.3.1.43.
11. "Turkey's Kurds eye kingmaker role in election against Erdogan". Reuters. March 21, 2023.
12. "Let down by Erdogan, Kurds cautiously back secular rival". France 24. 2023-05-07. Retrieved 2024-01-30.
13. "Kurds fear Erdogan win amid sharper nationalist rhetoric". Reuters. May 25, 2023.
14. "Turkey's Kurds see ruling AKP as 'green Kemalism' - Gülay Türkmen".
15. "Turkey's Hour of Nationalism: The Deeper Sources of Political Realignment". The American Interest. 18 June 2019.
16. "BBP bölündü: Milli Yol kuruluş başvurusunu yaptı". 12 October 2021.
17. "Milli Yol Partisi Genel Başkanı Remzi Çayır 'Erken seçim veya zamanındaki seçime bu hareket damga vuracak'". 26 December 2021.
18. "Milli Yol Partisi Genel Başkanı Remzi Çayır Manisa'da" (in Turkish). Retrieved 2024-03-09.
19. "BBP'den ayrılanlardan "Milli Yol Partisi"". Journal Medya (in Turkish). Retrieved 2024-03-09.
20. "Remzi Çayır: Devletin büyüklüğü adalettir, liyakattır - Son Dakika Politika Haberleri". www.dha.com.tr. Retrieved 2024-03-09.
21. "ISIL refers to Erdoğan as 'taghut' and calls for jihad against Turkey". birgun.net. Retrieved 2023-11-30.
22. "ISIL's magazine slams Erdoğan, Turkey for first time". Hürriyet Daily News. 22 July 2015. Archived from the original on 22 July 2015. Retrieved 7 October 2015.
23. "Erdogan's Government Takes on Islamist Dissent in Turkey". Globe Post Turkey. 2018-02-23. Retrieved 2024-04-03.