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Teori pemilihan sosial atau pemilihan sosial adalah sebuah susunan teoterikal untuk analisis mengkombinasikan opini individual, preferensi, pemahaman atau kemampunan untuk mencapai keputusan kolektif atau kesejahteraan sosial dalam beberapa kasus.[1] Sebuah contoh non-teoretikal dari keputusan kolektif adalah membuat sebuah hukum atau merancang hukum-hukum di bawah sebuah konstitusi. Teori pemilihan sosial bermula dari rumusan paradoks pemungutan suara buatan Condorcet. Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) karya Kenneth Arrow dan teorema imposlibilitas Arrow di dalamnya umumnya dianggap sebagai dasar teori pemilihan sosial modern.[1] Selain teorema Arrow dan paradoks pemungutan suara, teorema Gibbard–Satterthwaite, teorema juri Condorcet, teorema pemilih median, dan teorema May merupakan beberapa hasil yang lebih dikenal dari teori pemilihan sosial.
Catatan
Referensi
- Kenneth J. Arrow, 1951, 2nd ed., 1963, Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley. ISBN 0-300-01364-7
- _____, 1972, Link to text of Nobel lecture with Section 8 on the theory and background.
- _____, 1983, Collected Papers, v. 1, Social Choice and Justice ISBN 0-674-13760-4
- Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya K. Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura, ed., 1997, Social Choice Re-Examined, 2 vol. ISBN 0-312-12739-1 & ISBN 0-312-12741-3
- _____, ed., 2002, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 1. Chapter-preview links.
- _____, ed., 2011, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, v. 2. Chapter-preview links.
- Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark, 2008. "social choice (new developments)," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract.
- John S. Dryzek and Christian List, 2003. "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation," British Journal of Political Science, 33(1), pp. 1-28. 2002 PDF link.
- Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano, 2006. Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd ed. ISBN 0-387-29367-1, ISBN 978-0-387-29367-7 Arrow-searchable chapter previews.
- Gaertner, Wulf (2006). A primer in social choice theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-929751-7.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1987, "interpersonal utility comparisons," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 2, pp. 955–58.
- Moulin, Herve (1988). Axioms of cooperative decision making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-42458-5.
- Nitzan, Shmuel (2010). Collective Preference and Choice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-72213-6.
- Lionel Robbins, 1935, 2nd ed.. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, ch. VI
- ____, 1938, "Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment," Economic Journal, 43(4), 635–41
- Amartya K. Sen, 1970 [1984], Collective Choice and Social Welfare. ISBN 0-444-85127-5 Description. Diarsipkan 2011-05-01 di Wayback Machine.
- _____, 1998, "The Possibility of Social Choice," Nobel lecture.
- _____, 1987, "social choice," The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, v. 4, pp. 382–93.
- _____, 2008. "social choice,". The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Abstract.
- Shoham, Yoav; Leyton-Brown, Kevin (2009). Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-89943-7. . A comprehensive reference from a computational perspective; see Chapter 9. Downloadable free online.
- Kotaro Suzumura, 1983, Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare. ISBN 0-521-23862-5
- Taylor, Alan D. (2005). Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-00883-2.
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