Islamist uprising in Syria

Not to be confused with Syrian Civil War.

Islamist uprising in Syria
Part of the Arab Cold War

A destroyed section of Hama's old town, after the 1982 Hama massacre
Date31 May 1979 – 28 February 1982[10]
(5 years, 8 months and 28 days)
Location
Damascus, Hama, Aleppo, Palmyra, and Jisr ash-Shugur, Syria
Result

Ba'athist victory

Belligerents
Fighting Vanguard[1][2]
Muslim Brotherhood (after mid-1979)[3][4]
Supported by:
Iraq (1980–1982)
 Jordan[5][6]
 West Germany[7]		 Ba'athist Syria
Supported by:
 Soviet Union[8][9]
Commanders and leaders

The Islamist uprising in Syria comprised a series of protests, assassinations, bombings, and armed revolts led by Sunni Islamists, mainly members of the Fighting Vanguard and, after 1979, the Muslim Brotherhood, from 1976 until 1982. The uprising aimed to establish an Islamic republic in Syria by overthrowing the neo-Ba'athist government, in what has been described by Ba'ath Party as a "long campaign of terror".[11]

After 1980, the popular resistance to Ba'athist rule expanded, with a coalition of Islamist opposition groups coordinating nation-wide strikes, protests and revolts throughout Syria.[12] During the violent events, resistance militias attacked Syrian Arab Army bases and carried out political assassinations of Ba'ath party cadres, army officials, Soviet military advisors, and bureaucrats linked to Assad family.[13][14][9] Civilians were also killed in retaliatory strikes conducted by security forces.[15] The uprising reached its climax in the 1982 Hama massacre, during which the Syrian government killed over 40,000 civilians.[16][17]

Background

Main article: History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria
Politics of Syria

Arab League Member State of the Arab League

Constitution
Human rights
Executive
Legislature
Judiciary
Subdivisions
Elections
Foreign relations

1963 Coup and 1964 Hama Riots

Main articles: 1963 Syrian coup d'état and 1964 Hama riot

In context, the insurgency traces its origins to multiple factors. Historical ideological friction is a result of the Ba'ath Party's ultra-secularist foundation versus the Muslim Brotherhood's religious foundation. Muslim Brotherhood believed that Islamic religion had the central role in directing the laws of the state.[18] On the other hand, secular Ba'athist ideology emphasized Arab nationalism and advocated the replacement of religion with socialism.[19]

This friction became heated following the 1963 Ba'ath Party coup which saw the Party claiming sole power in the country and subsequently outlawing all other organised opposition. In response, the Muslim Brotherhood encouraged general protests across the country. These protests were most acute in the city of Hama, long considered "a stronghold of landed conservatism".[20] During the 1964 Hama uprising, Ba'ath Party responded violently, crushing the revolt with brutal force.[21]

Muslim Brotherhood was forced to continue its activities clandestinely. In the party, the ideological dispute began widening towards a sectarian one; as dominance of Alawite elites in the Ba'athist military, bureaucracy and politics became visible after the Old Guard was overthrown by the neo-Ba'athist military wing of Alawite General Salah Jadid in the 1966 coup.[18] The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood fractured over disputes of the best course of action. Much of the party leadership was afraid to directly oppose the Syrian government, fearing that a violent confrontation could cause more harm than good. In contrast, several of the most radical members of the party split off to form the "Fighting Vanguard", led by Marwan Hadid. The Fighting Vanguard was willing to challenge the government by conducting assassinations and sabotage actions.[1][2]

1970 Coup and 1973 Constitutional Amendment

Main article: Corrective Movement (Syria)

On 13 November 1970, Hafez Al Assad launched a coup which saw him gain sole power. To cement his power, on 31 January 1973, Assad implemented a new constitution which led to a national crisis. Unlike previous constitutions, this one did not require that the president of Syria must be a Muslim, leading to fierce demonstrations in Hama, Homs and Aleppo organized by the Muslim Brotherhood and the ulama. They labelled Assad as the "enemy of Allah" and called for a jihad against his rule.[22] Under pressure, Assad returned the requirement and convinced Lebanese cleric Musa al-Sadr to issue a fatwa proclaiming the Alawite minority to be part of Shia Islam.[23] The 1973 constitution greatly increased the support for Hadid's Fighting Vanguard, and many Muslim Brotherhood members defected to his faction or at least began to support it. He subsequently reorganized his group to increase the number of attacks, hoping to provoke the Syrian government into a crackdown that would force the Muslim Brotherhood into open rebellion.[24][25]

Robert D. Kaplan has compared Assad's coming to power to

"an untouchable becoming maharajah in India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia—an unprecedented development shocking to the Sunni majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries."[26]

