Persoalan mengapa Sekutu tidak bertindak atas laporan awal mengenai kekejaman di kamp konsentrasi Auschwitz dengan menghancurkan kamp tersebut atau jalur kereta api melalui udara selama Perang Dunia II telah menjadi bahan kontroversi sejak akhir tahun 1970-an. Menjadi perhatian publik melalui artikel tahun 1978 yang ditulis oleh sejarawan David Wyman, hal ini digambarkan oleh Michael Berenbaum sebagai "sebuah pertanyaan moral yang melambangkan tanggapan Sekutu terhadap penderitaan orang-orang Yahudi selama Holokaus",[1] dan apakah Sekutu memiliki persyaratan tersebut atau tidak. Pengetahuan dan kemampuan teknis bertindak terus dieksplorasi oleh para sejarawan. Pemerintah AS mengikuti nasihat kuat militer untuk selalu menjadikan kekalahan Jerman sebagai tujuan utama, dan menolak untuk menoleransi nasihat sipil dari luar mengenai operasi militer alternatif. Tidak ada organisasi besar Yahudi Amerika yang merekomendasikan pengeboman.
Wyman, David S. (1998) [1994]. "Why Auschwitz wasn't bombed". Dalam Yisrael Gutman; Michael Berenbaum. Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp. Indiana University Press. ISBN978-0-253-20884-2.
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