Rambouillet Agreement
The Rambouillet Agreement, formally the Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, was a proposed peace agreement between the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia on the one hand and the delegation of political representatives of the ethnic Albanian majority population of Kosovo on the other. It was drafted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and named for the Château de Rambouillet, where it was initially proposed in early 1999. Among other things, the accords called for 30,000 NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law.[1] The Kosovo Albanian side signed the agreement on 18 March 1999, however the refusal of the Yugoslav and Serbian side to sign the accords led to the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia.[2] ProvisionsThe provisions of the agreement included:[1]
Proposed autonomy for KosovoThe Rambouillet Agreement included provisions for creating a system of democratic self-governance in Kosovo. It would have established three branches of government, a system of local government and law enforcement institutions.[3][4][5] CompetenciesKosovo would have the authority to make laws in areas it has competence including levying taxes, instituting programs of economic, scientific, technological, regional and social development, and could conduct foreign relations within its area of responsibility in the same manner as a republic within the federation. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would have competency over territorial integrity, maintaining a common market, monetary policy, defense, foreign policy, customs services, federal taxation, and federal elections. Serbia would have competence republic level elections in Kosovo. Kosovo would be entitled to at least 10 seats in the federal parliament and at least 20 seats in the Serbian parliament.[4] The federal government would maintain border crossings at Kosovo's external borders with Albania and North Macedonia and would exercise authority in connection with the enforcement of federal immigration laws. Legislative branchKosovo was to have an 120 member assembly of which 80 would be directly elected. Of the remaining 40 members, 10 would be elected by communities representing between 0.5 and 5% and 30 would be shared equally between the Albanian and Serb communities. The assembly would be led by a president, two vice-presidents.[3] Executive branchKosovo would have had a president elected by the assembly for a three year term renewable once. Executive power would be exercised by a government led by a prime minister, proposed by the president and confirmed by the assembly.[3] Judicial branchKosovo was to have a constitutional court, a supreme court, district courts, and communal courts. The constitutional court and supreme court would each have 9 judges. An office of the prosecutor, led by a chief prosecutor, would be responsible for prosecuting individuals who violate the criminal laws of Kosovo. With the exception of immigration and customs related crimes, any person arrested within Kosovo would subject to the jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights would apply directly in Kosovo. An ombudsman institution would be established to protect human and community rights in Kosovo.[3] Local governmentKosovo's existing communes would continue to exist and would elect their own assemblies and executive councils. Law enforcementCommunal police units would be established throughout Kosovo with responsibility police patrols, crime prevention, criminal investigations, arrest and detention of criminal suspects, crowd control, and traffic control. Communal police officers may be equipped with a sidearm, handcuffs, a baton, and, a radio and would be required to wear a badge, picture identification, and name tag. Each unit would be led by a communal commander, appointed by the local communal assembly. A criminal justice administration would be established to coordinate law enforcement operations across Kosovo.[3] Negotiating partiesThe negotiations were chaired by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine. At times, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also took part in the talks. Three parties were involved in the negotiations:
NegotiationsRambouilletOn 23 February 1999, the co-chairmen Robin Cook and Hubert Védrine of the negotiation process put out a statement saying that the negotiations "have led to a consensus" on substantial autonomy for Kosovo, including on mechanisms for free and fair elections to democratic institutions, for the governance of Kosovo, for the protection of human rights and the rights of members of national communities; and for the establishment of a fair judicial system". They went on to say that "a political framework is now in place" leaving the further work of finalizing "the implementation Chapters of the Agreement, including the modalities of the invited international civilian and military presence in Kosovo".[7] However, this assessment was at best overly optimistic, and at worst absolutely ignored the divergence of interests between the two major parties. The Albanians were unwilling to accept a solution that would retain Kosovo as part of Serbia, while the Serbs did not want to see the pre-1990 status quo restored, and they were implacably opposed to any international role in the governance of the province, including the offer of a face-saving measure wherein blue-helmeted UN peacekeeping troops would be used instead of NATO troops.[8] To add to the problem, the NATO Contact Group countries were desperate to avoid having to make good on their threat of force—Greece and Italy were opposed to the idea. Consequently, when the talks failed to achieve an agreement by the original deadline of 19 February, they were extended by another month. ParisIn the end, on 18 March 1999, the Kosovo Albanian, American and British delegation signed what became known as the 'Rambouillet Accords'[9] while the Serbian and Russian delegations refused. The accords called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous region within Yugoslavia; a force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. In addition, NATO forces would have the right to use local roads, ports, railways, and airports without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges, as well as the right to use the electromagnetic spectrum without payment. NATO would also have the right to requisition public facilities for its use free of cost. NATO forces would have the right to hire local personnel who upon employment with NATO would be exempt from local laws in respect to acts performed in their official capacity, national service obligations, local labor laws, and taxes on their salaries. Local infrastructure would be subjected to improvements or modifications to by NATO forces when deemed necessary to facilitate the mission.[1] According to Tim Judah, the Serbian side used Annex B only later on as a reason for the failure of talks; at the time, the Serbs rejected any discussion of the involvement of foreign troops, let alone the extensive rights that would have been afforded them by Annex B.[10] SigningThe agreement was signed by Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Thaçi, Rexhep Qosja and Veton Surroi on behalf of "Kosovo" in the presence of Christopher Hill and Wolfgang Petritsch on 18 March 1999. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia did not sign the agreement.[3][11] AftermathEvents proceeded rapidly after the failure at Rambouillet. The international monitors from the OSCE were withdrawn on 22 March for fear of the monitors' safety ahead of the anticipated bombing by NATO. On 23 March, the Serbian assembly issued a resolution that condemned the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors,[12] and accepted the principle of "autonomy" for Kosovo[13] and non-military part of the agreement. NATO leaders had expected that a brief bombing campaign would lead to Serb forces withdrawing from Kosovo, hence ending the humanitarian crisis; but Milošević may have gambled that his government and armed forces could withstand a few days of bombing without serious harm.[10] ReactionsIn commentary released to the press, former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that:
The historian Christopher Clark supports this view, asserting that the terms of the 1914 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia appear lenient compared to the NATO demands.[15] A former hand on the State Department's Yugoslavia desk, George Kenney, reported in May 1999 that a senior State Department official had briefed journalists off the record that "[we] deliberately set the bar higher than the Serbs could accept".[16] For the Serbs, signing the Rambouillet agreement would actually have been signing away all Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. It was not even a "take it or leave it" proposition, as Secretary of State Albright emphasized back in February 1999; rather, it was "sign it or get bombed." There were, in fact, no negotiations at all, and no sovereign, independent state would have signed the Rambouillet agreement.[17] Historian Noel Malcolm wrote that as the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the agreement on the 18th, the Yugoslav delegation boycotted the ceremony and declared its opposition to the plan and that military maneuvers were being planned, so that by March 20 there were more than 26,000 Serbian troops inside the province and another 15,000 stationed just beyond its eastern border.[18] See also
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