Economic downturn

According to historian Patrick Seale, the "economic boom following the October War had run out of steam, and new inequalities were created".[27] Raphael Lefevre adds that the emergence of secular ideology had led to the "overturning of traditional structures of political and socioeconomic power".[28] Additionally, a decrease in Gulf countries' economic support, the cost of Syria's military campaign in Lebanon, and the take-in of several refugees from the conflict all further exacerbated Syria's economic livelihood.[29]

Economic impact of state socialism adopted by the Ba'athist government as well as rising assertiveness of Alawites in the new socio-political system resulted in the alienation of the traditional elites, landowners, industrialists and the bourgeoisie. Their support shifted in favour of the Islamic opposition which positioned itself as ideological defenders of private property and free trade.[18]

Phases of the Insurgency

Phase One: Clandestine Terrorist Operations 1976–1979

1976 marked the Syrian army's intervention in the Lebanese Civil War, initially against the Palestinian guerrillas (PLO). This was received with surprise across the Arab world and contributed to pre-existing reasons for discontent with the Syrian government. Historian Patrick Seale described this attack as "slaughtering Arabism's sacred cow".[30]

In the same year, Syria experienced sporadic terror attacks, mostly explosions and assassinations.[31] The killings were largely aimed at prominent military officers, bureaucrats and government officials, including doctors and teachers. Most of the victims were Alawites, which led some to suggest "that the assassins had targeted the community" but "no one could be sure who was behind" the killings.[32]

The Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein had supported the insurgents with a steady flow of arms and supplies.[33] General Rifa'at al-Assad, younger brother of Hafez al-Assad, became a powerful figure in the Ba'ath party and Syrian politics, as a result of his activities in the Lebanese Civil War. Rifa'at's corruption as well as the sectarian excesses of his increasingly autonomous Alawite loyalist private militias provoked widespread resentment across the Syrian population. As a result, internal situation in Syria became further destabilized and protests spread further across the cities.[34]

Phase Two: Large-scale Campaign June 1979 – January 1982

See also: Aleppo Artillery School massacre

16 June 1979 marked the day of the Aleppo artillery school massacre. Member of school staff, Captain Ibrahim Yusuf, called cadets to an urgent meeting at the dining hall. Once assembled, gunmen fired indiscriminately at the cadets with automatic weapons and grenades.[31] The massacre was masterminded by 'Adnan 'Uqla, a Fighting Vanguard commander.[35][36] 'Uqla committed the mass murder without the permission of the Fighting Vanguard's formal leader, Hisham Jumbaz, or its field commando in Aleppo.[37][38][3]

This massacre signalled a turn in the insurgency as it was now more than just a series of sporadic attacks, but a campaign of "large-scale urban warfare".[39] By August, the Brotherhood had declared a jihad against the Syrian government, effectively claiming responsibility for the insurgency.[40]

In the days leading up to 8 March 1980 (the 17th anniversary of the 1963 Ba'athist coup), nearly all Syrian cities were paralysed by strikes and protests, which sometimes developed into pitched battles with security forces.[41] The events escalated into a widescale crackdown in Aleppo, where the government responded with overwhelming military force, sending in tens of thousands of troops, supported by tanks and helicopters. In and around Aleppo, hundreds of demonstrators were killed, and eight thousand were arrested. By April, the uprising in the area had been crushed.[42]

Between 1979 and 1981, Brotherhood insurgents continued to target Ba'ath party officials, party offices, police stations, military vehicles, barracks, factories, and even Russian officials.[39] Insurgents would form 'hit teams' to kill Ba'ath party members in their sleep, such as 'Abd al 'Aziz al 'Adi, who was murdered in front of his wife and children and had his body thrown into the street.[43] On occasion, individuals who had denounced the killings were also targeted, including Sheikh al-Shami, Imam of the Suleymania mosque of Aleppo.[44]

Other instances of terrorism include attacks in August, September and November 1981, where the Brotherhood carried out three car-bomb attacks against government and military targets in Damascus, killing hundreds of people, according to the official press.[45] Among the victims were Soviet officials, experts, and their families serving with the United Nations as part of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.[46]

Phase Three: Government Response 1979-1981

Main articles: Siege of Aleppo (1980) and Jisr ash-Shughur massacre (1980)

Losing control over the streets, the government decided on a policy of all-out-war on the insurgents after a Ba'ath party congress concluded in January 1980.[47] The Party's first step was to arm Party loyalists and sympathizers, effectively creating a 'citizen militia'.[47] By March and April, the cities of Jisr al-Shughur and Aleppo were brought into line with thousands of troops in garrison and tanks on the streets. Hundreds were rounded up in search-and-destroy operations.

