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Hwasong-11B
The Hwasong-11B[a][b] (Korean: 《화성포-11나》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11B; KN-24 under United States’s naming convention)[7] is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled tactical ballistic missile. DesignThe Hwasong-11B bears an external resemblance to the American MGM-140 ATACMS and likely fills a similar role of supporting battlefield operations. Its aft-mounted aerodynamic fins are fixed rather than foldable like those on the ATACMS, requiring deployment from rectangular launch canisters. It flies in a "variable ballistic trajectory," flattening out at a lower altitude, below around 50 km (160,000 ft), than traditional SRBMs like the Scud, where the atmosphere is dense enough, so the missile's fins can maintain aerodynamic control over its entire flight and dive toward the target.[7][8][9] The use of INS updated with satellite-guidance data could make it accurate to within 100 meters CEP, or 200 meters using INS alone. Although the missile is outwardly similar to the ATACMS, it has demonstrated greater range, suggesting its physical dimensions are larger. It appears to share a common booster with the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and is estimated to carry a 400–500 kg payload with a unitary or submunition warhead. The Hwasong-11B is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, as its non-parabolic trajectory makes it more survivable against missile defense systems, and its increased accuracy reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[7][8][9] Despite their similarities to the ATACMS system, the Hwasong-11B is significantly larger, and likely uses the same motor as the Pukguksong-1 with similar jet vanes, and overall resembling a single stage version of it. The launch container has a width of about 1.26 m and a wheel diameter of 0.78 m, similar to the Pukguksong-2 tracked TEL. A number of images shown of the system appears to be manipulated, significantly increasing the size of the launcher.[10] With the missile fulfilling a similar role to the Hwasong-11A (KN-23), there should have been no need to develop another missile later with an overlapping performance. In an analysis of news reports from the Korean Central News Agency, despite the differences the KN-23 possesses from the 9K720 Iskander, the KN-23 is likely to be constructed with foreign assistance or foreign parts.[11] While all the news reports on the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) mainly focused on the deployment, 'demonstration of power' and newness of it, reports on the Hwasong-11B instead focused on the 'research' and 'development' in its first launch. Later launches of Hwasong-11B made mention of 'Juche weapons of Korean style', which is not mentioned at all for the Hwasong-11A (KN-23), hinting that whereas the Hwasong-11B underwent a research and development phase, the Hwasong-11A was already deployed prior to being tested, and likely having foreign involvement in some form.[11] In the “Self-Defence 2021”[c] military exhibition, North Korea revealed official name of the missile, which was previously only known by United States's designation (KN-24),[12][b] as well as a beige-coloured version of Hwasong-11B.[10] List of tests
Usage during Russian invasion of UkraineOn 15 February 2024, a Hwasong-11B was shot down in Ukraine, near Kyiv.[16] A day later, on 16 February 2024, Ukrainian data showed 24 missiles of the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B type being used by Russia, with overall low accuracy.[17] See also
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