International communication center

International communication centers (ICC, Chinese: 国际传播中心) are state media institutions established by provinces and municipalities of the People's Republic of China. They operate under the supervision of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, with state media outlets such as China Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and China News Service providing infrastructure and serving as a partner to many.[1][2] The first ICCs were established in 2018 in response to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping's call to "innovate" foreign-directed propaganda.[3][4] According to Qiushi, the theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), ICCs are "developed based on local propaganda needs" and aim to be a "new force" in the country's global propaganda ecosystem.[5]

ICCs have been described as part of China's soft power initiatives and have represented a shift from foreign-directed propaganda being created at mostly the central government level to creation and dissemination by the country's provincial and local governments.[4][5][6] Certain ICCs have specific geographic and country targets for their messaging and act as fusion centers for pooling jurisdictional media resources.[1]: 5  They are known to leverage overseas institutional partners to increase their reach and use foreign influencers for astroturfing purposes.[1]

History

In 2018, Chongqing established the first ICC in the country, which operates under the iChongqing platform.[4][2] Its social media accounts were documented by ProPublica to downplay concerns and controversies at the 2022 Winter Olympics that would portray the PRC in a negative light.[7] Also in 2018, the newspaper Gansu Daily and the propaganda department of the Gansu Provincial Committee of the CCP jointly launched an ICC.[8] In 2020, the newspaper Sichuan Daily and the Sichuan Provincial Committee of the CCP jointly formed an ICC.[9] In May 2022, China Daily and the propaganda department of the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party established an ICC called the South and Southeast Asian Media Network that publishes content in multiple regional languages.[10][5] In June 2022, Jiangsu launched an ICC called JiangsuNow, which is run by the newspaper Xinhua Daily.[1]: 8 

From 2021 to 2023, over 30 ICCs were created.[4] In June 2023, the country's ICCs organized a national association to better coordinate their work.[10] The same month, Shenzhen Media Group formed an ICC.[11]

In July 2023, the Fujian Media Group created an ICC at the direction of the Fujian Provincial Committee of the CCP.[1]: 13  The Fujian ICC operates various social media accounts that post content against the Pan-Green Coalition in Taiwan, specifically the Democratic Progressive Party.[1]: 14  It also focuses efforts on Japan and Indonesia through its HolaFujian-brand social media accounts.[1]: 20  In October 2023, the Shanghai United Media Group launched an ICC called the Shanghai Global News Network (SGNN).[12] It operates social media accounts under the ShanghaiEye brand.[1]: 11 

In November 2023, Guangdong launched an ICC that brands itself as GDToday and Daily Bae in English.[13] The same month, Shandong formed an ICC under the state-owned Shandong Television.[14] In January 2024, Hebei created its Great Wall International Communication Center (GWICC).[5] The GWICC subsequently partnered with Agência Brasil and also set up a liaison station in Milan.[1]: 18  In February 2024, the Hong Kong-based newspaper Ta Kung Pao partnered with the Heilongjiang Daily Newspaper Group to establish the Heilongjiang ICC, which focuses its external propaganda efforts on Russia and South Korea.[1]: 19 

In May 2024, the newspaper Zhejiang Daily established an ICC for the province.[5][15][1]: 9  It signed an agreement with the University of Nottingham Ningbo China the following month.[16] The province hosts at least 16 separate ICCs.[3] In June 2024, Tianjin formed an ICC that aims to "serve the country’s overall public diplomacy."[5][15] In June 2024, the Sichuan ICC inaugurated a branch center in São Paulo, Brazil in cooperation with Kuaishou.[17] In September 2024, the Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee of the CCP launched an ICC based in Lhasa to coordinate government narratives about the region.[18] The International Campaign for Tibet condemned the launch.[19]

As of December 2024, over 70 ICCs have been established.[16] Many have struggled with hiring talent as native-level foreign language skills are required and, therefore, have begun signing cooperation agreements with foreign universities for talent.[16]

References

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Thorne, Devin (December 10, 2024). "China's Propaganda Expansion: Inside the Rise of International Communication Centers (ICCs)" (PDF). Recorded Future. Archived (PDF) from the original on December 10, 2024. Retrieved 2024-12-21.
  2. ^ a b Bandurski, David (2024-07-04). "China Starts Influence Ranking for Cities". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-07-06. Retrieved 2024-12-22. China Daily is a critical and well-funded layer of the country's international communication array. It seems to be serving as a media partner for many newly-created ICCs, particularly at the city level, where there may be less media savvy, and fewer resources, to handle external communication.
  3. ^ a b Colville, Alex (2024-12-04). "Telling Zhejiang's Story". China Media Project. Retrieved 2024-12-04.
  4. ^ a b c d Fang, Shu (2024), Chang, Lu; de Araujo, Gabriel Antunes; Shi, Lei; Zhang, Qian (eds.), "Localization and Globalization, the Complexities and Strategies of Establishing Local International Communication Centers in China", Proceedings of the 2024 8th International Seminar on Education, Management and Social Sciences (ISEMSS 2024), Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, vol. 867, Paris: Atlantis Press, pp. 573–579, doi:10.2991/978-2-38476-297-2_72, ISBN 978-2-38476-296-5
  5. ^ a b c d e f Yang, Lin (2024-06-21). "Cities, provinces across China join global propaganda push". Voice of America. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  6. ^ Tang, Didi; Klepper, David (2024-09-28). "In global game of influence, China turns to a cheap and effective tool: fake news". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 2024-09-28. Retrieved 2024-12-06. Media groups at the local level are creating "international communication centers" to build an overseas presence with websites, news channels and social media accounts.
  7. ^ Myers, Steven Lee; Mozur, Paul; Kao, Jeff (2022-02-18). "How Bots and Fake Accounts Push China's Vision of Winter Olympic Wonderland". ProPublica. Archived from the original on 2022-03-08. Retrieved 2024-12-23.
  8. ^ Kilpatrick, Ryan Ho (2023-11-02). "Desert Power, Discourse Power". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-10-01. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  9. ^ Bandurski, David (2023-09-20). "Gilding the Panda". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-10-01. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  10. ^ a b Bandurski, David (2024-02-29). "China's Local Game of Global Propaganda". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-02-29. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  11. ^ Bandurski, David (2023-10-05). "Reading China's Media Counter-Attack". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2023-10-09. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  12. ^ "Shanghai United Media Group launches international communication center". Shanghai Daily. 2023-10-26. Archived from the original on 2023-11-01. Retrieved 2024-12-23.
  13. ^ Parete, Dalia; Bandurski, David (2024-01-04). "What Does It Mean to Understand China?". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-10-05. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  14. ^ Colville, Alex (2024-07-23). "How to Push China's Narrative Abroad". China Media Project. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  15. ^ a b Bandurski, David (2024-06-12). "More Local Centers for Global Propaganda". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-12-08. Retrieved 2024-12-22.
  16. ^ a b c Colville, Alex (2024-12-06). "China's Global Talent Crunch". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-12-06. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  17. ^ Bandurski, David (2024-06-28). "Olá Panda!". China Media Project. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  18. ^ Yang, William (2024-09-12). "China tries to reshape Tibet, Xinjiang narratives with new propaganda efforts". Voice of America. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
  19. ^ "Tibet rights organisation condemns launch of Chinese propaganda centre in Lhasa". Asian News International. September 13, 2024. Retrieved 2024-12-06.