In another case, in retaliation to a failed terror attack on an Alawite village near Hama, the army executed about 400 of Hama's Sunni inhabitants, chosen randomly among the male population of over the age of 14.[48]

On 27 June 1980, Hafez Al Assad himself narrowly escaped death after a failed assassination attempt. The assailant fired a burst of rounds and threw two grenades, the first being kicked away by Assad and the second being covered by his personal bodyguard, Khalid al-Husayn, who died instantly. In retaliation, the very next day, Rifaat Al Assad's defence company flew into the infamous Palmyra prison in helicopters and killed hundreds of prisoners who had been Brotherhood-affiliates. By 8 July, membership of the Muslim Brotherhood became a capital offence altogether,[49] with a month-long grace period for those who wished to turn themselves in and avoid a death sentence. Some couple thousand individuals turned themselves in, hoping to escape the death penalty; mostly urban, educated, young men.[50]

Rifaat Al Assad (Left) next to his brother Hafez Al Assad (Right). Rifaat Al Assad commanded the military divisions that entered Hama to crush the insurgency.

Phase Four: Crushing of the Insurgency 1982

Main article: 1982 Hama Islamic uprising

The insurgency is generally considered to have been crushed by the bloody Hama massacre of 1982, in which thousands of insurgents, soldiers and residents were killed, according to anti-Syrian Government claims "the vast majority innocent civilians".[51][52] On 2 February 1982, the Brotherhood led a major insurrection in Hama, rapidly taking control of the city; the military responded by bombing Hama (whose population was about 250,000) throughout the rest of the month, killing between 2,000 and 25,000 people. The Hama events marked the defeat of the Brotherhood, and the militant Islamic movement in general, as a political force in Syria.[53]

US Intelligence conducted an intelligence analysis with regards to possible outcomes of the conflict.[54]

Aftermath

Having suppressed all opposition, Hafez al-Assad released some imprisoned members of the Brotherhood in the mid-1990s.

The Muslim Brotherhood would have no physical presence in Syria again.

Although its leadership is in exile, the Brotherhood continues to enjoy considerable sympathy among Syrians. Riyad al-Turk, a secular opposition leader, considers it "the most credible" Syrian opposition group[citation needed]. The Brotherhood has continued to advocate a democratic political system; it has abandoned its calls for violent resistance and for the application of shari'a law. The Brotherhood also maintains that it condemns sectarianism against Alawites and is only against the Baathist dictatorship. Al-Turk and others in the secular opposition are inclined to take this evolution seriously, as a sign of the Brotherhood's greater political maturity, and believe that the Brotherhood would now be willing to participate in a democratic system of government.[citation needed]

In a January 2006 interview, the Brotherhood's leader, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni, "said the Muslim Brotherhood wants a peaceful change of government in Damascus and the establishment of a 'civil, democratic state', not an Islamic republic."[55] According to Bayanouni, the Syrian government admits having detained 30,000 people, giving a fair representation of the Brotherhood's strength.[51]

List of assassinations during the uprising

Individuals assassinated between 1976 and 1979

  • the commander of the Hama garrison, Colonel Ali Haydar, killed in October 1976
  • the rector of Damascus University, Muhammad al-Fadl, killed in February 1977
  • the commander of the missile corps, Brigadier 'Abd al Hamid Ruzzug, killed in June 1977
  • the doyen of Syrian dentists, Ibrahim Na'ama, killed in March 1978
  • the director of police affairs at the Ministry of the Interior, Colonel Ahmad Khalil, killed in August 1978
  • Public Prosecutor 'Adil Mini of the Supreme State Security Court, killed in April 1979.
  • President Hafez al-Assad's own doctor, the neurologist Muhammad Shahada Khalil, who was killed in August 1979.

Individuals assassinated between 1980 and 1982

While the involvement of the Syrian government "was not proved" in these killings, it "was widely suspected."

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Lefèvre 2013, pp. 100–101.
  2. ^ a b Conduit 2019, p. 34.
  3. ^ a b Conduit 2019, p. 35.
  4. ^ Lefèvre 2013, p. 110.
  5. ^ Milton Edwards, Beverly; Hinchcliffe, Peter (2001). "4: International Relations". Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy. New York, USA: Routledge. p. 97. ISBN 0-415-26726-9.
  6. ^ Conduit 2019, pp. 138–141.
  7. ^ Nina Wiedl, Kathrin (2006). The Hama Massacre – reasons, supporters of the rebellion, consequences. GRIN Verlag. pp. 26–31. ISBN 978-3-638-56770-1. Another reason for West Germany to oppose Asad [sic] was his involvement in international terrorism, such as the RAF (Baader Meinhof Gang) clique and the "Movement 2nd of June – Tupamaros West Berlin"... West Germany, as an ally in the anti-Soviet camp, had a reason to support the Brotherhood in Syria and to provide them a safe exile in Germany as a place from where they could continue their attempts to overthrow Asad [sic], in order to weaken the Soviet bloc... Three ways how West Germany supported the Syrian Brotherhood.. It provided asylum and a save haven from where the exile-brotherhood could organise its struggle against Asad [sic], it protected them against attacks of Syrian intelligence, and West German newspapers reported about the Hama incident in a way that supported the aims of the Brotherhood.
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